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Abstract 
READING NEUROSCIENCE: VENTRILOQUISM AS A METAPHOR FOR 
MULTIPLE READINGS OF SELF by DAVID CENYDD LLOYD EVANS 
This thesis argues that the consensus models of self forwarded and upheld in the fields of 
discourse most concerned with its description, indicate a process of ventriloquism where 
agency slips between dual poles of body and mind and cannot be tracked to a hiding 
place. Just as with ventriloquism, in these models of self it is unclear who is doing the 
'talking', and the skill of performance would seem to make the distinction almost 
redundant. The self seems a complicity of often conflicting agents when analysed as its 
constituent parts, and not there at all when viewed as a whole. This thesis takes as its 
starting point the confusion of Edgar Bergen when struggling to justify his philosophical 
conversations with his dummy: who is at work here, and where would agency reside in 
such a dialogue? That it serves us to assume the 'theory of mind' explanation for the 
behaviours of others, and by extension place ourselves within a scaffold of causal 
motives, says more for the use value of such a theory than for the presence of * mind'. 
Why this 'theory of mind' rather than any other? Because that is how mind and motive 
are presented to us during our acquisition of a spoken language. Mediation, 
transformation and referral: this thesis argues that these are qualities which characterize 
ventriloquism, and also the human means of perception and self-perception. There are a 
number of unfulfilled potentialities that reach their heaven in the unified self. The 'drive' 
to unity culls these lost futures and condemns us to another fulfilment, that of'oneness'. 
Most of these resolutions regarding self are predicated on what is ' in ' and what is 'out'; 
how does the discriminatory self establish grounds for inclusivity or exclusivity? This 
thesis means to provide a lexicon of other possibilities regarding the conceptualization of 
self. 
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Explanation of Methodology and Review of Literature 
The real motivations for this thesis are the saccades, the automatism and the ghostlike 
tissues that feature in the medical case histories I quote. For me, these spectral images 
have such potency that they dominate the mood and tone of the whole thesis. The purpose 
of this thesis, my interest in it, and its real aim is to set up the occasion for a certain sort 
of writing, and the writing of a certain few key passages of this thesis. The nature of those 
passages is more subjective, is more about mood or tone than the researched academic 
writing surrounding them. The academically inflected writing is intended as a *scene 
setting' that excuses those freer passages the need of a justification to exist. 
This thesis is not conventionally art work linked to a contextualizing document as 
practice-based PhDs are more usually presented. In this thesis the written document also 
enacts the ^practice* component of the PhD submission. This thesis was completed within 
the context of the Performance Writing field at Dartington College of Arts, and in this 
thesis the writing performs. The thesis concems performance, it features a performance, it 
constitutes a performance and it enacts a performance. In this thesis writing is made to 
perform. 
It perhaps explains my decision to pursue this research through an art college i f I 
explain my truer motives for writing this thesis. This thesis was motivated by a desire to 
string together a number of literary images. These images are either drawn from medical 
texts or their inspiration came from my having read so many medically related texts. This 
thesis should be seen as spreading from image to image: a narrative work which flows in 
opposition to the narrative self propounded in neuroscientific literature. I wanted to set up 
these images on a stage where my writing could perform. 
1 would like to compare the intentions and methods of this thesis with the kind of 
critical theory exemplified by Mikhail Bakhtin's Rabelais and his World (1971) and 
Raoul Vaneigem's The Movement of the Free Spirit (1986/1994). Although far apart in 
subject matter each book may be said to constitute a postulate of freedom. Freedom may 
only exist as this postulate, but the freedom exists as long as one is a reader of the book, 
perhaps also having an afteriife as measure or standard of all things that continue after the 
book has finished. Similariy I would like this thesis to indicate a kind of freedom in 
postulating the self; a self that would be unavailable solely from the narrower remit of 
neuroscience, and yet is equally discernible in the research literature of that discipline 
like a ghost in the glass. 
In many areas of writing (PhD theses, scientific and philosophical writing included) it 
is enough to write *about* whatever is the subject of one's study. This thesis aims to enact 
its argument without resorting to representation: it will do a thing rather than say a thing. 
This thesis is meant less to critique certain works or even disciplines than to instigate or 
indicate another way of thinking entirely that renders those works irrelevant. This thesis 
is intended to be the point that those works miss. 
The method of this thesis is intended to unravel through whatever reading the reader 
gives this thesis. The reader's feeling on conclusion of the reading is whatever this thesis 
was meant to suggest. The last thing intended is just to provide another idea for the 
reader's * encyclopaedia'. In poetry workshops one is taught that good writing should 
show and not tell. This thesis does not want just to tell the reader a new idea; the work 
has to enable the reader to see things differently or to think differently. To do that the 
reader must be placed in the discourse where that happens: in the medical evidence and 
psychological anomalies that contribute to the chapters of this thesis. It is in reviewing 
the physiological misdemeanours in which we fail to recognize ourselves as ourselves 
that I suggest our true reflection can be found. We are aghast at our finitude: what is 
eluded is often the point. 
This thesis is less about thought than it is about an action: performativity. I do not 
mean to persuade the reader of something but rather have the reader persuade him or 
herself, to put the reader where that happens in the medical and psychological anomalies I 
relate in this thesis. I want to disorientate the reader of this thesis with evidence from the 
mainstreams of psychology and neurology that seem to argue against the unitary self and 
against the authority of ratiocination. What this accumulation of case histories amounts to 
may seem like a medical black museum of horrors; I mean to overwhelm with detail and 
with convincing haptic reality the reader resistant to a sceptical reading of psychological 
and philosophical consensus regarding self. Something of my purpose, also, was in 
arguing against the confining, consensus-bolstering nature of academic research itself. 
In this thesis I often use medical evidence to make a point opposed to that it has been 
intended to make. Medical evidence has an haptic originality, a convincing viscerality, 
and a uniqueness or particularity which I wanted to adopt for my work. Spent too much 
time with it may feel like one has passed through the looking glass. The subjects of these 
medical case histories are reporting back, in some sense, on a worid we cannot always see 
but which we know all the time is there. In Wilder Penfield's delineation of post-ictal 
states (those states which immediately follow an epileptic seizure), there features a young 
man who, 
While in this state moved about in an automatic manner, got down on the fioor 
seeming to search for something, and finally tried to get into a bed that was not his 
own. When attendants attempted to put him into his own bed, he struggled against 
them. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 501) 
The young man in an automatic state is a very radical recording angel. He is my chief 
witness in attesting to the 'automatic' nature of self. This thesis is fiction in that it 
concerns the creation of character the way you or I constitute character ordinarily and the 
way that neuroscientific, psychological and philosophical consensus convenes on a 
common denominator for this practice. Does it matter who is talking? Only inasmuch as 
we say it does. Is character appointed to us in any way other than ostension? Does 
character accrete to us in any way other than this appointing? One does not need to resort 
to the 'thought experiments' of philosophy to study this: actual human beings in the 
extremis of medical case histories illustrate these philosophical causes. 
I am with Wittgenstein and Freud in thinking that we are "concealed in assertion and 
action and revealed in temptation and wish" (Cavell, 1969, p. 76). For this reason it is as 
important to this thesis to discuss the potential models we provide for the self as is it to 
discuss one's actual behaviour. It has been important for me to discuss these matters 
analogously; all of these dramas are enacted on a literary stage as metaphor. My chief 
metaphor in this thesis is the dyadic or confiated personae of ventriloquist and dummy. In 
ventriloquism there is an overiap like a Venn diagram and a confusion as to where 
character resides. The performative emphasis on the persona presented by the dummy 
means the performer is diffused between locations or inhabits uninhabitable sites of 
speech. Mostly I have fallen in love with the Grand Guignol or tragic element of case 
studies fundamental to neuroscience and wish to reflect on their end-of-pier 
characteristics. Describing the expressionist effect of ventriloquism on its misdirected 
audience, I felt no change in atmosphere from the case histories fundamental to the 
historically justified tenets of the brain sciences. There seemed to be the same processes 
at work. This is the theme I explore in this thesis, meaning to tease out its significance 
and wider ramifications. 
Why write a thesis related to science while based at a college with no science 
departments and with very few science connections? This thesis is dependent on 
scientific research and written reports for its content: a major concern of this thesis is the 
language used in medical and psychological descriptions of the human self, but the work 
in this thesis proceeds along two lines. I confess to a measure of subterfuge: in this thesis 
what might be called ^philosophy of science' (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 16) is often a vehicle 
for me to do a certain kind of writing which would not be possible in another field or 
discipline. The philosophy of science in this thesis is ingenuous and of sincere intent. 
The broader points of this thesis are about misconceptions regarding the perception of 
the self, but I also define a particular logical gap in the assumptions of neuroscientists. 
When a neuroscientist describes a particular mental process in neurological terms what is 
described is really a snapshot of a procedure and not an 'event' as such. By means of the 
retrospective prognostics of science, and its ontological certainty, what is really a cellular 
correlate of human affect is given as its cause. In medical science there is a doctrine of 
specific aetiology; that is, "for every disease there is specific cause" (Bakan, 1968, p. 11), 
Medical language, as I argue in this thesis, has an haptic actuality which trumps 
philosophy every time. I seek to redress the balance. How to present the logical flaws in 
neuroscientific assumption when neuroscience has the matter of brain activity in its realm 
whilst philosophy and critical theory have only words? It is axiomatic that neuroscience 
will assume precedence for these neural processes, rather than for the sociological or 
anthropological correlates. There is, of course, no logical reason why parallel neural 
activity should be understood as cause of observable human behaviour, psychology and 
character rather than as just its neurological correlate. Medical language has visceral 
certainty and empirical ^proof in opposition to any philosophical dubiety. 
It would be much easier and straightforward to make my points with an explicitly 
psychoanalytic methodology; to subject the beliefs and 'discoveries' of science and 
medicine regarding the self to psychoanalytic critique. I wanted to make my argument, 
though, from within the discourses I sought to critique; or rather, to use the evidence and 
research literature of neuroscience and philosophy of mind (which goes hand in hand 
with neuroscience) to undermine or contradict the doctrines of those same disciplines. 
My research has led me into conflict with the methods and discourses to which 
research itself is home. My research and writing are subject to the same strictures, 
handicaps and blinkers as all other academic research. Research is a discourse; the 
discourse creates a worid and describes what is permissible or desirable in that worid and 
what is not. Within a certain discourse only certain ways of saying are permitted and 
consequently only certain things can be said. In any given discourse, 
The constraints function to filter discursive potentials, interrupting possible 
connections in the communication networks; there are things that should not be said. 
They also privilege certain classes of statements (sometimes only one), whose 
predominance characterizes the discourse of the particular institution: there are things 
that should be said and there are ways of saying them. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 17) 
I would ask of PhD theses, are they questioning anything (even if that is the avowed 
intention), i f they repeat the rules and means of discourse of their critical forebears? The 
rules and means of discourse have written into them the possible outcome: the available 
ways of saying dictate what can be said. If one wants to challenge consensus or standard 
practice one has to bend the rules somewhat. In this thesis it may not appear where art 
practice stops and conceptualizing begins. This thesis aims to show and not tell. That is 
why this thesis is short of self-explanatory justification. The reader is trusted to find his 
or her own way through to the end. And whatever they find there is the subject of this 
thesis. 
You may expect a thesis that includes within it an idea (a notion, an instruction) of its 
own reading. You may expect this thesis to include within it a selected or prescribed 
notional reader. I do not want you to be this reader. I do not wish to present you with a 
thesis that conforms to Adomo's criticism of popular music, that in popular music "the 
composition hears for the listener" (Adorao, 2002, p. 442). This thesis tries to convey a 
conceit without resort to philosophy; that is, by the literary means of metaphor. 
Throughout this thesis I have resorted often to direct quotation from primary sources. 
The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, so much quotation removes the voice of the 
persons behind my writing in this thesis, and has a ventriloquial aspect which is pertinent 
in this context. It is formally apt to absent myself or make my point through the voice of 
another, given my use also of the extended metaphor of ventriloquism. Secondly, I mean 
to establish the points of view argued for by authorities in the fields of study I wish to 
critique. I felt that i f I let the readers of my thesis read for themselves what the claims 
were in the various disciplines I go on to critique, it would be less a case of the reader 
having to accept my interpretation of unfamiliar material and more a case of assessing it 
for themselves (although I recognize that the primary sources I quote are mediated by my 
selection). Principally I quote to let the readers of this thesis see for themselves what the 
arguments are of the various disciplines I critique, and thus minimize the 'swallowed 
whole' acceptance required of a reader unfamiliar with the core data of this thesis. 
The styles and modes of address I maintain in this thesis should not hobble a reading 
of its argument by anyone familiar with literary (particulariy poetic) methods. A reader 
familiar with the abrupt changes of tone or mode of address common to modemist poetry 
should have no trouble following my stylistic method in this thesis. Formal poetry also 
indicates a precedent for my methods in the writing of this thesis. Repetition, refrain and 
pastiche are factors in this work and also in poetic forms such as the sestina or the 
villanelle. I would also like to indicate the investigative or exploratory virtues of artistic 
form. 1 would suggest that, for instance, Bach's use of fugue carries artistic intent and 
achievement beyond the claims or control of the artist. I f one submits to the logic of an 
artistic form one is carried far further than individual aesthetic choice would direct. 
My approach to the source material of this thesis (from the fields of neuroscience, 
psychology, philosophy of mind, and medicine) is grounded in the form of an academic 
thesis. I have researched and read literature from a variety of academically robust 
disciplines: neuroscience, psychology, philosophy of mind, and neurology. I have not left 
the bounds of academic rigour in my treatment of those primary sources. I have read and 
cited a broad range of theories and research data from within those disciplines, but I've 
wanted to report and quote principally from their mainstreams. This is a point I want to 
stress: in order to illustrate the validity of my criticisms it is necessary for the reader to 
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see that the ideas I critique, and the evidence or theories I use to critique them, are 
broadly accepted and to a degree incontrovertible within their fields. What I have 
attempted to assess and critique is the consensus within those fields of study 
(neuroscience, philosophy of mind, psychology and medicine). 
In this thesis I attempt to show the way that concepts or conversational tropes from 
the world of folk psychology form the basis for a priori assumptions in science. I also 
attempt to show that concepts, or models of understanding, from the scientific field leak 
back into or inform conceptual models in everyday thinking and speech. This thesis is 
intended to be more than a gloss on the current vogue for accessibly written books by 
neuroscientists, or of current attitudes and policies in neurology. This thesis is intended 
also as more than unquestioning retread of the ideas central to philosophy of mind of the 
last 15 years. My educational background is not in those fields but in the fields of art and 
critical theory. My modes of writing fit within the artistic or literary realm; my means of 
expressing ideas depends on a familiarity with literary styles and modes of address. 
Wishing to challenge the starting points for thinking in those fields of discourse which 
are the subjects of the thesis (principally neuroscience and philosophy of mind), I have 
approached them with a critical and questioning perspective which seems more at home 
in an art college. Having spent time in philosophy faculties 1 now miss the occasion for 
debate but 1 do not miss the rigid regard for disciplinary boundaries. I suspect the only 
field in which 1 could have done this research and writing is in the form of a PhD thesis 
submitted through an art college. Here I have been able to conduct research in whatever 
field seems appropriate to my task, understanding that it is the quality of my research, 
thinking and writing that determines the success of my work, rather than the proscribed 
negotiating of disciplinary boundaries. In this way, my written thesis forms both the 
artistic practice and the contextualizing document elements of my doctoral submission. 
Despite this artistic approach to enacting the logic of my thesis rather than spelling it 
out, the researching and presentation of this document accord with the formal and 
standards required of a written doctoral thesis. I have researched, organized and 
addressed a wide field of texts within several discrete disciplines, taking a cross-
disciplinary approach to study. In the following survey of literature I mean to show that I 
am cognizant of, and qualified to fairiy critique the range of assumptions and conclusions 
that define these different academic disciplines. In critiquing the stance inherent in, and 
fundamental to, these different disciplines, I mean not to attack their protagonists as straw 
men. My approach to the research (theirs and mine) is sincere and ingenuous, but means 
to point out certain category errors which I think undermine their fundamental 
approaches and a priori assumptions. 
Precedents for my writing exist in philosophy and critical theory. From the field of 
philosophy my main methodological influence comes from the later work of 
Wittgenstein. As Stanley Cavell has written: 
[Wittgenstein's later writing] is deeply practical and negative, the way Freud*s is. And 
like Freud's therapy, which wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied 
by inner change. Both of them are intent upon our masking the defeat of our real need 
in the face of self-impositions which we have not assessed or fantasies (^pictures') 
which we cannot escape. In both, such misfortune is betrayed in the incongruence 
between what is said and what is meant or expressed; for both, the self is concealed in 
assertion and action and revealed in temptation and wish. Both thought of their 
negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of knowledge, and both were obsessed 
by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood - partly, doubtless, because they 
knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter. (Cavell, 1969, p. 76) 
Without wishing to claim the depth or profundity creditable to Wittgenstein's or Freud's 
work, I wish to share some of their aims, as here delineated by Stanley Cavell. The aim of 
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creating a work whose import is unappreciable if "unaccompanied by inner change" in 
the reader, is an aim that has motivated my writing of this thesis also. Similarly, my intent 
or the 'purpose' of this thesis my be unappreciable if one does not share the doubts and 
confusion of its author, confusion the thesis is intended to counter or engage with. 
Wittgenstein wrote that the results of philosophy are "the uncovering of one or other 
piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head 
up against the limits of language" (quoted in Monk, 1990, pp. 365-366); to which his 
biographer Ray Monk has responded: 
Whether such explanations would mean anything to people who have themselves 
experienced such 'bumps' remains doubtful. But then, the method was not developed 
for such people, just as Freudian analysis was not developed for the psychologically 
unconcerned. Philosophical Investigations - more, perhaps, than any other 
philosophical classic - makes demands, not just on the reader's intelligence, but on his 
involvement. Other great philosophical works - Schopenhauer's World and 
Representation, say - can be read with interest and entertainment by someone who 
'wants to know what Schopenhauer said'. But if Philosophical Investigations is read in 
this spirit it will very quickly become boring, and a chore to read, not because it is 
intellectually difficult, but because it will be practically impossible to gather what 
Wittgenstein is 'saying'. For, in truth, he is not saying anything; he is presenting a 
technique for the unravelling of confusions. Unless these are your confusions, the book 
will be of very little interest. (Monk, 1990, p. 366) 
Again not wishing to lay claim to the brilliance of Wittgenstein I would wish to excuse 
my thesis in these same terms. 
As well as his influence on the style or approach to writing in my thesis, 
Wittgenstein's critical perspective as regards scientific thinking is relevant to my own. 
'Discoveries' in science and philosophy are better understood as grammatical innovations 
rather than indicative of any located 'presence'. It says nothing of the essential properties 
of, for instance, 'consciousness' that scientists or lay-persons can use the term with 
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something like consensual understanding. Just because we can talk about it does not 
mean that it is there. 
In [Wittgenstein's] thinking about psychology, mathematics, aesthetics and even 
religion, his central criticism of those with whom he disagrees is that they have 
confused a grammatical position with a material one, and have presented as a 
discovery something that should properly be seen as grammatical innovation... Thus, 
in his view, Freud did not discover the unconscious; rather, he introduced terms like 
'unconscious thoughts' and 'unconscious motives' into our grammar of psychological 
description. Similarly, Georg Cantor did not discover the existence of an infinite 
number of infinite sets; he introduced a new meaning of the word 'infinite' such that it 
now makes sense to talk of a hierarchy of different infinities. The question to ask of 
such innovations is not whether these 'newly discovered' entities exist or not, but 
whether the additions they have made to our vocabulary and the changes they have 
introduced to our grammar are useful or not. (Monk, 1990, p. 468) 
There were a number of ideas I was familiar enough to gesture at, but wanted to go 
further and state explicidy. This thesis was my opportunity to explore and propose 
explicitly those 'unthought knowns,' to transform them from gesture or trope into text. I 
would like to say, with Raoul Vaneigem: 
The sheer number of texts that had to be uncovered... added to the cursory nature of 
this project. And if this contributed to its lack of completeness I must reserve myself 
that right - just as I also claim the right to the biases that can be found in this book. For 
these are the biases of anyone who undertakes subjective investigations, whether he 
does so under the pretence of objectivity or not: and I prefer to own up to the influence 
of those personal desires that move in accordance with the unfolding of one's own 
tangled destiny. (Vaneigem, 1986/1998, p. 13) 
As topics came up during research, which I knew could provide supporting evidence for 
my thesis, I followed their lead, even into unfamiliar areas of study. I was as unfamiliar 
with, say, medical arguments regarding the pronounced time of brain death as perhaps my 
examiners are on approaching this thesis. Before researching and writing this thesis I 
knew nothing of 'theory of mind', commissurotomy, the 'McGurk effect', or surgical 
treatment of epilepsy. It was my interest to research how the self is represented 
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physiologically, or neuro-anatomically; or rather the ways in which philosophical 
meanings are substantiated by resort to medicine. I was increasingly aware that these 
approaches to self, mind, (and its attributes memory, intelligence, etc.), and 
consciousness are problematic and perhaps specious subjects for study. I was aware also 
that the work of the British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott (Newman, 1995) and the 
Russian linguistic theorist Bakhtin (1971) both represented the self as a more plural 
inhabitation. I wanted to investigate the ways in which philosophy and its ally medicine 
both commonly miss the point, by committing to a fundamental category error in their 
approach to the self and its attributes. To do this I use an extended metaphor 
(ventriloquism) such as extended metaphor is used in poetry. 
Philosophers other than Wittgenstein quoted in this thesis include Quine, Strawson 
and Thomas Nagel. If Daniel Dennett is the most quoted philosopher in this thesis it is 
because he is the most influential in the field known as philosophy of mind. This field 
would also include Daniel Wegner, the Churchlands, Kathleen Wilkes, Julian Jaynes and 
George Ainslie. Jaynes, Wilkes and Ainslie are the most important of these to the 
conceptualizing and approach present in this thesis. Their work might also be included in 
a list of psychologists whose work is important to this thesis. From the fields of 
psychology and psychiatry I would list as influential writers: Richard Bentall, David 
Healy, Thomas Szasz, R. D. Laing, and the historically important work of Bleuler and 
Scneider. These last two could also be listed as contributors in the field of medicine, a list 
which would also include Sperry, Bogen and Gazzaniga, Penfield and Jasper, and D. A. 
Shewmon. These writers might also be classed as neuroscientists, from which field I 
choose as influential representatives Mark Solms, LeDoux, Changeux, A. Damasio and 
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V, S. Ramachandran. From the field of linguistics I have delineated the theories of 
Vygotsky and Bakhtin. Lastiy, from the field of critical theory I have quoted Lyotard and 
Feyerabend. Interestingly, Feyerabend is often credited with introducing the term 'folk 
psychology'' (an important term in the context of this thesis), in his essay Materialism 
and the Mind-Body Problem (1963). 1 have referred to this essay by Feyerabend often 
when researching the methodological approach of this thesis and although his essay 
concems what could otherwise be termed 'folk psychology'. Feyerabend makes no use of 
that term. Where, then, does the term originate? I quote this anomalous missing link as 
emblematic of the attitude of this thesis generally: evidence neariy never presents the 
argument that accretes to it, or can be made to say whatever you will. A consensus 
position can pertain to a theory which cannot support it. As researcher one has only to lift 
a single pebble of doubt to find not supporting evidence but a rabbit hole leading God 
knows where. 
See, for instance, Bentall (2003), p. 530 
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Chapter One: Ventriloquism 
Picture a ventriloquist practising his or her hidden dialogue for the dummy, the 
speech becoming more and more indiscemible to an observing worid. Two selves is it, or 
one self in two places? That mediated self who has leamt his or her lines, and that 
conferring, complicitous self who schemes to 'get things right'. Ventriloquist Edgar 
Bergen regulariy performed a sketch that began with his discovery of his dummy, Charlie 
MacCarthy, reading a book entitled 'Ventriloquism: Its Cause and Prevention' (Connor, 
2000, p. 408). Who speaks for whom? 
The story I like to tell is when my father was writing the 'Edgar Bergen and Chariie 
McCarthy Show'. One time my father and I came into Edgar's room. He didn't know 
we were watching him. Edgar was talking to Charlie and we thought he was 
rehearsing, but he was not rehearsing. He was asking Chariie questions: 'Charlie, 
what is the nature of life? Chariie, what is the nature of love?' And this wooden 
dummy was answering quite unlike the being J knew on the radio. A regular wooden 
Socrates, he was. It was the same voice but it was very different altogether. And 
Bergen would get fascinated and say, 'Well, Chariie, what is the nature of true 
virtue?' and the dummy would just pour out this stuff: beauty, elegance, brilliant. 
And then we got embarrassed and coughed. Bergen looked around and turned beet 
red and said, 'Oh, hello, you caught us.' And my father said, 'What were you doing?' 
And he said, 'Oh, I was talking with Chariie. He's the wisest person I know.' And my 
father said, 'But that's your mind; that's your voice coming through that wooden 
creature.' And Ed said, 'Well, I guess ultimately it is, but I ask Chariie these questions 
and he answers, and I haven't the faintest idea of what he's going to say and I'm 
astounded by his brilliance-so much more than I know.' (philosopher Jean Houston 
quoted in KJimo, 1987, p. 229) 
Having a 'mind', being a 'self, being in possession of'consciousness', this thesis argues 
that these are metaphorical procedures. Their procedures are enacted suppositionally or 
'as i f , but are not understood as doing so by science or philosophy. 'Mind,' 'self and 
'consciousness' have metaphorical status but are taken as 'real' in medical and 
psychological discourse. This thesis takes the ventriloquist act as central metaphor in 
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1. Edgar Bergen in Chariie McCarthy's shadow . 
(Image reproduced from Asbury, 2003, p. 24) 
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indicating the limits for the designations of the terms 'mind', 'self and 'consciousness' 
as presented in medical and psychological discourse. This thesis takes the ventriloquist 
act as analogous to the act of being a self, of'consciousness', of'mind' as presented in 
neuroscience, psychology and folk psychology. This thesis advances the proposition that 
it is the bewitchment by language that leads to belief in 'mind' as more than an abstract 
conceit, to believe that its suppositional space and characteristics are inscribed in the laws 
of physics, or in physiological and anatomical presence. This thesis advances the notion 
that the appearance of 'mind' and 'consciousness' in our language does not prove 
anything beyond the grammatical viability of the terms; just because it suits and serves 
consensually to believe there are physiological presences 'behind' these terms does not 
make it so. Theory of mind, the utilitarian practicality of folk psychology, medical and 
philosophical metaphor, these are bewitching portraits of things that this thesis argues are 
tricks of the light, a dumb show which has the illusory depth of a stage act. 
This thesis explores similarities between the act of ventriloquism and what is termed 
neuronal man (Changeux, 1983), or the synaptic self (LeDoux, 2002). This thesis quotes 
from manuals on ventriloquism to explore similarities between the ventriloquist act and 
the medically, psychologically and folk psychologically conceived self; the gestural 
overiapping of act of ventriloquism and act of self. Descriptions in neuroscientific 
literature describing the processes of'being a self, of consciousness, of memory, and of 
'mind' come close to describing ventriloquial procedures enacting the same. Mediation, 
the act of animating a figure, the metaphorical in the theory of mind, the animating spirit 
of self or character, confusion and referral in the speaking for and speaking from: these 
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are played out in the performance of ventriloquism and in the neurologically and folk 
psychologically defined self. 
This thesis provides a compendium of altematives to the 'intentional stance' in 
philosophy. When I began this thesis I was unaware that there was an alternative to the 
'intentional stance'. The 'intentional stance' has been characterized as follows: 
We must move beyond the text; we must interpret it as a record of speech acts; not 
mere pronunciations or recitations but assertions, questions, answers, promises, 
comments, requests for clarification, out-loud musings, self-admonitions. 
This sort of interpretation calls for us to adopt what I call the intentional stance: we 
must treat the noise-emitter as an agent, indeed a rational agent, who harbours beliefs 
and desires and other mental states that exhibit intentionality or 'aboutness,' and whose 
actions can be explained (or predicted) on the basis of the content of these states. Thus 
the uttered noises are to be interpreted as things the subjects wanted to say, of 
propositions they meant to assert, for instance, for various reasons. (Dennett, 1991, 
p. 76 [Dennet's italics]) 
The 'intentional stance' is the philosophical substantiation of the position maintained in 
folk psychology: that of assuming intention for the agent concemed, assuming a 
psychological inner life characterized by motive and desire. 'Theory of Mind', as 
characterized in psychology and psychiatry, is also unthinkable without a sense of the 
intentionality of human behaviour and mental agency; indeed, theory of mind might be 
said to be the plan adopted when assuming an 'intentional stance' for oneself and others. 
Intentionality is the 'aboutness' that links human thought to the worid it concems. 
Despite the immaterial, insubstantial qualities of the 'intentional stance' (whose drives 
take place in an invisible, conceptual realm), it is the default belief system of 
neuroscience. That there is something like an alternative to this approach I discovered 
only by trial and error whilst researching this thesis. Julian Jaynes's book The Origin of 
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976) presents an altemative 
'archaeology' of self and consciousness, one where intention, as we know it, is less than 
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central and often absent altogether. Benjamin Libet's (Libet et al, 1979 and 1983) 
experiments in psychology again displace intention from the centre of the picture of the 
human self, indicating the retrospective imputation of volition or agency. Daniel 
Wegner's book The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) backs up this evidence as it applies 
philosophically. The commissurotomy studies of Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen (1969) 
indicate the arbitrary, contingent presence of consciousness by describing the alternative 
inlentionality of confabulation and so-called *split-brain' consciousness. George Ainslie's 
books Picoeconomics (1992) and Breakdown of Will (2001) use an economic model to 
'breakdown' the facets and factions often lumped together as a single will or agency, and 
represent the self rather as an arbitrary confluence of bargaining agents, held together 
only by the space they share. 
I don't think any of these books and studies set out to counter the 'intentional stance', 
but I cite them in defence of an alternative. The picture of the self that emerges from 
these studies is multifarious and contradictory, is plural or often absent. The evidence 
from the commissurotomy studies, for instance, gives a picture of the self that can be 
conceptualized in any number of ways. I aim to give substance to these paradoxical 
claims for the self by presenting a hydra of voices as they contest the single self. That I 
often quote direcUy from primary sources indicates my ventriloquial assessment of these 
claims; each claim is heard in its own voice and not subsumed into a seamless text. That 
these claims for a multiple self are many faceted means this thesis amounts to a prism of 
contending voices. 
This thesis argues that the conversational validity of the terms 'mind,' 'self and 
'consciousness' does not indicate a presence beyond a grammatical role. The viewpoint 
19 
of this thesis incorporates Wittgenstein's scepticism regarding the referents necessitated 
by grammatical terms. 
In [Wittgenstein's] thinking about psychology, mathematics, aesthetics and even 
religion, his central criticism of those with whom he disagrees is that they have 
confused a grammatical proposition with a material one, and have presented as a 
discovery something that should property be seen as grammatical innovation... Thus, 
in his view, Freud did not discover the unconscious; rather, he introduced terms like 
'unconscious thoughts' and 'unconscious motives' into our grammar of psychological 
description. Similariy, Georg Cantor did not discover the existence of an infinite 
number of infinite sets; he introduced a new meaning of the word 'infinite' such that it 
now makes sense to talk of a hierarchy of different infinities. The question to ask of 
such innovations is not whether these 'newly discovered' entities exist or not, but 
whether the additions they have made to our vocabulary and the changes they have 
introduced to our grammar are useful or not. (Monk, 1990, p. 468) 
This thesis applies this Willgensteinian understanding of language in a reading of medical 
and psychological terms referring to the self: 
The whole modem conception of the worid is founded on the illusion that the so-called 
laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. (Wittgenstein quoted in 
Monk, 1990, p. 139). 
It is within the power of language to confer presence on referents that have only 
conceptual status. Medical language is infomed by a particulariy haptic significance; the 
referents of its terms are visceral. Because one can talk of a 'synaptic self or a 'neuronal 
self one can conceive of these things; these terms link anatomical matter ('synapses'. 
'neurons') with a contestably material or immaterial property ('self). This thesis argues 
that these are innovations in grammar that do not contribute anything useful to the 
language; they simply reinforce certain second-order philosophical concepts that both 
science and folk psychology would do better to be without. 
In concerning myself with these terms I am stressing the importance of language in 
configuring the self I side with Wittgenstein in his concern regarding bewitchment by 
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language. A picture of the self is the self. Language is pernicious and we are susceptible. 
Its terms get under the skin. Only the language of medicine is actually under the skin. 
Philosophers constantiy see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to 
anything, or to explain anything. (Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 18) 
It is a feature of philosophical debates regarding 'consciousness' or 'mind' that 
philosophers share journal space with neurosurgeons, and with behavioural or 
developmental psychologists. Indeed there are a number of incidences where 
neuroscientists and philosophers work together; for instance, V. S. Ramachandran has 
written a paper with Patricia S. Churchland (Churchland and Ramachandran, 1998) in 
which the essay is presented as written in a meld of undifferentiated voices. Medical 
language has a transparency that literary language can never match. It seems difficult for 
a scientist to spot a metaphor, and the mechanistic pictures of neural events described 
above are trusted in scientific terms not as representational but as verisimilitude. Thomas 
Szasz writes that: 
Although most people assume that educated persons know what a metaphor is, I have 
learned that this may not be so. Medical students are educated persons. But most of 
them do not know what a metaphor is. Medical students often ask me what I mean 
when I say that mental illness is not a real illness, and I sometimes try to explain it by 
drawing a distinction between the literal and metaphorical uses of the word illness. 
One day, before beginning my explanation, I asked if anyone in the group - there must 
have been about 20 students sitting around the table - could define metaphor. Half of 
them raised their hands. I tumed to one and asked him to tell us. He said he knew 
what a metaphor is but could not define it. I suggested he give us an example. He 
thought for a moment and then said: 'My mind is a blank.' And not one single student 
laughed. It was then I realized that they did not know what a metaphor is; and perhaps 
why so many people do not, or cannot, distinguish literal diseases, such as cancer and 
heart disease, from metaphorical diseases, such as lovesickness and mental illness. 
(Szasz, 1987/1997, p. 135) 
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1 quote Szasz here to establish that I am not alone in supposing medical consensus naive 
in its use and undersunding of metaphor. This thesis questions the absolutism of medical 
language and asks what it hides regarding the abstract conceits dependent on consensus 
understanding of the terms 'self and 'mind'. 
This thesis employs written evidence from the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, 
linguistics, and neuroscience to imply another kind of self than that which is the 
consensus in any of those disciplines. The work and evidence quoted is not from the 
furthest reaches of any of those disciplines but from their mainstream. Each of those 
disciplines supports a consensus of opinion regarding the self. This thesis argues that the 
work of the writers and researchers here quoted argues for a very different kind of self 
than that ever pictured or propounded as consensus. This thesis argues that the sciences 
and methodologies quoted from influence, and are influenced by the folk psychology 
which represents the 'unthought known' regarding the human self. As this thesis shall 
explain: folk psychology influences science which in tums feeds back its findings to 
influence folk psychological perspectives on those same matters. 'Folk psychology' 
becomes a key concept in this thesis, and is understood as denoting: 
The prescientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized 
humans deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the behaviour 
of humans and higher animals. This framework includes concepts such as belief, 
desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, 
sympathy, intention, and so forth. It embodies our baseline understanding of the 
cognitive, affective, and purposive nature of people. Considered as a whole, it 
constitutes our conception of what a person is. (Churchland, 1998, p. 3) 
This thesis uses the metaphor of ventriloquism to critique the model of self forwarded 
in the disciplines of neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy and linguistics, 
and uses evidence from within those disciplines to extend this metaphor. This thesis finds 
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many instances where neuroscientific and other extant scientific models of self support or 
mirror this ventriloquial model. This thesis argues that the self has less to do with 
unilateral agency than with the phantoms of such and follows this concern as it appears in 
neuroscientific literature, and in the literatures of behavioural and developmental 
psychology, and philosophy of mind. I approach these topics by means of the most 
frequently aired concepts: self, mind, memory and consciousness. Consciousness is a key 
concept because it seems to define all that follows. Without clarity as regards the term, or 
without agreement as to what the term might refer, any discussion of the nicer points of 
phenomenology (that is, the means and process of perceiving and the means of describing 
and classifying the 'objects' of perception) is previous, or building on a false premise. 
Unfortunately most discussions of this phenomenological process depend on acceptance 
of the consensus viewpoint: that consciousness is a central and essential facet of human 
experience, and that perception is inconsiderable without being grounded in this concept. 
Julian Jaynes's work is a dissenting voice amongst psychologists. Amongst 
neuroscientists, whatever conceptual muddle defines 'consciousness' is the underpinning 
architecture of perception. In neuroscientific literature consciousness is neariy always 
presented in 'black and white' terms, as a given and only infinitely defineable and not 
dismissable. I go on to explore these problems in more depth in the chapters that follow. 
Vygotsky's behavioural observations of the formation of 'theory of mind' concepts in 
children do not assert the truth-value of 'theory of mind' propositions. There is utility 
value in assuming emotional motives and desires as explanations 'behind' the behaviour 
of a care-giver; this is not to plasticize those assumptions neurally or to see in them an 
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essential truth of human substance. To seek physiological correlates of these concepts is 
indeed to confiate a grammatical proposition with a material one. 
In our effort to understand illness in purely medical terms, we have stumbled into a 
great confusion. We have done so because of a stubbom refusal to see that although the 
idea of illness is rooted in a medical context, certain nonmedical - for example, moral, 
economic, and political - factors play a decisive role in imparting meaning to it. 
(Szasz, 1986/1997, p. 18) 
Language is as culturally bound in medicine as it is elsewhere, but only in medicine does 
it have the evidence of the body. Psychology (and philosophy of mind) works out its 
concepts in the subjective intimacy of 'self, 'mind' and 'consciousness,' but wants the 
truth-value that medical language can confer. 
In emphasizing the fluidity of the grammatical/material distinction, [Wittgenstein] 
was drawing attention to the fact that concept-formation - and thus the establishing of 
rules for what it does and does not make sense to say - is not something fixed by 
immutable laws of logical form but is something that is always linked with a custom, a 
practice. Thus, different customs or practices would presuppose different concepts 
from the one we find useful. And this in tum would involve the acceptance of different 
rules (to determine what does and does not make sense) to the ones we, in fact, have 
adopted. (Monk. 1990, p. 469) 
The questions asked by this thesis are not meant disingenuously and are intended to 
be read as sincere inquiry. There is, however, a form of ventriloquism that is taking place 
in the construction of this thesis. I quote from medical and psychological discourse at 
length in order to highlight aspects I find problematic in their modes of address. There is 
a dissembling spirit at work in that I advance my own arguments by means of quotation 
from others. It is an act of detoumement (Plant, 1992, pp. 86-89), which allows me often 
to find other meanings than those intended by the writers quoted. I mean not to set up 
straw men as targets, but to highlight the equivocal in scientific research and the way that 
consensus often over-rules enquiry. Often this detouraement is a form of ventriloquism; 
my thesis seeks to allow disparate voices of authority their own contending claims, much 
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in the manner that Charlie McCarthy and Edgar Bergen would argue during their radio 
broadcasts (Bergen, 1964). I quote also for veracity: when I indicate what I consider the 
consensus in any discipline I substantiate the claim by recourse to words from the 
disciplines themselves. 
This thesis aims to explain why ^consciousness' is a redundant concept, to 
neuroscience and folk psychology alike. Whereas folk psychology regularly uses terms 
where definition is vague or has never been attempted, in science this would seem to be a 
problem. Presumably psychology would seek to differ itself from folk psychology by the 
clarity and robustness of its terms. 
In the 1963 feature film Devil Do// (1963) ventriloquist The Great Vorelli does not 
draw applause by just 'voice-throwing*. The crowd is not amazed by his act of 
ventriloquism: it is the dummy walking that draws the applause. The dummy Hugo can 
walk and talk even when separated from his ventriloquist. This 'Devil Doll' confusion 
surrounding a dummy activated by remote agency is founded in Cartesian dualism and is 
an extension of that theory and is consistent with it. The explanation of the self in 
contemporary neuroscience is as equally riven by Cartesian dualism. The self/mind is a 
projection, or is an 'emergent property' of the body/brain; that is, the self is consistent 
with, and a direct result of the neuronal action of human cellular matter. Body equals 
brain equals self. Even allowing for 'feedback', for 'response', for 'organic mutability' at 
a genetic level, and as regards brain development, neuronal activity equals self. The one 
is explicable always by the other. In current neuroscience the self is the mechanical 
expression or act of neurons, and is explicable by that action always. 
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What is most interesting to me in approaching this thesis is that these issues depend 
crucially on linguistic and etymological interpretation, and devolve on the spoken and 
written word. All of these concerns seem to devolve upon a metaphor that of the *space' 
of consciousness, the place upon which we introspect, and to which we defer 
epistemological debate. All of the concerns of *seir might be said to metaphorical; all the 
ills that concern this thesis might be said to be semantic ailments. To clarify these terms 
then might provide a cure, or at least a better understanding of the symptoms. 
The term *conscious(ness)' and its cognates are relatively recent to the English 
language (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 18). The term 'consciousness* did not appear in English until 
1678. The term *self-conscious' does not appear in English until 1690. French and 
German equivalent terms appear around the same time. By another estimate (Whyte, 
1962, p. 43) 'conscious' as meaning 'inwardly sensible or aware' first appears in English 
in 1620, The term 'consciousness' meaning 'the state of being conscious' appears in 
1678. 'Self-conscious' meaning 'consciousness of one's own thoughts' appears in 1690. 
Whyte also points out that the Latin root of 'con-scious' means 'to know with' or 'to 
share knowledge with another' and this was the meaning of the term in its original 
English usage. 
It is interesting to track the appearance of these terms as they define a particular view 
of the self in English philosophy. In Leviathan {\65i) Thomas Hobbes spells out the 
apparent development of what is meant by the current use of the English term 
'conscious(ness)': 
When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be 
CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And 
because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third: it was, and 
ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience: or to 
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corrupt, or force another to do so: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience has been 
always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the 
same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret 
thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand 
witnesses. (Hobbes, 1651/1996, p. 48) 
In this usage Hobbes is aware of the etymological root of the word 'conscious' in 'cum-
scire*, meaning 'to share knowledge with another' (Wilkes, 1988b, p. 203), and uses the 
word in this sense. Here is Locke writing in 1689: 
[A person] is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to 
me, essential to it; it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that 
he does perceive...For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that 
which makes every one to be what he calls himself. (Locke, 1689/1997, p. 302) 
And in 1748 David Hume wrote that "the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known" 
and "consciousness never deceives" (Hume quoted in Wilkes, 1988a, p. 23). 
These are all descriptions of a very particular type of man, one whose ideas of a self 
precede his will to be a certain sort of person. *1 am my thoughts' he seems to say, 'and 
the rest is a smelly bag of bones'. *1 am my thoughts and my thoughts are known to me.' 
In this picture of a person we are being spoken by our language, with no visceral 
infiltration. And our words belong to our thoughts. What about those words we have said 
but wish we hadn't? Or wanted to say but couldn't? Or are ashamed of? Or condemned 
by? What of those words which lose us friends? 
In 1640 Rene Descartes wrote in a letter to Mersenne: 
That nothing can be in me, that is to say, in my mind, of which lam not conscious, this 
is something which I have proved in my Meditations, and it follows from the fact that 
the soul is distinct from the body and that its essence is to think. (Descartes, 1970, 
p. 90) 
27 
As can be seen from the preceding group of quotations from philosophical works, the 
Cartesian view of human minds quickly became the accepted and authoritative model in 
Western Europe. Although previous to Descartes and these English Empiricist voices it 
had been easier to accept the mind as sometimes unfathomable or at least occasionally 
unclear, by the eighteenth century mental activity was characterized by this infallible 
'conscious' introspection. Richard Rorty (1980) has pointed out that it seems new to 
Descartes, and those European thinkers who followed, to conceive of human mental 
activity as all taking place in the one arena; the 'Cartesian theatre' that has caused 
consternation in European thought ever since. 
The novelty was the notion of a single inner space in which bodily and perceptual 
sensations ('confused ideas of sense and imagination' in Descartes* phrase), 
mathematical truths, moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression, and all the rest 
of what we now call 'mental' were objects of quasi-observation. (Rorty, 1980, p. 50) 
This is not particularly different in essence to medical consensus today: 
Every medical student in introductory neuroscience learns a basic set of facts about 
the brain, among which the following two are key to the issue of *brain death': 
(1) The brain is central integrator of the human body. 
(2) With respect to consciousness: 
a) the cerebral hemispheres (particularly the neocortex) mediate the content of 
consciousness, and 
b) the brain stem (specifically the ascending reticulator activating system) mediates 
arousal. 
These principles are so fundamentally and so universally accepted as established 
beyond doubt that their truth is simply taken for granted in professional circles. 
(Shewmon, 1997, p. 35) 
Where might 'consciousness' be located? Folk psychology would seem to locate 
consciousness in the head. What are the reasons for locating one's consciousness in one's 
head? Julian Jaynes, a psychologist, wrote in his book The Origin of Consciousness in the 
Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind: 
Where does consciousness take place? Everyone, or almost everyone, immediately 
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(Image reproduced from Hercat, 1916, p. 45) 
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replies, in my head. This is because when we introspect, we seem to look inward on an 
inner space somewhere behind our eyes. But what on earth do we mean by 'look'? We 
even close our eyes sometimes to introspect even more clearly. Upon what? (Jaynes, 
1976, p. 44) 
By 'looking' in this way we grant consciousness a spatial character. We 'search our 
mind' for the right answer to a question. The answer is 'in there somewhere'. Can we 
characterize this space and, if so, what would it look like? Locating this space in our 
heads, we assume it is similarly located in the heads of others. When we talk we maintain 
an eye contact. This is to assume a space behind those eyes into which we consider 
ourselves to be talking. The space we imagine ourselves talking into is located and 
constructed similarly to the space we imagine ourselves talking from. To quote Julian 
Jaynes: 
This is the very heartbeat of the matter. For we know perfectly well that there is no 
such space in anyone's head at all! There is nothing inside my head or yours except 
physiological tissue of one sort or another. And the fact that it is predominantly 
neurological tissue is irrelevant. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 45) 
This is a form of ventriloquism that is taking place, both in our instigation of a space 
of consciousness * somewhere behind our eyes' and in our supposition of a similar space 
behind the eyes of our interlocutor. It is an imaginary space that we speak from and to. It 
is not an anatomical space. Look and we cannot find it. And the placing of that space is 
an arbitrary matter. There might be practical reasons for locating that space within our 
bodies: nearness to sources of visceral data, immediacy of neuromuscular activity, etc. 
More likely it revolves around the misappellation in synecdoche. It may make practical 
sense to refer to a person's 'mind' when implicating an invisible calculating device, or 
emotional motives in trying to understand a person's behaviour, but to come to see the 
whole as only ever representative of the part is to misunderstand the role of metaphor. 
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If a chess player is mulling over his next move, it follows that he isn't sure what he is 
going to do (hence, wouldn't tell you if you asked him), that he is trying to discover a 
good move (hence, would welcome an expert's advice, if that is allowed), that he is not 
arguing fiercely about the cup final, and also that he is not in fact making his next 
move. Since we are not talking about a part of someone when we say he is talking, 
welcoming, arguing and making moves, we are not talking merely about a part of him 
when we say he is mulling over, pondering, thinking about what to do. This is not an 
attempt to show that nothing is going on inside us, or even that traditional candidates 
for mental activities do not involve something inside us. It is a reminder that such 
things as dreaming, silent reading and thinking, are not merely things going on inside 
us. The part of us which thinks and feels does not exist. (Squires, 1971, p. 335) 
Common sensations of one's consciousness being located elsewhere than in one's 
head ought to point out the arbitrariness of routinely or ever placing it there. Commonly 
in dreams we find ourselves looking down on our protagonist-self acting out some 
scenario for us below. Self or selves? In dreams or in daydreams there is often a mobile 
personal pronoun at play: 1 am this person or that in the drama, just as it interests or 
informs me to be. Not wishing to let this thesis be hijacked by anecdotal evidence from 
the more outre reaches of medical literature, here is a report from a nurse in a coronary 
care unit (as related by Pin Van Lommel, a Dutch cardiologist): 
During night shift an ambulance brings in a 44-year old cyanotic, comatose man into 
the coronary care unit. He was found in coma about 30 minutes before in a meadow. 
When we go to intubate the patient, he tums out to have dentures in his mouth. 1 
remove these upper dentures and put them onto the *crash cart'. After about an hour 
and a half the patient has sufficient heart rhythm and blood pressure, but he is still 
ventilated and intubated, and he is still comatose. He is transferred to the intensive 
care unit to continue the necessary artificial respiration. Only after more than a week 
do I meet again with the patient, who is by now back on the cardiac ward. The moment 
he sees me he says: *0, that nurse knows where my dentures are.' I am very 
surprised. Then he elucidates: 'You were there when I was brought into hospital and 
you took my dentures out of my mouth and put them onto that cart, it had all these 
bottles on it and there was this sliding drawer underneath, and there you put my 
teeth.' I was especially amazed because 1 remembered this happening while the man 
was in deep coma and in the process of CPR. It appeared that the man had seen himself 
lying in bed, that he had perceived from above how nurses and doctors had been busy 
with the CPR. He was also able to describe correcdy and in detail the small room in 
which he had been resuscitated as well as the appearance of those present like myself. 
He is deeply impressed by this experience and says he is no longer afraid of death. 
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(Van Lx)mmel,2004, p. 120) 
This may be an irregular and extraordinary instance, but I quote it to illustrate how 
arbitrary the placing of consciousness ever is. Of course such evidence indicates the 
flexibility of our definitions of 'personality' or 'self. An experience such as the one 
described above might be considered as so foreign to what we might normally consider 
could ever happen to us that the lacuna it leaves in our view of ourselves when it happens 
is far more disturbing than amnesia. 
Are not such lacunae common? Not just in terms of memory (though that is common 
enough), but also in terms of those experiences that leave a blank in the continuity of our 
selves that is far more blank than an unremembered period would be. Consider any form 
of hallucination (in the widest definition of the term): there are many occasions where it 
is something other than somatosensory information that returns us to our normal sense of 
ourselves. If one were trusting purely epistemological data on these occasions, one would 
end up believing something very different to that one habitually takes as true. Or consider 
occasions when some extraordinary circumstance alters our normal consciousness of 
ourselves: can't we on those occasions sometimes feel more 'ourselves' than we do 
ordinarily? 
Historically, and in some contemporary cultures, it is not always in the role of 
'consciousness' to be found behind our eyes. Aristotelian writings posit what we might 
call consciousness somewhere in the upper chest (Jaynes, 1976, p.45). In Generation of 
Animals Aristotle writes of the corporeality of 'soul', but " it remains that thought alone 
comes in from outside, and that it alone is divine; for corporeal actuality has no 
connection at all with the actuality of thought" (Aristotle quoted in Barnes, 1982/2000, 
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p. 108). One can think of a number of personal instances when consciousness seems to 
centre elsewhere in the body, or to float free of the body altogether. Medical history is 
full of anomalous accounts of (what I might call) free-floating consciousness, when 
consciousness seems centred up above the body like a watching angel or not 'centred' 
anywhere at all. We don't need such anomalies to prove the point (although neuroscience 
relies on such anomalies to make clear the 'norm'). The good reasons for locating one's 
'mind-space' inside oneself are to do with volition and internal sensations, but it is not a 
phenomenal necessity. To quote Julian Jaynes: 
When I am conscious, I am always and definitely using certain parts of my brain 
inside my head. But so am I when riding a bicycle, and the bicycle riding does not go 
on inside my head. The cases are different of course, since bicycle riding has a definite 
geographical location, while consciousness does not. In reality, consciousness has no 
location whatever except as we say it has, (Jaynes, 1976, p. 46) 
The core brain nuclei of the 'ascending activation system' are involved in the 
modulation and regulation of our visceral slates: for instance, temperature, heartbeat, 
respiration and digestion. Their sources of information are the neurotransmitter systems 
of the nervous system and also the hormones commuted through the bloodstream and 
cerebrospinal fluid circulation. Antonio Damasio is a Portuguese neurologist who made 
'core consciousness' the study of his book The Feeling of What Happens (2000). He 
considers that the 'state' of consciousness is a product of the brainstem as it monitors the 
internal milieu of the body. He thinks that this deep brainstem network contains a 
representational 'map' of our visceral functions. Damasio considers that the conscious 
state is generated by this virtual body, and responds to changes that occur in this neural 
network that represents the visceral functions of the body. This network cannot only 
monitor these changes, but acts to modify the sources of the information. 
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The most basic function of consciousness, then, is to monitor the state of these 
homeostatic systems to report whether they (i.e. you) are 'contented' or not. 
(Damasio, 2000, p. 91) 
Mediation, transformation, and referral: these are qualities which characterize 
ventriloquism and also the human means of perception and self-perception, even at the 
neural level. 
For Wilkes (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 25) it is no coincidence that the term 
'unconscious(ness)' enters the English language with the first flood of post-Cartesian 
thought. For Wilkes it was a term founded in the need to make distinct a view of the 
human mind that was not this Cartesian 'conscious' mind. The thinker who wished to 
"combat the Cartesian revolution by stressing the role of non-conscious factors had to 
devise his own vocabulary" (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 25). Cartesian Dualism forced a schism 
between 'conscious' and 'non-conscious' in discussions of human mental processes and 
any discussion of these human mental processes had to be defined in terms dictated by 
this dichotomy. It is Wilkes's opinion that this dichotomy is still the foundation for 
thinking in philosophy and psychology. Wilkes quotes E . L . Thomdike from 1898: 
[Descartes's] physiological theories have all been sloughed off by science long ago. 
No one ever quotes him as an authority in morphology or physiology...Yet his theory 
of the nature of the mind is still upheld by not a few, and the differences between his 
doctrines of imagination, memory, and the emotions, and those of many present-day 
psychological books, are comparatively unimportant. (Thomdike quoted in Wilkes, 
1988a, p. 25) 
Although present as a concern in European philosophy since the 17^ century, 
neuroscience approached a study of 'consciousness' only in the 20^ century. One might 
wonder both why it took so long and why neuroscientists bothered researching 
'consciousness' at all. 
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Consciousness has long been an important topic in philosophy but until recently only 
a few neuroscientists had worked on it. For a brief period during the middle of the 
twentieth century, especially in the forties and fifties, neuroscience devoted 
considerable attention to the study of consciousness. The experimental work of 
G. Malgoun, H. W. Monizzi, and H. Jasper and the clinical and experimental 
observations of W. Penfield stand out among several contributions from an epoch that 
ended all too soon. Benjamin Libet is another pioneering exception. What is currently 
known as the field of consciousness studies was created over the past decade by a 
handful of philosophers and scientists, independendy, unwittingly, and unexpectedly. 
Thanks are due especially to the philosophers Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia 
Churchland, Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn, and John Searle, and to the 
neuroscientists Gerald Edelman and Francis Crick. (Damasio, 2000, p. 336) 
Neuroscience is still defined by its devotion to Cartesian physics (though not Cartesian 
physiology). Quantum physicist Henry P. Stapp has pointed out the problematic discourse 
classical physics has with contemporary conceptions of 'mind': 
The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe, and that 
even our bodies and our minds are mechanical systems. The theory asserts that 
nature has a ^material' part that consists of tiny localized bits of matter, and that every 
motion of each of these minute material elements is completely determined by contact 
interactions between adjacent material elements. This material part of nature includes 
our bodies and our brains. (Stapp, 1993/2004, p. 265) 
The mechanistic classical-physics picture of the self is illustrated in numerous fictional 
depictions of the ventriloquist act; one is left with the strangeness of a body acted upon 
by distant agents. In these fictional depictions of ventriloquism one is left guessing at the 
motility of the 'dummy', just as when imputing a 'neuronal' or ^synaptic' self to humans 
(and finding it in the mechanistic actions of neurons upon 'will', 'agency' and 'self, or in 
the expression of a 'gay' or 'alcoholic' gene). 
Neurologists are, after all, brain chauvinists, who tend (at least subliminally) to 
regard the person as the mind, the mind as the brain, and the body as nothing more 
than a carrying case for the brain and a means for its interaction with the external 
world (especially with other brains). (Shewmon, 1997, p. 34) 
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The neuronal self is as equally mechanistic and 'classical physics' as is Descartes. In his 
book Synaptic Self (2002) Joseph LeDoux, a neuroscientist "at the height of his 
professional standing...the man in the middle...at a gathering of...guardians and 
cultivators of the new reigning orthodoxy about the sel f (Ross, 2003, p. 67), describes 
his neurological understanding of the self: 
The bottom-line point of this book is *You are your synapses'. Synapses are the spaces 
between brain cells, but are much more. They are the channels of communication 
between brain cells, and the means by which most of what the brain does is 
accomplished. (LeDoux, 2002, p. ix) 
LeDoux is not alone in presenting a picture of a mechanistically conceived self; he 
represents the orthodoxy in neuroscientific explanations of self and its attributes. A list of 
contributors to this orthodoxy would include Eric Kandel who won the Nobel Prize for 
work on the molecular mechanisms of memory (Kandel, 2006), and Roger Sperry who 
won the Nobel Prize for work with commissurotomized patients and his studies of the 
hemispheric division of brain faculties (Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen, 1969). 
Neuroscientific orthodoxy has extended its consensus by means of books and television 
programmes popularizing its concepts. V. S. Ramachandran (Ramachandran and 
Blakeslee, 1998), Antonio Damasio (2000), and Rodolfo R. LLinas (2001) are all 
scientists who have written neuroscientific books of popular appeal. These books 
represent a scientific orthodoxy and help form a popular understanding of the scientific 
viewpoint on matters pertaining to 'self. 
Jakk Panksepp is a neuroscientist whose work concerns 'affective neuroscience'; that 
is, the neural correlate of emotion. It is his view that the evolutionary heritage of 
language precludes scientific discussion of emotions: 
With the evolution of connections between different sensory areas, vocal 
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communication gradually emerged as an especially effective way for encoding the 
relationships among external events. In this role, it is ideal for discussing visually 
evident worid events that constitute most of scientific enquiry; but as the ability to 
interrelate extemal events improved, it remained a deficient medium for discussing 
internal events that arise from deep evolutionary rather than environmental sources. 
These difficulties still haunt the application of language in scientific inquiries where 
we must speak of processes that cannot be seen. Emotions, of course, are such 
processes - for the only things we can 'see' are the outward expressions, gestures, 
sounds, and other behavioural acts. (Panksepp, 1998, p. 331) 
It is interesting to learn that the verb 'to be' derives from the Sanskrit 'bhu' meaning 'to 
grow, or make grow'. The English forms 'am' and 'is' have evolved from the Sanskrit 
'asmi' meaning 'to breathe'. There is a difference between 'to grow' or 'to breathe' and 
our verb 'to be' in that the first two observe an activity whereas the third implies a 
presence. Any language is a finite set of terms; it is through metaphor that we stretch the 
range of our referents and our perception. When we use a metaphor we are stretching 
language to introduce something new and strange to its range of referents. In using 
metaphors we describe something new and strange, but describe it in terms that are 
familiar. The feeling of familiarity these terms include brings with it a sense of 
understanding. Our errors regarding a definition of consciousness could be said to be 
errors in our range of metaphors. Any metaphor for consciousness would be misleading; 
consciousness does not 'do' anything as such and could only ever 'do' it in a virtual 
space. So what worldly thing could be used as a metaphor for consciousness, that 
wouldn't mislead by means of its range of associations? To think this way would in any 
case conceive of consciousness as a 'thing', thereby granting it a location and a substance 
that physically it can't have. 
Julian Jaynes describes the way in which a mind or consciousness may be considered 
as having the properties of an 'analogue': 
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An analogue is a model, but a model of a special kind. It is not like a scientific model, 
whose source may be anything at all and whose purpose it is to act as an hypothesis of 
explanation or understanding. Instead, an analogue is at every point generated by the 
thing it is an analogue of. A map is a good example. It is not a model in the scientific 
sense, not an hypothetical model like the Bohr atom to explain something unknown. 
Instead, it is constructed from something well known, if not completely known. Each 
region of a district of land is allotted a corresponding region on the map, though the 
materials of land and map are absolutely different and a large proportion of the features 
of the land have to be left out. And the relation between an analogue map and its land 
is a metaphor. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 54) 
So subjective conscious mind might be said to be an analogue of what is called the real 
worid, and: 
It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or 
analogues of behaviour in the physical worid. Its reality is of the same order as 
mathematics. It allows us to shortcut behavioural processes and arrive at more 
adequate decisions. Like mathematics, it is an operator rather than a thing or 
repository. And it is intimately bound up with volition and decision. (Jaynes, 1976, 
p.55) 
The way an analogue is generated, though, is not the way it is used. Consider maps: the 
cartographer knows and has surveyed the land, and negotiates a blank piece of paper to 
represent it. The map user looks to the map to make understandable and navigable the 
land that is foreign and distant to his knowledge and expectations. Put simply, the map is 
not the territory but it may be all we have. Assuming I see the worid from 'this' 
perspective places me 'here'; but this is no more than assumption. We may or may not be 
where we imagine ourselves to be: all we have is that it seems that way, just as binocular 
vision seems to provide a singular cyclopean vantage point from the centre of our 
forehead. That binocular vision cannot and does not provide this vantage point (only after 
elision and mediation do we 'see' things this way), never bothers us; in this case and in 
the cases of 'mind', or 'memory' or 'self, that it seems so is enough. 
It may be impossible for us to abandon certain ways of conceiving and representing 
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ourselves, no matter how little support they get from scientific evidence. (Nagel, 
1971, p. 148) 
The foeval area of the eye in which one has high resolution and high acuity vision is 
smaller that the area eluded by the 'blind spot' (Churchland and Ramachandran, 1998, p. 
177); that area of our vision Tilled in' or supposed is larger than the area of our vision 
'seen clearly'. What of this? "I am placed in this world like my eye in its visual field" 
wrote Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein quoted in Monk, 1990, p. 140). Precisely as my eye is 
placed in its visual field: whole areas eluded and filled in, and a perspective which is 
suppositional but which necessitates placing the 'self in this vantage point. The eye that 
'sees' is no different from the cortically placed 'self or 'mind' or 'consciousness': in 
principle as in practice an eluded, suppositional space, substantiated by a metaphor. That 
it serves us to assume the 'theory of mind' explanation for the behaviours of others, and 
by extension place ourselves within a scaffold of causal motives, says more for the use 
value of such a theory than for the presence of *mind'. Theory of Mind is just that, only a 
theory, and by definition any theory may be proved wrong. Theory of mind would seem 
to be indivisible from 'mind'. 
Where Julian Jaynes's theory is most interesting as regards this thesis is in its 
accounts of'the analogue ' I " and 'the metaphor'me": 
The analogue T which can 'move about' vicarially in our 'imagination', 'doing' 
things that we are not actually doing. There are of course many uses for such an 
analogue T . We imagine 'ourselves' 'doing' this or that, and 'make' decisions on the 
basis of imagined 'outcomes' that would be impossible if we did not have an imagined 
'self behaving in an imagined 'world'...If we are out walking, and two roads diverge 
in a wood, and we know that one of them comes back to our destination after a much 
more circuitous route, we can 'traverse' that longer route with our analogue T to see 
if its vistas and ponds are worth the longer time it will take. Without consciousness 
with its vicarial analogue T , we could not do this. (Jaynes, 1976, pp. 62-63) 
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Jaynes elaborates to say: 
The analogue T is, however, not simply that. It is also a metaphor 'me'. As we 
imagine ourselves strolling down the longer path we indeed catch ^glimpses' of 
'ourselves'... We can both look out from within the imagined self at the imagined 
vistas, or we can step back a bit and see ourselves perhaps kneeling down for a drink of 
water at a particular brook. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 63) 
Is this not like ventriloquism? Is this not the Pinocchio we construct to do our 
imaginative dirty work and who claims a life of his own? Who is this magical dummy 
that sits in our metaphorical lap and says the words for us as we might say them? Try as I 
might I'm still confused as to whose voice is heard. Is it the big person who holds the 
puppet, or is it the little puppet that talks back? The puppet seems to have all the best 
lines and the agency. 
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Chapter Two: Hallucinations 
The work and theories of Lev Vygotsky have gained rather than lost in currency in 
the years since his death. Vygotsky was a Russian psychologist who died in 1934 and left 
his major work Thought And Language (1934/1986) to posterity. The illustration 
appended to this page is from a current teacher training text book (Pollard, 2002, p. 112) 
and indicates the cultural value and theoretical influence his work has still. Vygotsky's 
theories are not just influential on those working with children, but underpin much that is 
known in current developmental psychology (Bentall, 2003, p. 192). Vygotsky*s 
observations of the process of speech acquisition led to the *theory of mind' principle 
current in psychology and neuroscience. It is as the founder of this theory that Vygotsky's 
work becomes central evidence in this thesis. 
Theory of mind* is described as a facet of folk psychology (Fonagy et al, 2002, p. 
26). Paul M . Churchland defines the term *folk psychology* as denoting, 
the prescientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized 
humans deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the behaviour 
of humans and higher animals. This framework includes such concepts as belief, 
desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, 
sympathy, intention, and so forth. It embodies our baseline understanding of the 
cognitive, affective, and purposive nature of people. Considered as a whole, it 
constitutes our conception of what a person is. (Churchland, 1998, p. 3) 
Folk psychology constitutes the prescientific, commonsense models of self which are 
apparent in the everyday language we use to characterize our behaviour and the motives 
for our behaviour. The models of self in folk psychology are constituted by prescientific 
terms but the influence of folk psychology carries into scientific models. As Quine puts 
it: 
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Pan 2 • Being a reflective teacher 
R E A D I N G 
Mind in society and the ZPD 
Lev Vygotsky 
Vygotsky's social consrructivisi psychology, though stemming from the 1930s, underpins much 
modem thinking about teaching and learning. In particular, the importance of instruction is 
emphasized. However, this is combined with recognition of the influence of social interaction and 
the cultural context within which understanding is developed. Vygotsky's most influential concept 
is that of the 'zone of proximal development' {ZPD) which highlights the potential for future 
learning which can be realized with appropriate support. 
The influence of Vygotsky's work will be particularly apparent in Readings 7.8, 7.9, 7.11, 13.2 but 
it is also present in many other readings, particularly in Chapters 11 and 12. 
Thinking of a particular area of learning and a child you know, can you identif>- an 'actual 
developmental leveP and a 'zone of proximal development' through which you could provide 
guidance and suppon? 
Edited from: Vygorsky, L. S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. 
Cambridge, MA: Har\-ard Universit>' Press, 84-90 
That children's learning begins long before they anend school is the staning point of this 
discussion. Any learning a child encounters in school always has a previous history. For 
example, children begin to study arithmetic in school, but long beforehand they have had 
some experience with quantity - they have had to deal with operations of division, addition, 
subtraction and determination of size. Consequently, children have their own pre-school 
arithmetic which only myopic scientists could ignore. 
It goes without saying that learning as it occurs in the pre-school years differs markedly 
from school learning, which is concerned with the assimilation of the fundamentals of 
scientific knowledge. But even when, in the period of her first questions, a child assimilates 
the names of objects in her environment, she is learning. Indeed, can it be doubted that 
children learn speech from adults; or that, through asking questions and giving answers, 
children acquire a variety of information; or that through imitating adults and through being 
instructed about how to act, children develop an entire repository of skills? Learning and 
development are interrelated from the child's very first day of life. 
In order to elaborate the dimensions of school learning, we will describe a new and 
exceptionally important concept without which the issue cannot be resolved: the zone of 
proximal development. 
A well-known and empirically established fact is that learning should be matched in some 
manner with the child's developmental level. For example, it has been established that the 
teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic should be initiated at a specific age level. Only 
recendy, however, has attention been directed to the faa that we cannot limit ourselves 
merely to determining developmental levels if we wish to discover the actual relations of the 
developmental process to learning capabilities. We must determine at least two developmental 
levels. 
The first level can be called the actual developmental level, that is, the level of development 
of a child's mental functions that has been established as a result of certain already completed 
developmental cycles. When we determine a child's mental age by using tests, we are almost 
always dealing with the actual developmental level. In studies of children's mental develop-
ment it is generally assumed that only those things that children can do on their own are 
112 www.rtweb.info 
3. Page from contemporary teaching handbook indicating the continued relevance of 
Vygotsky's theories of child development and language acquisition. 
(Page reproduced from Pollard, 2002, p. 112) 
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Science, after all, differs from common sense only in degree of methodological 
sophistication. Our experiences from earliest infancy are bound to have overlaid our 
innate spacing of qualities by modifying and supplementing our grouping habits little 
by litde, inclining us more and more to an appreciation of theoretical kinds and 
similarities, long before we reach the point of studying science systematically as such. 
Moreover, the later phases do not wholly supersede the earlier, we retain different 
similarity standards, different systems of kinds, for use in different contexts. We all 
still say that a marsupial mouse is more like an ordinary mouse than a kangaroo, except 
when we are concerned with genetic matters. (Quine, 1969, p. 129) 
The principles found in folk psychology may be contested by current scientific 
psychology, or by neuroscience, but there is little disagreement in these disciplines that 
such a 'shared conceptual framework' (Churchland, 1998, p. 3) exists. 
Theory of Mind' is "an interconnected set of beliefs and desires, attributed to explain 
a person's behavioui^' (Fonagy et at, 2002, p. 26). Each of us is said to have a theory of 
mind: it is how we understand our own and others' behaviour by recourse to a set of 
explanatory principles. These principles would include motives and desires, and 
constitute an epistemology of thought and feeling. Theory of Mind' does indeed 
constitute a model of the human self, but also describes a process of understanding our 
own and others' actions in the world. 
Each of us has a theory of mind. We use it everyday to deceive, joke, teach, gossip and 
so on. Experiments on the development of this theory in children may involve, for 
example, the famous Smarties task where a lube ostensibly containing chocolate 
candies but in fact containing something else, such as pencils, traded between 
knowing and unknowing kids to see how well they cope with the deceptions involved. 
The conventional view is that we have privileged access to our own mental states, so 
we don't need it for ourselves. (Ross, 2003, p. 77) 
Children are tested in the way described above because autistic people are said to seem 
'unaware that others have mental states' (Bentall, 2003, p. 525). Autism is seen to be a 
* developmental disorder of social insight' (Ross, 2003, p. 78) because autistic people 
seem to lack this ability to attribute mental states to others, and thus seem unconcerned 
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with the beliefs and desires of others. Acquisition of a theory of mind, then, is understood 
to be a feature of normal development. How do we acquire a theory of mind? 
In Thought And Language (1934/1986) Lev Vygotsky wrote about child 
development and the child's acquisition of language. Vygotsky characterized the 
development of thought and language, thus: 
I) In their...development, thought and speech have different roots. 2) In the speech 
development of the child, we can certainly establish a preintellectual stage, and in his 
thought development, a prelinguistic stage. 3) Up to a certain point in time, the two 
different lines grow independently of each other. 4) At a certain point these lines meet, 
whereupon thought becomes verbal and speech rational. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 83) 
Vygotsky*s method of research was observation. His teacher was Ivan Pavlov. In 
Conditioned Reflexes And Psychiatry, Pavlov concluded that: 
Numerous speech stimulations have removed us from reality, and we must always 
remember this in order not to distort our attitude towards reality. (Pavlov quoted in 
Bentall,2003,p. 195) 
Vygotsky's concerns were communicative speech and verbal thought. Which comes first 
in a child's development? Do the abilities arrive as one? What does one's thinking gain 
from speech? Are thought and language synonymous or dependent on one another? It 
was Vygotsky's observation that we learn to speak as children in the context of our 
caregivers, with child and adult asking questions and issuing instructions to one another. 
In this way speaking is first the process of child and adult attempting to determine or 
control each other's actions. This process might be said to be the founding of a theory of 
mind and also explains the utility value of such a 'theory'. The observation of its practical 
development indicates that it is not an empirical theory as such, but initially a means to 
an end. Thus to call it a 'theory' of mind is misleading; it is a working principle. 
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After a period in which they ask caregivers questions, only to answer those questions 
themselves, at the end of their second year children discover that they can instruct 
themselves in their own activities by speaking aloud to themselves about what they are 
doing. At this stage of their life children spend much time talking out loud to themselves 
(or to no-one in particular) without much concern as to who else is hearing. This 
phenomenon is referred to as *private speech* (or in Piaget*s term, *egocentric speech'). 
It was Vygotsky's belief that this is an act of self-regulation on the part of the child. Mark 
Solms and Oliver Tumbull comment that: 
This aspect of language...enables one to subordinate one's behaviour to verbal 
programs, such as 'first I must do this, before I can have that.' We rely on this aspect 
of language all the time. It is easiest to recognize it in young children, who still often 
extemalize their inner speech, thus making it clear how they are using words (often 
adapted wholesale from their parents) to regulate their behaviour and impulses. 
Consider the common example of the small child who points at the thing that it desires, 
while simultaneously saying 'No* or 'Dangerous' to itself. With time, these 
self-instructions become increasingly intemalized and invisible - that is, they become 
automatic and unconscious. (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 260) 
In this way 'prohibitions become inhibitions' (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 283) and the 
regulatory import of social speech becomes the child's (and adult's) means of regulating 
him or herself. 
Vygotsky observed that, at about four years old, social and private speech become 
differentiated in the child. At this age children have become able to talk silently to 
themselves. This silent talk, inaudible and undetectable to those around them, is known as 
*inner speech'. Lev Vygotsky put it that. 
The word is a thing in our consciousness...that is absolutely impossible for one 
person, but that becomes a reality for two. The word is direct expression of the 
historical nature of human consciousness...Language is a practical consciousness-for-
others and, consequently, consciousness-for-myself. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 255) 
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We absorb a 'theory of mind' as language and as a dialogue with our guardians and early 
caregivers. In this sense it is always another's language that we speak. The great Russian 
literary theorist Bakhtin was convinced of the dialogic character of inner speech. Bakhtin 
considered all speech to be 'speech for a listener' and that this was true even when the 
speaker was alone and the speech was silent. In inner speech we have an interlocutor in 
mind. 
As soon as we begin meditating about some question, as soon as we start to think it 
over carefully, our inner speech (which sometimes, if we are alone, is pronounced 
aloud) immediately assumes the form of questions and answers, assertions and 
subsequent denials, or to put it more simply, our speech is broken down into separate 
reliques [rejoinders] of varying size: it takes the form of dialogue. (Bakhtin, 
I920s/1983,p. 119) 
Bakhtin was also convinced of the inherited nature of inner speech. Why this 'theory of 
mind' rather than any other because that is how mind and motive are presented to us in 
the language of our forebears. Even birds are bom needing to leam their song 
(Notlebohm, 1984). In learning language we leam 'theory of mind'. Fonagy et al 
summarized recent research on theory of mind (they term it 'mentalization'), in 
psychology, psychoanalysis and philosophy, with the following paragraph (written in 
2002): 
P. K, Smith (1996) has forcefully advanced the central role of language in the 
acquisition of mentalizing [theory of mind] capacity. Using primate evidence, he 
suggested that the availability of symbolic codes (words) for mental states was crucial 
for the developing individual to acquire mind-reading abilities, and the explicit use of 
such codes by caregivers was therefore likely to be important. Even more pertinent in 
this context is Harris's (1996) proposal that the experience of engaging in 
conversations per se alerts children to the fact that people are receivers and providers 
of information, irrespective of whether that conversation involves reference to mental 
states (knowing, thinking, desiring, etc.). The structure of information-bearing 
conversations (e.g., being told about a past event that one has not witnessed, 
challenging of information in dissent and denial, or filling in information gaps in 
questions or when information exchange misfires and repair is needed) strongly 
implies that partners in a shared conversation differ in what they know and believe 
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about a shared topic. Effective conversation requires that gaps in shared knowledge are 
acknowledged and addressed. (Fonagy et a/, 2002, p. 49) 
There is a further facet of private speech which has import and echoes in life after 
childhood. If one accepts the Vygotskian notion of private speech, and his observation of 
the context in which we learn to speak, then inner speech can have an explanatory role in 
the narrative device of self. As adults, when we speak silently to ourselves, our inner 
speech still has a neuromuscular 'echo' of our eariy life when we could only talk out 
loud. When we, as adults, think in words our lips and speech muscles are active in an 
activity known as 'subvocalization'. The invention of a device called an electromyogram 
made possible the measurement of electrical currents in the muscles beneath the skin. 
Electrodes attached to lips and larynx show activity equating to that of inner speech. 
Electrodes attached to the pectorals, etc. show that the muscular activity is limited to the 
speech muscles only. Deaf people who have acquired sign language use inner speech in 
the form of signs; as they think the correspondent signing activity is measurable in their 
fmger muscles. It is not that verbal thought is impossible without the speech muscles of 
the lips and larynx; subvocalization is an echo of the out-loud verbal thought of 
childhood and an intellectual 'audit trail' of the manner in which we learnt to talk to 
ourselves. 
How like ventriloquism this is: imagine a ventriloquist practising his or her hidden 
dialogue for the puppet, the speech becoming more and more indiscernible to an 
observing world. Two selves is it, or one self in two places? That mediated self who has 
learnt his/her lines, and that conferring, complicitous self who schemes to 'get things 
right'. Ventriloquist Edgar Bergen regulariy performed a sketch that began with his 
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discovery of his dummy, Chariie MacCarthy, reading a book entitled * Ventriloquism: Its 
Cause and Prevention' (Connor, 2000, p. 408). Who speaks for whom? 
One day, a visitor came into Bergen's room and found him talking - not rehearsing -
with Chariie. Bergen was asking Chariie a number of philosophical questions about the 
nature of life, virtue, and love. Chariie was responding with brilliant Socratic answers. 
When Bergen noticed he had a visitor, he turned red and said he was talking with 
Charlie, the wisest person he knew. The visitor pointed out that it was Bergen's own 
mind and voice coming through the wooden dummy. Bergen replied, 'Well, I guess 
ultimately it is, but I ask Chariie these questions and he answers, and I haven't the 
faintest idea of what he is going to say and I am astounded by his brilliance. 
(Siegel, 1992, p. 163) 
Of course, the things we say to ourselves in adulthood are different to the things we 
say to ourselves as children. By adulthood inner speech has lost many of the 
characteristics of ^social speech' and has become, 
A highly condensed form of silent verbal activity. When using inner speech we rarely 
have to state the subject of our thoughts, because it is already known to us. Elements 
of speech that allow propositions to be linked meaningfully together so that they 
appear coherent to the listener (known to linguists as cohesive ties) become redundant. 
At the same time inner words expand their symbolic function and develop multiple and 
complex associations. Although the measurement of this kind of thinking is fraught 
with difficulty, studies in which the immediate recollections of inner speech have been 
compared with the full expression of the same thoughts have suggested that one 
minute of inner speech can equal up to 4000 words of overt speech. (Bentall, 2003, 
p. 197) 
What we spend most of our time talking to ourselves about is ourselves. For this 
reason inner speech has been described as an important vehicle of self-awareness. When 
we talk most to ourselves is during challenging, or arousing situations that cause us 
stress. Or simply when we think we are alone. We talk to ourselves about what we have 
done, or plan what we are going to do next, or we debate problems that we find 
emotionally, or psychologically challenging. We rehearse transient memories, such as 
telephone numbers that we need to keep in mind until we can write them down. 
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Statistically, the most common form of auditory hallucination is said to be a voice, or 
voices, issuing instructions (Leudar and Thomas, 2000, p. 192). This is also, in 
Vygotskian terms, most commonly the form that inner speech takes; that is, a stream of 
instructions issued to the self. For this reason it is often concluded by psychologists that 
auditory hallucinations are inner speech (Dennett, 1991, p. 250). Using 
electromyographic studies, this thesis has been tested since the 1940s. Louis Gould 
recorded a raised muscular lip and chin activity in those of his psychiatric patients 
experiencing auditory hallucinations (McGuigan, 1978, p. 188). He subsequently showed 
that this neuromuscular activity coincided with the onset of his patients' reports of 
auditory hallucinations. This experiment has been repeated, by many different researchers 
and different patients, in different times, and in different countries, and always with the 
same results. The electromyographic data even corresponds with the duration and 
apparent loudness of the patients' auditory hallucinations of voices. 
Using a very sensitive microphone, the British psychologists Paul Green and Martin 
Preston managed to record the rapid subvocal speech of a male patient who reported 
hallucinatory hearing of the voice of a woman. 
When they amplified and played back their recordings to their patient this had the 
surprising (and as yet unexplained) effect of making his speech less and less silent, 
until both sides of the conversation between the patient and the voices could be clearly 
heard without the aid of special equipment. (Bentall, 2003, p. 361) 
What does this remind you of? This searching for voices in the brain seems a bit like a 
stance, or those scenes in the film Alien where they are trying to detect another life in the 
space station. It is just like watching a ventriloquism act so carefully one can see the 
ventriloquist's lips move for the puppet. 
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Is it easy for us to know the source of our sensory information? How easy is it for us 
to know whether our sensory information comes via the sensory periphery of eyes, ears 
or skin, or whether it is imagined? Can we confuse the two sources and not know about 
it? Does sense data arrive labelled with maridngs that refer to its origin? Our ability to 
distinguish the provenance of sense data is known to psychologists as 'source 
monitoring'. Is this ability inherent in the brain's physiology or is it an acquired skill? 
Harry J. Jerison has demoted the importance of such questioning with his comment that. 
The simplest intuitive description of the brain's work (for me) is that it creates a 'real' 
worid. Within that real worid all the events of a lifetime take place. (The realities 
differ, of course, depending on the nervous systems that do the work of building a real 
worid and on the experiences - the information - to which the nervous systems are 
exposed during the lifetimes of the individuals.)...The perception of self may be a 
peculiariy human development of the capacity for creating 'objects' in a 'real' worid. 
The reality of the self as an object (a person) is one of the most compelling intuitions. 
Our capacity for imagery and imagination, though still pooriy understood, may be 
related to our models of our 'selves' and is cleariy a kind of information processing 
that goes beyond simple model building based on the accommodation to stimulation 
through a variety of sense modalities. (Jerison, 1973, p. 429) 
Which of one's sense data does one 'receive' from outside stimuli, from the worid 
outside of one's body? Which beliefs conceming that worid are specious? What might 
only be imagination, or dream, and what might be an experience that is genuinely bound 
to an interaction with the 'outside' worid (that is, to anything outside of one's body)? 
Surely it is easy to be sure whether one is 'conscious' or only 'unconscious'? Surely it is 
even easier to source activity, to say 'this comes from outside of me' or 'this comes from 
inside'? Must there be some distinguishing feature by which one recognizes the internally 
generated sense data from the external? If source monitoring is a skill which one 
acquires, are some people perfect at it? Can some people not do it at all? 
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Consider dream states. In dreaming one is aware of internally generated images; one 
is conscious, as it were, of one's intemally generated images. Sleepers can be aroused 
from REM sleep, or synchronized sleep (deep sleep) by specific auditory stimuli such as 
a baby's cry even whilst remaining deaf to louder sounds which the brain knows it can 
safely ignore. Dreams can be very bizarre and yet convincing. The brain never rejects 
dreams as 'invalid,* as 'ignorable,' on the grounds that they are too outre to be admitted 
or accepted. What in a dream tells us not to trust it? 
It is only because there is an active inhibition of motor neurons by neurons in the 
pons of the brain that one does not physically enact with dream figures, or dream 
scenarios, just as one would with the people and events in waking life. 
Sensory input is gated during NREM [non-REM] sleep at the thalamo-cortical level 
via hyperpolarization, but in REM sleep it is gated at the periphery. Motor output is 
blocked during NREM sleep by disfacilitation of brain-stem neurons, but, by contrast, 
during REM sleep there is active inhibition of motor neurons by neurons in the pons. 
This produces a kind of paralysis, which can be abolished by making a small lesion 
near the locus coerulus, whereupon the animal will move about during REM sleep, 
apparendy in accordance with dream events. There are ten recorded patients (all male) 
who have REM without atonia. They behave in accordance with the motor demands of 
their dream narrative, and consequenUy crash into walls and furniture. This 
behaviour contrasts quite markedly with somnambulists who typically manoeuvre 
quite well, open doors, and so on. (Churchland, 1988, pp. 293-294) 
In effect, the sensory cortex of the brain does not know whether the 'inputs' it gets 
are generated intemally or not. There is nothing intrinsically 'invented' or 'imaginary' 
about a dream, nor is there anything intrinsically 'real' about external stimuli. The 
sensory cortex just processes the data it gets and tries to make sense of whatever that may 
be. 
Somnambulism (sleep-walking and sleep-talking) occurs during synchronized sleep; 
that is, during the 'deepest' and least 'conscious' periods of sleeping. In synchronized 
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sleep we are not aware even of dreams. Yet sleepwalkers navigate and co-ordinate well; 
they dress themselves, open doors, find their way to where they are going, etc. As 
Patricia Smith Churchland has put it: 
Somnambulism challenges the assumption that consciousness and control must go 
hand in hand. It is part of the conventional wisdom that the conscious self is in control, 
and what we are in control of we are also conscious of. (Churchland, 1988, p. 289) 
Why should introspection help to differentiate the things we see and hear; those we 
have generated ourselves, from those of a source or process external to ourselves? The 
sights and sounds don't have a label on them to indicate provenance. There is no clear 
instance; we have always just to infer how to best describe or classify a particular 
experience using whatever information is available to us. It is a taxonomy by percentages 
or by likelihood. But what are the criteria we might use to discem the differences in 
sensory report? 
The American psychologist Marcia Johnson has conducted research into what is 
referred to as 'source monitoring' (Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993). Johnson has 
shown that in source monitoring we depend on a number of cues. Contextual information, 
such as time and place, can help us to deduce whether an event happened externally or 
internally. We use our knowledge of 'the laws of nature' (gravity, durational parameters 
for events, etc.), to assess the probability of an occurrence or the likelihood of our having 
invented it (should we be in doubt). The more vivid our memory of an event the more we 
are likely to trust that it happened. There is also, Johnson claims, a feeling of cognitive 
effort or 'cognitive operation' (Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993, p. 4) that 
characterizes the mental activity of, say, coming up with an answer to a question that 
requires thought or inventing a solution. We can use this sense of a 'cognitive operation' 
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to indicate that we came by a thought of our own effort, or by thinking hard, rather than 
by appropriating its contents from some external source. 
Richard P. Bentall has summarized Marcia Johnson's research findings by writing 
that: 
Source monitoring is a skill, much like the skill of discriminating between rhinoceroses 
and elephants. Imagine that you are a game warden and, in order to conduct some kind 
of zoological research, you are required to shoot with an anaesthetic dart the former 
beast but not the latter. You are standing in a jungle clearing, when a large grey 
animal charges into view. Pulling the trigger, you discover to your dismay that you 
have knocked out an elephant. On asking yourself how you could have made such a 
bad mistake, you will discover that your judgment was undermined by the same factors 
that undermine the source-monitoring judgments of hallucinating patients. 
(Bentall, 2003, p. 366) 
Beliefs or expectations can override one's senses. What one expects to see or hear can 
govem what one sees and hears. Using the above analogy: if one has been told that it is 
rhinoceroses that are to be found in the jungle clearing, any large grey animal charging 
from the bush will appear as a rhinoceros. Sense data can be corrupted by context; 
consider hunting by night, or in a forest, or in fear. In such a context people can vary the 
level of evidence they require to make a decision. In crowds, in urgency, or in low light, a 
rhinoceros is neariy enough an elephant to be mistaken for one, to convince us that it is 
one. Ernesto 'Che' Guervara describes such an episode in his Motorcycle Diaries: 
In his broken Spanish he told us that a puma was in the region. 'And pumas are 
vicious, they're not afraid to attack people! They have huge blond manes...' 
Attempting to close the door we found that it was like a stable door - only the lower 
half shut. I placed our revolver near my head in case the puma, whose shadow filled 
our thoughts, decided to pay an unannounced midnight visit. The day was just 
dawning when I awoke to the sound of claws scratching at my door. At my side, 
Alberto lay silent, full of dread. I had my hand tense on the cocked revolver. Two 
luminous eyes stared at me from the silhouetted trees. Like a cat, the eyes sprang 
forward and the black mass of the body materialized over the door. 
It was pure instinct; the brakes of my intelligence failed. My drive for self-
preservation pulled the trigger. For a long moment, the thunder beat against and 
around the walls, stopping only when a lighted torch in the doorway began desperately 
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shouting at us. But by that time in our timid silence we knew, or at least could guess, 
the reason for the caretaker's stentorian shouts and his wife's hysterical sobs as she 
threw herself over the dead body of Bobby - her nasty, ill-tempered dog. (Guevara, 
1952/2004, pp. 52-53) 
Do not dreams impel us to trust them? Sometimes extemal data can 'constrain' 
information by its context. Dreams would mean less if we weren't blind to the outside 
worid when dreaming. Sometimes data perceived from extemal sources corrupts or 
degrades by context. We eliminate and predict to fill in gaps in the 'incomplete' data. 
People who hallucinate are more likely to do so when alone (at night) or when extemal 
stimulation is chaotic and unpattemed, such as in the midst of noisy crowds. 
Stress, or the perceived need to make a quick or especially correct decision, 
influences our discernment. Concern, fear, or urgency can influence us to rash judgments. 
These influences are factors, too, in our source monitoring. Source monitoring is a skill 
and requires decision-making. 
We rarely consciously think about the source of our perceptions, and source 
monitoring judgments are neariy always automatic (but, then, so are many of our 
judgments about rhinoceroses and elephants). The analogy shows how hallucinations 
arise from an error of judgment rather than error of perception. (Bentall, 2003, p. 367) 
If we extend this explanation to our thinking about the self, to our generating a 
structure of self, is it not illuminating? The consistency and quality of data in that context 
are variable and are often corrupted by ellipses in perception. How can we 'know' in such 
circumstances as those in which we generate a sense of self? Regarding the factors and 
information that are the composition of the self, we act as we do with any incomplete 
picture of events - we make things up to complete the picture. There is no face in a 
mirror for our self-referral. But we sometimes need, in acts of private self-confirmation. 
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4. We sometimes need, in acts of private self-confirmation, an image or object to 
represent ourselves - Six different expressions. 
(Image reproduced from Houlden, 1958/1967, p. 30) 
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an image or object to represent ourselves. What suffices for an inner 'face' in such 
circumstances? 
In the film The Cradle Will Rock (1999), the ventriloquist dummy ("I prefer 'puppet'" 
says the ventriloquist Tommy Crickshaw, played by Bill Murray) takes on a life of its 
own even without the freakish 'vitalization' that can be seen in other cinema 
representations of ventriloquism, such as Devil Doll (1963) and Dead of Night (\945). 
What the dummy represents to the ventriloquist in The Cradle Will Rock it is hard to say. 
The dummy is not a figure of fear and sinister threat to his ventriloquist as the dummies 
are in other films representing ventriloquism such as Magic (1977) and Dead of Night. In 
The Cradle Will Rock the dummy is most of all a confidant for the lonely, reactionary 
'Archie Rice'-like character of ventriloquist Tommy Crickshaw. Crickshaw confides in 
the puppet (who is never referred to by a name) as if only the puppet could provide the 
communal support missing from Crickshaw's other relationships. In his courtship of the 
agitating anti-communist played by Joan Cusack ('Hazel Huffman'), Crickshaw lets the 
puppet do the talking. 
In contrast to other fictional representations of ventriloquism (e.g, Stine, 1995), 
Crickshaw's dummy has no self-animating agency. In the scene showing an anti-
communist show-and-tell organized by Hazel Huffman, Crickshaw's dummy comically 
does not react when Crickshaw looks to him for support. Whenever Crickshaw removes 
his hand from the dummy's animating mechanics, the dummy falls in a crumpled heap. 
Ventriloquism is an act and not an illusion. In one extraordinary scene the relationship 
between Tommy Crickshaw and his dummy takes centre stage. Crickshaw is first usurped 
by his proteges, who play out a sort of human equivalent of the ventriloquist and dummy 
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act whilst stealing all of Crickshaw's jokes. Crickshaw approaches the stage as if 
enacting an endgame in defiance or fatalism. "Where have you come, Tommy 
Crickshaw?" asks the dummy, "Where's the old comrade 1 once knew? Let's do the old 
act, one more time, for old time's sake. Come on Tommy!" Ventriloquism is essentially a 
double act with one performer voicing both roles; Crickshaw sets up his dummy to be his 
mouthpiece. Crickshaw is merely the stooge or straight man to a dummy who has all the 
articulacy Crickshaw lacks, and who has all the best lines. Whereas Crickshaw is dry and 
bitter and straight, his dummy is passionate and risk-taking and confident; the puppet is 
the showman and Crickshaw the hapless stooge. 
In Crickshaw's last act the puppet runs away with the show in a manic recitation of 
socialist dogma, thinking and acting far too quickly for Crickshaw to keep up. "I've 
known this dummy like the back of my hand! And I swear! In my own hands a 
revolutionary!" protests Crickshaw to the audience. "Ladies and Gentlemen," responds 
the dummy, "this man exploits my labour for his own profits. This capitalist pays me 
zero, works me whenever he likes! I sleep in a coffin-like apartment!" It is not clear 
whether the dummy is mocking his audience, his ventriloquist, the socialist community 
theatre, or everyone equally, but the dummy is shown to be a defiant and fearless 
showman. The scene resembles less the demonic possession or psychoses shown in Dead 
of Night, and more the *madman speaks the truth' scenes familiar from the last acts of 
King Lear or Tarkovsky's Nostalgia (1983). When the dummy has had his say, 
ventriloquist Crickshaw leaves the stage to boos from the crowd. For a moment the 
dummy sits alone, on a pedestal, impervious to the audience derision. Then, lacking 
Crickshaw's supporting hand, the dummy falls headlong onto the stage fioor. 
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Earlier in the film we have seen Crickshaw's proteges, Sid and Larry, rehearsing their 
human ventriloquist act, saying to each other over and over again, "Now who's the 
dummy?", "Now who's the dummy?" Are there two individuals performing in this last 
show by Crickshaw and his dummy? We see the usual dyad present in the ventriloquist 
act, but this representation highlights the intransigence and unniliness of the ventriloquial 
mouthpiece. The dummy says the very opposite of what we would expect Crickshaw to 
say and represents a very public performance of split agenda. The film represents the 
riven agency of the pair in such a way that we witness a double act rather than just a 
particularly good ventriloquist at work. It is of course always the aim of ventriloquism to 
represent one person as two people; to call it a 'dummy' is to indicate its formal rather 
than its performative qualities. Fictional representations of ventriloquism tend to exploit 
this possible division of agencies to show the dummy acting out the hidden or displaced 
desires of a ventriloquist upon the public stage. Ventriloquism in these cases is less a 
trick to deceive audiences as to the whereabouts of the performer and more an instance of 
remote agency: protagonists are found guilty of acts at which they were not even present. 
Agency in these matters shows a slippery lack of integrity and answers as much to the 
will of the monster as to Doctor Frankenstein. Crickshaw witnesses the unruliness of the 
mouthpiece in a double-act that sees the dummy gain the upper hand and all the best 
lines. 
Mikhail Bakhtin has argued for the dialogic character of inner speech: 
The dialogic form is most apparent when we have to take some decision. We hesitate. 
We do not know what is the best course of action. We argue with ourselves, we try to 
convince ourselves of the rightness of one decision. Our consciousness seems to be 
divided into two independent and contradictory voices. (Bakhtin, 1920s/1983, p. 119) 
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Whose voices are we hearing in this exchange? Is it that both voices can be said to belong 
in the same individual? 
'My action will be wrong', but wrong from what point of view? My own personal 
one? But where did I get this 'personal' point of view from, i f not from the points of 
view of the people I was brought up by and educated with, whom I have read in books 
and newspapers and heard at meetings and lectures? And i f I reject the views of the 
social group to which I have belonged up to now, then this will only be because the 
ideology of another social group has gained control of my consciousness, taken it over 
completely and compelled me to recognize the rightness of the social being generated 
by it. (Bakhtin, 1920s/1983, p. 119) 
Somewhere in the cinematic model of ventriloquism is an understanding of the 'theory of 
mind' espoused by developmental (and other) psychologists. Speech acts originate 
somewhere in the midst of competing agencies. Bakhtin pictures inner speech as always 
characterized by dialogue, especially so in times of responsibility and determination. One 
person can represent a conflict of interests; this might be the logic that defines inner 
speech. 
In his essay Freedom and Resemment P. F. Strawson points to the linguistic reflection 
of 'theory of mind' as evidence of its influence on quotidian thought: 
What I have to say consists largely of commonplaces. So my language, like that of 
commonplaces generally, will be quite unscientific and imprecise. The central 
commonplace that I want to insist on is the very great importance that we attach to the 
attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to 
which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about 
these attitudes and intentions. I can give no simple description of the field of 
phenomena at the centre of which stands this commonplace truth; for the field is too 
complex. Much imaginative literature is devoted to exploring its complexities; and we 
have a large vocabulary for the purpose. (Strawson, 1968, p. 75) 
This thesis considers two-party notions of self. I f the self one acknowledges seems 
ventriloquial then who is the ventriloquist? 'Self could be described as semantic ailment; 
the concept is provided for by an aleatory grammar of references that resolve in the body. 
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5. One person can represent a conflict of interests: 
this might be the logic that defines inner speech. 
(Harry Baer ventriloquizes for King Ludwig II in the shadow of Hitler 
Image reproduced from Stewart, 1992, p. 36) 
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Whatever happens, when or where, we're prone to wonder who or what's responsible. 
This leads us to discover explanations that we might not otherwise imagine, and that 
help us to predict and control not only what happens in the world, but also what 
happens in our minds. But what if those same tendencies should lead us to imagine 
things and causes that do not exist? Then we'll invent false gods and superstitions 
and see their hand in every chance coincidence. Indeed, perhaps that strange word *!' 
- as used in ' I just had a good idea' - reflects the selfsame tendency. If you're 
compelled to find some cause that causes everything you do - why, then, that 
something needs a name. You call it 'me'. I call it 'you'. (Minsky, 1985, p. 232) 
This thesis is intended as an erosion of the established facts surrounding the 'self. This 
thesis aims to provide evidence to prove that the locations established for the 'self, in 
neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and in our folk psychology, are untenable in either 
cultural or physical form. What one habitually thinks is there is simply not there. There 
might indeed be nothing there. 
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Chapter Three: Double Talk 
Since Eugen Bleuler's ciassificatory reference to 'schizophrenia' in 1911 (1911/1950, 
p. 8), and the confusing speech he thought was symptomatic of it, much has been written 
about how 'schizophrenia' and confused speech coincide. More importantly, Bleuler's 
symptomatology for schizophrenia described confused speech (or confusing speech) as 
indicative of incoherent reasoning. Of course, one can only recognise 'thought disorder' 
by its outward signs: that is, the apparently confused speech of the person so diagnosed. 
As linguists have pointed out (Rochester and Martin, 1979, p. 3), it is mistaken to 
conflate a speech that is difficult to follow with a disorder of thinking in the speaker. 
There may be many reasons why we might find it difficult to follow what someone is 
saying. R. D. Laing's view (Laing, 1959, p. 163) was that whether so-called 'crazy talk' 
seems confused or disordered is dependent on the attitude of the listener; when one 
listens properly to context in the words of the speaker, the content is clear and often 
enlightening. For those of us who are less gifted as listeners it is elucidating to consider 
the linguistic links between 'inner speech' (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 248) and so-called 
'thought disordered' (Rochester and Martin, 1979, p. 3) speech. 
The diagnostic criteria for 'thought disordered' speech are inevitably compromised 
because they depend on the premise that speech that is difficult for the listening 
psychiatrist to understand is indicative of the 'disordered' thought of the speaker. That is 
a premise which is very difficult to substantiate and very easy to doubt. Nevertheless it 
has survived in the hegemony of psychiatric definitions of schizophrenia since at least the 
1930s. Even supposing a synonymity between confusing speech and disordered thought 
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were provable, the diagnosis rests on the confusion of the listener rather than that of the 
speaker. How would one map the linguistics of speech that confuses? What, i f any, 
consistent factors characterize speech that is labelled as 'thought disordered' by 
psychiatrists? 
'Formal thought disorder' is one of the criteria first listed in DSM III in 1980 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) as warranting a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Note the subtle conflating of ^thought' with 'speech' in the following passage, and the 
failure to discriminate between those two. Note also that the defining characteristic of this 
'formal thought disorder' is the listener's incomprehension: 
A disturbance in the form of thought is often present. This has been referred to as 
'formal thought disorder,' and is distinguished from a disorder in the content of 
thought. The most common example of this is loosening of associations, in which ideas 
shift from one subject to another completely unrelated or only obliquely related 
subject, without the speaker showing any awareness that the topics are unconnected. 
Statements that lack a meaningful relationship may be juxtaposed, or the individual 
may shift idiosyncratically from one frame of reference to another. When loosening of 
associations is severe, incoherence may occur, that is, speech may become 
incomprehensible. There may also be poverty of content of speech, in which speech is 
adequate in amount but conveys little information because it is vague, overly abstract 
or overly concrete, repetitive, or stereotyped. The listener can recognize this 
disturbance by noting that litde if any information has been conveyed although the 
individual has spoken at some length. Less common disturbances include neologisms, 
perseveration, clanging, and blocking. (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 
p. 182) 
One might think it possible to enlist the assistance of a patient who is diagnosed 
schizophrenic by that criterion, and assess what about the patient's language marks it out 
as exhibiting 'marked loosening of associations' (A. P. A., 1980, p. 188). But nobody, 
neither linguist nor psychiatrist, can point to these 'discourse failures' (Rochester and 
Martin, 1979, p. 1-2) in any but the loosest terms. In 19n,Eugen Bleuler( 1911/1950, 
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p. 21) wrote of the confusion he felt when listening to the speech of certain of his 
patients. He attributed his confusion to their incoherent discourse, in which: 
Often ideas are only partially worked out, and fragments of ideas are connected in an 
illogical way to constitute a new idea. Concepts lose their completeness, seem to 
dispense with one or more of their essential components; indeed, in many cases they 
are only represented by a few truncated notions. Thus, the process of association often 
works with mere fragments of ideas and concepts. This results in associations which 
normal individuals will regard as incorrect, bizarre, and utteriy unpredictable. Often 
thinking stops in the middle of a thought; or in the attempt to pass to another idea, it 
may suddenly cease altogether, at least as far as it is a conscious process (blocking). 
Instead of continuing the thought, new ideas crop up which neither the patient nor the 
observer can bring into any connection with the previous stream of thought. (Bleuler, 
1911/1950, p. 9) 
In the chapter of this thesis titled Hallucinations I described Vygotsky's concept of 
'inner speech' and its role in thought and language. The syntax of inner speech, in 
Vygotsky's concept, differs radically from social speech. The language of inner speech is 
less complete and coherent than social speech due to three principle characteristics, which 
Vygotsky lists as: predication, agglutination, and varied signification. Of predication, 
Vygotsky writes: 
We know what we are thinking about; i.e., we always know the subject and the 
situation. And since the subject of our inner dialogue is already known, we may just 
imply it. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 243) 
Predication also occurs in social speech, especially between people familiar to one 
another. This omission of the subject of a sentence and all the words connected with it, 
whilst preserving the predicate, is what most particulariy marks the syntax of inner 
speech. Agglutination is a way of forming compound words where several words are 
merged into one. The resultant neologisms can express very complex ideas whilst still 
designating all the separate elements of these ideas; for example, 'thoughthazard' (my 
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example). Thirdly, 'varied signification' exploits the preponderance of sense over 
meaning in the syntax of inner speech: 
In inner speech, one word stands for a number of thoughts and feelings, and 
sometimes substitutes for a long and profound discourse. And naturally this unique 
inner sense of the chosen word cannot be translated into ordinary external speech. 
Inner speech turas out to be incommensurable with the external meaning of the same 
word. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 248) 
Inner speech is marked by a condensation such that, "A single word is so saturated with 
sense that... it becomes a concentrate of sense. To unfold it into overt speech, one would 
need a multitude of words" (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 247). This process can mean that, 
in inner speech, there can be a use of words that have acquired special meanings known 
only to the initiate. This is what is meant by 'the preponderance of sense over meaning in 
the syntax of inner speech'. 
Vygotsky is keen to emphasize that inner speech forms "an entirely separate speech 
function" (1934/1986, p. 235) distinct from social speech. Its characteristic trait is the 
peculiarity of its syntax: "Compared with extemal speech, inner speech appears 
disconnected and incomplete" (1934/1986, p. 235). Vygotsky is sure that, even i f inner 
speech were made audible to another, it would remain, "abbreviated and incoherent" 
(1934/1986, p. 235). 
In 1911 Eugen Bleuler defined 'schizophrenia' by means of a descriptive account of 
the fallibility of understanding he associated with listening to schizophrenic discourse. 
Throughout Bleuler's induction into grammar of schizophrenia as a psychiatric category, 
a very particularly confusing discourse is represented as confused and as the first rank 
symptom of schizophrenia. This problematic discourse is emblematic of 'the group of 
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schizophrenias' and is its most recognizable symptom. Bleuler's defining qualification of 
'schizophrenia' conflates speech with thought. 
In the normal thinking process, the numerous actual and latent images combine to 
determine each association. In schizophrenia, however, single images or whole 
combinations may be rendered inefTective, in an apparently haphazard fashion. Instead, 
thinking operates with ideas and concepts which have no, or a completely insufficient, 
connection with the main idea and should therefore be excluded from the thought-
process. The result is that thinking becomes confused, bizarre, incorrect, abrupt. 
Sometimes, all the associative threads fail and the thought chain is totally interrupted; 
after such 'blocking', ideas may emerge which have no recognizable connection with 
preceding ones. (Bleuler. 1911/1950, p. 22) 
This sounds like Vygotsky's description of inner speech, and fulfils his belief that inner 
speech would signally fail to be understood should it somehow be heard aloud. So much 
is withdrawn from the discourse of inner speech, omitting the subject of the sentence and 
all words connected with it, that a listener could not follow the references and 
implications. Bleuler described the discourse of his confusing 'schizophrenic' patients as 
'vague and woolly,' exhibiting 'loose associations' and 'long silences' and 'rhyming 
words,' and as 'haphazard' and 'bizarre' and 'lacking in goals' (Rochester and Martin, 
1979, p. 4). Al l of which describes the listener feeling 'left out of the picture' and failing 
to perceive the context that would make clear the predicates in the discourse. 
Is 'inner speech' synonymous with thought? Vygotsky seems to describe inner speech 
also as 'verbal thought,' and points out that: 
Thought is not begotten by thought; it is engendered by motivation, i.e., by our 
desires and needs, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an 
effective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last 'why' in the analysis 
of thinking. A true and full understanding of another's thought is possible only when 
we understand its affective-volitional basis....To understand another's speech, it is not 
sufficient to understand his words - we must understand his thought. But even that 
is not enough - we must also know its motivation. No psychological analysis of an 
utterance is complete until that plane is reached. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, pp. 252-253) 
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Bleuler seemed not to view speech as synonymous with thought. Rochester and Martin 
have interpreted his view as follows: 
He notes, for example, that a speaker may appear confused when only the 'manner of 
expression' is obscure. In such a case, 'logical transitions may be assumed to exist'. 
And elsewhere he observes that a 'gap in associations' in the speaker's thoughts may 
be bridged in speech by grammatical fonms. In this case, speech which appears to be 
reflecting coherent thoughts is, in fact, only simulating them. Thus, the patient's 
speech may be confusing while the thoughts are logical; or the thoughts may be 
unconnected while the speech is linked through grammatical forms. Speech is one 
thing, Bleuler seems to be saying, and thought another; and though the two often 
meet, they are not inseparable, (Rochester and Martin, 1979, p. 2) 
So, speech is more liable to be meaningful if we understand something of the speaker's 
thoughts, and thoughts only make sense if we can understand the thinker's motives, or 
desires, or intentions. Thoughts, furthermore, are not necessarily discemable from speech, 
What if we add to that G, E. M. Anscombe's (1957) argument to the effect that, it is 
wrong to claim that we know what our intentions are, rather we just can say what our 
intentions are? This last is an adumbration of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and his 
observation that humans can only describe their own mental states inferentially 
(Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Wittgenstein made a comparison between speech acquisition and mathematics: 
Wittgenstein used to speak of teaching a child to multiply by going through examples 
of multiplication with him, then getting him to go through these and other exercises 
while you corrected his mistakes, and then saying 'Go on by yourself now'. But if you 
said something similar about teaching a child to speak you would have left out the 
most important thing. If he can speak he has got something to tell you. (Rhees, 1970, 
p. 80) 
Wittgenstein puts it that: one can teach a child the principles of multiplication and then 
say 'now go on in this way,' but with language the process is different - when a child 
learas to speak he or she has then got something to say. Or does it just sound like that? 
Language, or linguistic facility, or speech sounds like it should make sense. Maybe this is 
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what happens in the reception of so-called 'psychotic speech' or 'crazy talk' (Rochester 
and Martin, 1979). The fault is seen to reside with the speaker rather than with the 
speech. That is: it is seen to be a mental ailment rather than a semantic ailment, and that it 
indicates the perceptual problems of the speaker - and specifically the speaker's inability 
to learn the codes of language and what language is for and what it is intended to say. The 
diagnosis in 'crazy talk' is a criticism of the speaker's use of language, and an 
extrapolation towards faults (probably organic), which determine this problematic use of 
language. Even so, what comes out in this speech is not simply chaotic, and follows 
distinct semantic rules (though not all of the usual rules). Is the fault in not understanding 
the purpose and measure of language, or not knowing how to say what one wants to say? 
Maybe the message (if one applies the psychoanalytic concept of 'transference') is 
conveyed perfectly to the interiocuton that meaning is dogged by lack of precision, is 
fickle, is communicated as it is felt. 
Harry Jerison has argued that the first duty of language is to narrative rather than 
directions toward an activity: 
The quality of language that makes it special is less its role in social communication 
than its role in evoking cognitive imagery, and 1 suggest that it was this kind of 
capacity that was evolving in the eariy hominids. (We need language to tell a story 
much more than to give directions for an action.) (Jerison, 1973, p. 427) 
How then are we to understand Vygotsky's formula for 'theory of mind'? " I have done 
'this' because of 'this'" is a narrative. Most semantic rules tend toward narrative by way 
of tense and other grammatical means. In the sentence above the second 'this' places 
temporally before the first 'this', (at least, this is how we are to understand its description 
of events). The above sentence is first and foremost an indication of motive, and secondly 
a temporally ordered narrative of events. One tends to impute intent posthumously 
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(Wegner, 2002, Libet et al, 1983). Cause and effect descriptions are meant only 
figuratively but may not be understood as such. An explanation of events orders it 
temporally by means of cause and effect, temporal order, and narrative: the world and 
self are given to children, thus, and this is understanding. 
Verbal hallucination has become almost synonymous with schizophrenia in 
diagnostic terms. Among the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, DSM III listed: 
3. Delusions with persecutory or jealous content, i f accompanied by hallucinations of 
any type. 
4. Auditory hallucinations in which either a voice keeps a running commentary on the 
individual's behaviour or thoughts, or two or more voices converse with each other. 
5. Auditory hallucinations on several occasions with content of more than one or two 
words, having no apparent relation to depression or elation. (A. P. A., 1980, p. 188) 
The links between verbal hallucination and schizophrenia are historical rather than 
experimental. It is an obvious point, but mental illness doesn't have the aetiological 
clarity that a somatic illness might have. Even supposing a transparent and obvious 
symptomatology, diagnosis and prognosis are even more subjective and contestable than 
in physical illness. They also depend on a power relationship that is a folie^a deux of role-
playing. If three of the six classificatory symptoms of 'schizophrenia' list the experience 
of verbal hallucinations by the patient concerned, then it is axiomatic that most people 
diagnosed as 'schizophrenic' experience verbal hallucinations. More than that: by the 
same terms, those who experience verbal hallucinations would be most likely to receive a 
diagnosis of 'schizophrenia'. 
'Schizophrenia' is a term first used by Eugen Bleuler in his adaptation and extension 
of the classificatory system developed by Emil Kraepelin (Bentall, 2(X)3, p. 22, and 
Bleuler, 1911/1950, pp. 1-8). Schizophrenia, or 'dementia praecox' in Emil Kraepelin's 
terminology, was developed as a classification or diagnosis to, in part, account for those 
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patients in a nineteenth century German mental institution who experienced verbal 
hallucinations (Bentall 2003, p. 15). The terms of the diagnosis were arrived at in order to 
assist the psychiatrist governor of a mental institution, whose practice was made more 
efficient i f he grouped patients according to particular classification. In 1891 Emil 
Kraepelin was Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Heidelberg in Baden. 
Kraepelin's clinic was one of three hospitals responsible for the care of the insane in 
Baden. From the Heidelberg clinic, patients could be transferred to the other two clinics 
in Baden according to their capabilities and prognoses. Interested in classification, 
Kraepelin was perturbed by inaccessible patient records and by the slow procedures for 
patient transfer. On Kraepelin's analysis, "an understanding of the language of symptoms 
would allow the researcher to decode both the biological underpinnings of madness and 
their origins" (Bentall 2003, p. 14), Richard Bentall and P. D. Slade have pointed out: 
Although verbal hallucinations would seem to be very common among patients 
diagnosed as schizophrenic, they are also often present in patients with other 
diagnoses, such as psychotic depression. It should also be noted that, in some cultures, 
hallucinatory experiences are fairiy common among people not regarded as mentally ill 
and that, even in our own society, they may be more prevalent among non-psychotic 
individuals than is often realized. (Bentall and Slade, 1986, p. 519) 
After Kraepelin and Bleuler, the major influence on the classificatory and diagnostic 
use of the term 'schizophrenia' was the list of 'first rank symptoms' enumerated by Kurt 
Schneider in 1959 (1959). Schneider qualified as a psychiatrist in 1919 and in 1931 was 
appointed Director of the Clinical Research Institute for Psychiatry in Munich (Hoenig, 
1982, p. 392). The Institute was founded by Kraepelin, and though Schneider seems to 
have been more pragmatic he equally was concerned with diagnosis and discrimination. 
Schneider recruited Emst Rudin to the Research Institute in Munich. In 1920 Rudin 
had co-written a pamphlet entided Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Living 
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6. Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Living - Death ventriloquizes for Hitler. 
(Image reproduced from Kolland, 1998, p. 202) 
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(Bentall, 2003, p. 30) which advocated compulsory euthanasia for varieties of psychiatric 
patients. Rudin was later complicit with the National Socialist Party, and his genetic 
studies of schizophrenia led easily to his advocating and executing the extreme eugenic 
measures of the Nazi era. Upon the instigation of enforced sterilization and later murder 
of mentally ill patients, Schneider left the Institute to become an army doctor during 
World War I I . In 1945 Schneider was recognized as sympathetically anti-Nazi by the 
conquering American army, and he was appointed Dean of the reopened University of 
Heidelberg (where Kraepelin had been Professor). 
In 1959, Schneider's textbook Clinical Psychopathology {\959) was published in 
English translation. From biographical reports (Hoenig, 1982 and 1983) it seems 
Schneider did not consider his analysis of schizophrenia as particularly important 
amongst his ideas. Schneider's was a pragmatic, 'phenomenological' approach. 
Schneider sought to answer the question: what were the characteristics peculiar to 
schizophrenia? He attempted to differentiate schizophrenia from general problems of 
personality, and chose so-called 'first rank' symptoms for the convenience of their 
recognition. Schneider did not think that these symptoms were especially important, but 
rather that they were easy to spot. 
Schneider disagreed with Kraepelin's description of psychiatric diagnosis as 
identifying cases with a conrimon aetiology (Hoenig, 1983, p.553). His pragmatic 
approach led him to be dismissive of attaching any 'meaning' to symptoms. 
Diagnosis looks for the 'How?' (the form) not the 'What?' (the theme or content). 
If I find thought-withdrawal this is important to me as a certain mode of experience 
and as a diagnostic hint; I am not interested diagnostically whether it is the devil, 
the mistress or a political leader who withdraws the thoughts. Where one looks at such 
contents diagnostics recedes. In that case one sees only the biographical or the 
understandable existence. This is the case in psychoanalysis and in the new extreme 
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types of existential analysis. There, it is true, diagnosis comes to an end and with that 
also the heritage of Kraepelin. (Schneider quoted in Hoenig, 1983, p. 555) 
One can see from this statement that Schneider may be wary of the power relationship 
implicated and entrenched by interpretation. Interpretation may be said to be the 
substitution of the true meaning for the apparent meaning. The interpreter is semiotically 
privileged and thus a power relationship is invoked, Schneider was able to say: 
With the endogenous psychoses, which are purely psychological forms, one can make 
assessments only according to one's own concepts. One can only say: this is for me, or 
I call this cyclothymia or schizophrenia. (Schneider quoted in Hoenig, 1982, p. 398) 
This sounds like Thomas Szasz years later pointing out: 
Al l too often the problem of defining disease is debated as if it were a question of 
science, medicine, or logic. By doing so, we ignore the fact that definitions are made 
by persons, that different persons have different interests, and hence that differing 
definitions of disease may simply reflect the divergent interests and needs of the 
definers. (Szasz 1997, p. 17) 
Schneider (1959) gave as first rank symptoms of schizophrenia: Audible thoughts; 
Voices heard arguing (including one's own voice); Voices heard commenting on one's 
actions; Experiences of influences playing on the body (e.g. electricity); Thought 
withdrawal (thoughts taken away by another); Thoughts which are ascribed by the patient 
to other people who intrude their thoughts upon the patient; Thought diffusion (others 
knowing one's thoughts as i f having overheard them); Delusional perception (extravagant 
paranoia); Feelings, impulses (drives) and volitional acts that are experienced by the 
patient as the work or influence of others. One can see from this list that the importance 
in diagnosis is assigned to symptomatic display of verbal hallucination or delusion. 
Although Schneider thought this list a guide to diagnosis, subsequent definitions of 
schizophrenia have emphasized these criteria as precise, paramount and irreducible. 
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Ventriloquism and verbal hallucination have this in common: when the mouth is 
closed one is free to speak, but with one's mouth open the voices stop. In the chapter of 
this thesis titled Hallucinations I mentioned the link psychologists have long made 
between (in Vygotsky's term) Mnner speech' and the voices heard by people who have 
verbal auditory hallucinations. This is more than conjecture as has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in experiment with electromyography (EMG) measurement of the small 
muscle movement in the chin and other speech muscles: 
In the case of auditory hallucinations there have been empirical efforts to 
psychophysiologically measure subvocal speech and heightened EMG from the vocal 
musculature during the presumed hallucinatory experience. Gould (1949, 1950) was 
apparendy the first to successfully record covert oral language behaviour prior to the 
overt oral report of the presence of hallucinations, McGuigan (1966) reported 
significanUy increased amplitude of the chin EMG and pneumogram associated with 
slight whisperings that corresponded roughly to the content of the hallucination, 
immediately prior to the report of having heard voices. Malmo (1975) mentioned 
positive results that had been recorded some years eariier that were of a similar nature, 
viz., heightened EMG activity during auditory hallucinations. Inouye and Shimizu 
(1970) similariy reported that verbal hallucinations were often accompanied by an 
increase in speech muscle EMG. They measured the time lag between the onset of the 
increased EMG discharge and the verbal hallucination as being within 1.5 seconds, 
with the duration of the EMG increase being positively correlated with the duration of 
the report of the verbal hallucination. Furthermore, the loudness of the verbal 
hallucination was related positively to the amount of the EMG increase. Their 
conclusion was that subvocal speech is a part of inner speech that is produced at the 
moment of experiencing verbal hallucinations. (McGuigan 1978, pp.4I8-419) 
If the subvocal speech that anticipates verbal hallucinations were prevented, would the 
verbal hallucinations be prevented? Subvocal speech seems to be the physical act of 
Mnner speech*, and verbal hallucination seems to be inner speech with the feeling of 
agency missing, so it is to be presumed that these three are inseparable. 
In 1987 Peter Bick and Marcel Kinsboume (Bick and KJnsboume, 1987, pp.222-225) 
published their study of an attempt to preclude subvocal activity in hallucinating persons. 
They chose eighteen patients who met DSM III criteria for schizophrenia. Al l described 
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hearing voices of the kind described in DSM III : voices that addressed them directly and 
either issued commands or commented on their behaviour. Al l were taking psychoactive 
drugs as part of their treatment. Eleven of the patients were described as chronic, having 
been inpatients for three months or more, and these eleven reported having heard voices 
almost daily for between two and thirty-three years. The seven others were in an acute 
admissions ward. Al l eighteen patients had reported hearing voices at first interview. The 
experimenters asked the subjects to perform three manoeuvres and report after each 
whether their experience of verbal hallucination had increased, stayed the same or gone 
away. 
In a random order, counterbalanced across subjects, the experimenter asked the 
patients to 1) close their eyes tight, 2) open their mouths wide, and 3) make fists and 
squeeze tight for one full minute and then to comment on the voices they heard. The 
experimenter rated each reply as indicating an increase, a decrease, or no change in 
the voices. (Bick and Kinsboume, 1987, p.223) 
In thirteen of the eighteen subjects, the mouth-opening manoeuvre abolished verbal 
hallucinations. The control manoeuvres of eye or fist exercises had effect in only two 
subjects. None of the subjects reported an intensification of hallucination during any of 
the manoeuvres. 
Perhaps more interesting than the efficacy of the simple mouth-opening manoeuvre in 
precluding verbal hallucination, is the follow-up report on patient response: 
The patients complied readily but seemed indifferent to the fact that they could abolish 
the voices by a simple movement. Patients who had characterized the voices they heard 
as burdensome or terrifying expressed no relief that they could control them. One 
patient who had reported hearing continuously harassing voices was reinterviewed 
one week later. Asked i f she had used the mouth-opening manoeuvre when the voices 
became intolerable, she said that she had not and expressed no interest in doing so. 
(Bick and Kinsboume, 1987, p.223) 
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A chapter in David Mitchell's novel Ghostwritten (2000) dwells on differently 
conceived mental terrains and employs an homoncular protagonist to map these terrains. 
The narrator is a sprite that can manifest in a host mind, sometimes detected but never 
understood, and can affect desires and motives and agency within the host. Desires, 
motives and agency are, to us all, of either mysterious provenance or assumed as 
subjectively driven. Thus the sprite can effect its will after arriving unbidden in its host 
and nothing is felt to be altered or amiss. The mind is described as a physical space and 
yet clearly not that. 
The narrator sprite has jumped from the mind of a young male Australian backpacker, 
to the mind of a Mongolian herdswoman, (My description has already failed the subtlety 
of the original.) The sprite compares the experience of being at loose in the one mind and 
the other. The Australian's *mind-space' is like traffic on a ten-lane highway, and 
surrounded by neon advertising, with the radio on flicking loudly between channels all 
the time. It is easy for the sprite to hide here - there is so much noise, so much 
distraction. Conversely, the herdswoman has a barer space with no hiding place. She is 
attuned to what noises are in her mind, and the whole space is familiar to her and 
explored. She knows the wilful way of her moods, and not in retrospect but in concord. 
She has a cultural explanation for the feeling of having a wandering sprite at loose in her 
sense of self and mind-space. She is aware of the presence of the sprite, she is troubled by 
it, and feels her ancestors are not happy with her - that is her explanation for this 
unpredictable tenancy. It is an alien sprite with its own agenda; but even this is tolerated 
and understood by the woman. 
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It is not hard to imagine a narrator-sprite inhabiting our *mind space,' because that is 
something we often imagine: the concept is very similar to Descartes's homuncular 
vision of the self. It is also quite easy to picture the mind as an over-crowded, over-busy 
city, or as a very clean and empty house with few rooms; these also accord with ways we 
could picture that 'space' we might find our selves. It is illustrative for us to create these 
representations, just as it is to suppose an embodied voice for one's inner speech. If 
verbal hallucination is a form of inner speech, then the qualities of the voices heard and 
the manner in which they are heard can tell us something about our own 'head space,' A 
survey of the *out loud' qualities of inner speech in its form as verbal hallucination might 
serve as a sonar or echo-finder. Given the supposed roots and purpose of Vygotskian 
inner speech it is elucidating to consider whose voice (or voices) we hear when we 'hear' 
inner speech. 
Ivan Leudar and Philip Thomas interviewed a variety of 'voice-hearers' for their 
study Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity (2000), Some of the people they interviewed 
were diagnosed as mentally ill and some were not, and the published interview reports do 
not make a distinction between classes of interviewees. The researchers are not interested 
in interpretation, but in the understanding and experience of hallucinated voices in the 
explanations of the people interviewed. 
There is great variety in the reports of voice hearing. Some voices are indistinct and 
some have great clarity. Some voices are commanding, others are just voices. Voice 
hearers might struggle to characterize a voice, but the voice is neariy always like enough 
to a known person that the link can be established. A voice is recognized by tonal or other 
'audio' characteristics, or by the type of things the voice says, or by the occasions on 
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which the voice is heard. Al l of these help point to an embodied equivalent in the social 
worid of the hearer parent, spouse, priest, etc. These signifiers help even when the 
person speaking is no longer alive; hallucinated voices are anyway enigmatic and an 
effort often has to be made to 'place' the voice. The voice hearer seems to continue to 
leam about the context of the voice heard: whose voice it is, when it is heard, what kind 
of things are said, how or if one should respond, etc. Al l of these aspects are refiexive in 
that the voice-hearer can, for instance, change his or her response to commands heard. 
It is often given, by psychologists and psychiatrists, that verbal hallucination is at root 
a fault in source monitoring: that is, the hearer is unable to distinguish a voice heard only 
in his or her head from the kind of voice that might be heard by others. Voice hearers 
appear to be universally aware that this is a voice *heard' only by them, and that they 
*hear' the voice in their head rather than as in ordinary conversation; indeed, these are 
distinguishing characteristics of the voices they hear and constitute a part of the voice's 
enigma. The hearing of voices is not necessarily accompanied by magical belief: 
Voice hearers rarely tell voices to do things. This is not surprising since voices lack 
bodies, and our informants did not construe them as did Schreber, as supernatural 
agencies which could act in the worid and affect it without bodies. Under this 
description what one can tell voices to do must be concerned with talking. Indeed, the 
most frequent thing our informants reported telling voices was to shut up and go 
away. This rarely works. (Leudar and Thomas, 2000, p. 197) 
If verbal hallucination is a 'special form' of inner speech, presumably the voices 
heard are the voices in which we conduct our inner speech. Then, seemingly, we always 
conduct our inner monologues and dialogues with the voices of others. Is it 
impersonation? Or are we borrowing their voice? Or is our own voice borrowed always 
from another? Just like ventriloquism we speak for ourselves, always, in the voice of 
another. 
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Vygotsky plotted a chronology thus: the child speaks out loud to his or her caregivers; 
the child speaks out loud to his or her self (^egocentric speech'); the child speaking to his 
or her self speaks silently, replacing the egocentric speech with *inner speech'. At the 
transition from egocentric speech to inner speech, semantic structure and grammar alter 
in accordance with the changed context and purpose, and inner speech adopts the 
characteristics I listed earlier in this chapter. Vygotsky observed egocentric speech as 
occurring when a child tries to comprehend a situation or to plan nascent activity. 
Egocentric speech has a role as instrument of thought in the seeking and planning of a 
solution to a problem. Vygotsky observed that this thinking aloud is remarkably similar 
in child and adult, in content, use and structure. The processes of social speech and inner 
speech differ both functionally and structurally. Inner speech emerges in the matter of 
personal adaptation; it is speech-for-oneself and has no outwardly communicative role. 
Inner speech increases as egocentric speech decreases: 
The child talks about the things he sees or hears or does at a given moment. As a 
result, he tends to leave out the subject and all words connected with it, condensing 
his speech more and more until only predicates are left. The more differentiated the 
specific function of egocentric speech becomes, the more pronounced are its syntactic 
peculiarities - simplification and predication. Hand in hand with this change goes 
decreasing vocalization. (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 244) 
My main point in rehearsing the observations and theories of Vygotsky regarding 
inner speech, is to stress the following remark: 
Egocentric speech emerges when the child transfers social, collaborative forms of 
behaviour to the sphere of inner-personal psychic functions. The child's tendency is to 
transfer to his inner processes behaviour patterns that formeriy were social. (Vygotsky, 
1934/1986, p.35) 
This process plays an important part in the acquisition of what is referred to as *theory of 
mind,' or 'mentalization' (Fonagy et a/, 2002). Theory of mind' is the name given to our 
79 
ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others in our attempt to comprehend motive or 
intention. It is indeed a theory of mind in that it explains or predicts social behaviour as 
due to motivating desires and mental states. Shared language ordinarily allows us to ask 
people to explain or excuse themselves with reference to this lexicon of reasons. This 
process was what Vygotsky observed in the interchanges between infant and caregiver. 
Theory of mind is often invoked in discussions of autism: autistic people appearing 
somehow hindered in their appreciation of, or allowance for, the minds of others. In 
philosophy and related sciences, and in folk psychology, the conventional view is that we 
need a theory of mind to understand others, but that we have privileged access to our own 
mental states. Francesca Happ6, who is a researcher at the Institute of Psychiatry in 
London, has presented research (reported in Ross, 2003) that suggests otherwise: 
Children are no better at attributing mental states to themselves than to others. And 
autistic children also have problems reading their own minds. It seems that we 
theorize our own states of mind no less than those of others...Do we activate the same 
regions to read our own and other minds? Neuroimaging studies show that theory of 
mind activity occurs in medial frontal cortex and paracingulate cortex for both kinds of 
mind reading. And in both cases, autistic subjects show decreased paracingulate 
activation in theory of mind tasks compared to normal subjects. So we seem to use 
similar resources for reading our own and other minds. More speculatively, our ability 
to read other minds may even precede and facilitate our ability to introspect. Evolution 
may have forced us to read other minds before our own. (Ross, 2003, p.78) 
The above described process leads to what Alexander Luria called the 'regulatory 
function of language' (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 260). The role played by egocentric 
speech, and later inner speech, transforms prohibitions into inhibitions. Action can be 
transformed into thought; we can subordinate our behaviour by means of verbal 
programmes such as, ' I will do this in order to have that.' Solms and Tumbull have 
described the process thus: 
It is easiest to recognize it in young children, who still often externalise their inner 
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speech, thus making it clear how they are using words (often adopted wholesale from 
their parents) to regulate their behaviour and impulses. Consider the common example 
of the small child who points at the thing that it desires, while simultaneously saying 
'No' or 'Dangerous' to itself. With time, these self-instructions become increasingly 
internalised and invisible. (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p,260) 
We are always speaking the voice of another. The ventriloquist dummy mouths the words 
and acts as agent, but the voice heard is the voice of another. Do we know what we are 
saying? The evidence indicates that we leam what to say by taking on a mentalistic 
paradigm of self and inner self and other. Moral responsibility is the subjective clamour 
of inner voices. What do we owe to others when we are deaf to ourselves? It is seemingly 
easy for us to disclaim any involvement with even our speech acts. Such referred agency 
is a hazard of subjective consciousness. No wonder we disown or are embarrassed by the 
recorded sound of our own voice. And no wonder our inner speech can be mistaken for 
the outward speech of another, for, antecedently, that is what it is. 
81 
Chapter Four: Riven Agency 
The basic skills of ventriloquism are those that enable the ventriloquist to modulate 
his or her voice to suggest that their voice comes instead from another place a distance 
away from the speaker. Ventriloquism requires the ventriloquist to mimic the sound of a 
voice heard originating from somewhere other than their own mouth. Coram, the great 
ventriloquist act of the eariy 20^ century, has this to say in his book A/ow To Become A 
Ventriloquist: 
A very simple test will show you how difficult it is to tell the direction from which a 
sound comes. Go into a room without a carpet. Get a friend to blindfold you and then 
ask him to roll a penny on the floor. When the penny has come to the end of its journey 
see if you can tell where it stopped rolling. The chances are more than ten to one that 
your guess will be very wide of the mark, the reason being that you have only your 
sense of hearing to guide you. Perhaps you will understand from this illustration how 
a 'distant voice' ventriloquist is able to deceive you. He produces the sound of a voice 
as you would hear it if the speaker were at a distance from you and then, by the power 
of suggestion, the ventriloquist leads you to believe that the voice comes from a certain 
place. (Coram, 1900, p.5) 
Murray Alpert (1986, p.518) has pointed out that the task for the nervous system 
whilst ordinarily engaged in social speech is to not hear oneself. As regards listening to 
others: 
There are perceptual analysis tasks, such as speech perception, which would be 
beyond the limit of the brain's machinery i f it didn't utilize ingenious anticipatory 
strategies that feed on redundancies in the input. Normal speech occurs at the rate of 
four or five syllables per second, but so powerful are the analysis machines we have 
evolved to 'parse' it, that people can comprehend 'compressed speech' - in which the 
words are electronically sped up without raising the tone chipmunk-style - at rates of 
up to thirty syllables a second. (Dennett, 1991, p.l44) 
These are the ways that our common social speech by passes any control we might 
consider as 'conscious'. Our common social speech might be considered as ventriloquial 
in that the sound we hear is not the sound which others hear. When one listens to a 
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7. Front cover of Coram's How to become a Ventriloquist (1900). 
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recording of one's voice it often sounds alien. We might fail to recognise a recorded 
voice as our own; this is because one never really hears one's own voice. We throw our 
voices in the sense explained by Murray Alpert*s terms: 
[People] may fail to recognise their own voice for a number of reasons. What they 
hear of their voice while speaking has a large bone conduction component which has a 
low frequency bias. The recording is, in fact, very different spectrally from what they 
might hear while speaking. In addition, as Hoffman remarks regarding efferent copy, 
alluding to the large differences between exafferent and reafferent stimulation, the task 
for the nervous system while speaking is to not hear oneself. If we did hear we would 
be shouting into our own ear as we talked to someone some distance away. (Alpert, 
1986, p.518) 
Is speech a 'ballistic' act? In a ballistic act, "many acts must occur so fast, and with such 
accurate triggering, that the brain has no time to adjust its control signals in the light of 
feedback" (Dennett, 1991, p. 144). Piano playing and fast bowling are ballistic activities: 
once the act is triggered, its trajectory is unalterable. Is not speech like this? 
The eye responds to information that the visual cortex of the brain never receives. In 
this way the act of seeing (seeing being a process rather than an event) by passes 
consciousness and is always, to an extent, a 'ballistic' act. There is direct functioning 
between the retina and the skeletal musculature of the eye. When the eye responds to 
light stimulation, some nervous propagation goes to the brain, but: 
Some of this electrical reaction generated in the eye does not reach the brain-cortex 
but diverges by a side-path into nerve-threads which relay it to a small muscle, 
which...activates...the pupillary muscle. (Sherrington, 1906/1947, p.xx) 
The pupil responds to muscular activity which is informed by efferent information from 
the retina, and which is unmediated by the visual cortex of the brain (which the 
information has not reached). 
There are 130 million rods and cones in the eye. These cells make junction with one 
million nerve fibres; this ratio of 130 to 1 indicates that exceedingly complex events 
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must occur in the transfer of information from the receptor to the optic nerve. On the 
motor side, the oculo-motor nerve contains 25 thousand fibres, and the muscles that 
produce eye movements have approximately 3 muscle fibres for each nerve fibre. This 
ratio of 1 neural fibre to 3 muscle fibres invites thought about the transfer of 
information back from the brain to the eye musculature. (McGuigan, 1978, p.340) 
The eye has to do a lot of information processing without recourse to the brain. The eye 
has to respond to information faster than would be possible i f it were to refer all 
information processing to the brain. Some 'decisions' as to activity at the periphery are 
made at the periphery itself, and not at the traditionally conceived 'centres of 
consciousness' in the cortices of the brain. These decisions are not just adjustments to the 
centre of focus of the eye. but pupillary movements, and the marginalizing of some 
perceived light movement. 
What comes to be more prominently represented in the optic nerve message is also 
more prominent subjectively, and similariy for features like prey and predators that 
are important for an animal. It is fascinating to see how information about the factors 
known to trigger various forms of behaviour is preserved in the optic nerve message, 
whilst information about other aspects of the retinal image is discarded. It is also 
fascinating to have an opportunity of studying in the retina the physiological 
mechanisms that achieve some degree of specificity for these behavioural releasers. 
(Bariow, 1977, pp.264) 
The effect of television images might be said to be illusory or spectacular, a series of 
flashing lights which gives us enough of an impression of continuity, or plot, or presence 
that we can maintain a belief in them as 'event'. Paul Churchland (1998a) has written of 
this as an analogous picture of epistemological sense events as they transpire 
neurologically. Computational neuroscience (as practised by Paul Churchland) defines 
the basic unit of cognition not as the sentence-like model that is usually pictured, but as a 
pattem of excitation levels across a large population of neurons. The basic units of 
cognitive processing are "not the inference from sentence to sentence, but rather the 
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synapse-induced transformation of large activation vectors into other such vectors" 
(Churchland, 1998a, p. 10). Paul Churchland has compared this model of processing to 
the momentary picture on a television screen. It is a pattem of brightness levels across a 
large 'population' of pixels. It is the sequence of such patterns that gives the moving 
image. There are only two hundred thousand pixels on a standard television screen and, 
for instance, one hundred million light sensitive cells in the human retina, but it is also as 
an activation pattem in a temporal sequence that the eyes convey the external worid to 
the brain. Similarly, though not pictorially, the auditory cells in the cochlea of the human 
inner ear perform an "information-preserving transformation from external worid to 
internal representation" (Churchland, 1998a, p. 10). Even in these two examples the 
transformation occurs in quite different ways, and in different ways again in the other 
sense modalities. 
Churchland makes the point that that there is nothing 'propositional' about these 
representations either in terms of their various 'syntaxes,' or their various 'semantics': 
These intricate patterns - or activation vectors as they are called - are projected 
inward from the periphery, along crowded axonal highways, to secondary cell 
populations within the brain called the primary sensory cortices, one for each of the 
sensory modalities. Here too, representation consists in the pattem of activation levels 
across the cortical population of neurons, patterns provoked by the arriving sensory 
vectors. 
But the patterns at this level are not mere repetitions of the original patterns at the 
sensory periphery. Those patterns have been transformed during their journey to the 
cortical populations. They get transformed mainly by the vast filter of synaptic 
connections they have to transverse in order to stimulate the cortical population. The 
result is typically a new pattem across the cortical canvas, a principled transformation 
of the original sensory pattem. (Churchland, 1998b, p. 37) 
Sight is always interpretive; there is always a transformative nature to seeing and to 
understanding what we see. The sense faculties mediate even as they register at the 
periphery, and also in filtering information to the cortical sense modalities. Sensory 
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perception is characterized by reference, after-image and displacement and these are 
ventriloquial qualities. 
There is a similar mediation and transformation in the human perception of sound: 
The auditory nerve is protected by a bony pyramid structure. Before the sound 
reaches it, the sound has to pass through a long and eventful journey. First, as soon as 
it enters the extemal ear, before it reaches the tympanic membrane, it touches upon 
the cartilaginous and skin lined passages of the meatus. This is not a dead surface. It is 
innervated by different nerves, i.e., the facial, which is at the back of the pavilion and 
comes from the auricular branch: then the trigeminal, which descends through the 
temple auricular and enters in front; and the pneumogastric. which is at the back of 
the meatus and reaches the tympanic membrane. This region of auditory canal 
disposes the ear to listen. The tympanic membrane, which is the barrier to the entering 
sound wave, gathers the sound. This sound, already marked by these imprints, is 
transmitted to the cochlea. It is, therefore, of importance to see what happened to the 
sound wave before it has reached the ear itself. It is certain that many parts of the 
organism have been alerted to the sound in the meantime. (Tomatis quoted in 
McGuigan, 1978, p. 343) 
Not only is this relevant as regards the displacement of the 'centralized self by means of 
activity at the periphery; from this map of the procedure of hearing it seems clear that 
symbolic data is being 'interpreted' before it is perceived by anything resembling brain-
based 'consciousness'. As McGuigan puts it: 
We may note that all intemal linguistic events following stimulus input necessarily 
are 'abstract', since phonemic and semantic entities are obviously not present in the 
acoustic signal. Consequentiy. the assertion of such linguistic entities as phonemes 
and meaning reactions requires processing of the stimulus input. (McGuigan, 1978, 
p. 341) 
The interpretive work traditionally conceived of (in folk psychology and in neuroscience) 
as taking place within the realm of consciousness (by its varied meanings, and residing 
principally in the cerebral cortex) begins at the sensory periphery. 
I quote this medical research with two-fold purpose: to indicate the lack of centrality 
which 'self or 'consciousness' have in these matters of perception, and to point out the 
ventriloquial mediation which takes place in the process of perception. Al l 
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epistemologically pertinent sense data is ventriloquized in the act of perception; there is a 
manifold and complex procedure which takes place between the incidence of perception 
at the periphery and the 'knowing', acknowledging, and awareness which is said to take 
place in the brain. Perception is characterized by reference, after-image, and 
displacement, and as such is a ventriloquial endeavour. In this model of perception there 
is no centrality of the self, but a multiplicity of activity wherein all could be said to be 
essentially peripheral, or marginal, and in which there is no holistically present self. Any 
amalgam, or mean level is just what the heterogeneity of 'self would reject, being rather 
a dissemination of decoded, or re-coded material. 
Neuroscience has a name for the way in which a ventriloquist act achieves its effects 
on the audience. Some vocal sounds are harder to ventriloquize, and require tricks to fool 
the audience as to what is being said: *gottle of gear'. What the ear hears is influenced by 
what the eye sees. 
Recent experiments using an illusion similar to the ventriloquism effect, known as the 
McGurk effect, indicate that the parietal lobe is an important contributor to the 
perception of acoustic space. The McGurk effect describes an illusion derived from the 
mismatch between the auditory and visual inputs. For example, the presentation of the 
phoneme /ba/ while viewing a videotape of a person speaking /ga/ results in the 
perception of an in-between stimulus, in this example /da/. By presenting an acoustic 
phoneme to the contralesional ear and the appropriate visual information to the 
ipsilesional visual field, patients with hemineglect show a significant improvement in 
their ability to identify the phoneme accurately. (Recanzone, 1998, p. 874) 
This McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976, pp.747-748) has been extended in 
experiment to research the *ventriloquism aftereffect'. The 'ventriloquism aftereffect' 
describes "an enduring shift in the perception of the spatial location of acoustic stimuli 
after a period of exposure of spatially disparate and simultaneously presented acoustic 
and visual stimuli" (Recanzone, 1998, p. 869). Put more simply: a person's perception of 
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the origin of a sound can be manipulated in experiment, and the effects of this 
disturbance continue for tens of minutes afterwards. 
The localization of auditory stimuli in space is known to be affected by concurrent 
visual stimulation, which is demonstrated by the ventriloquism effect, where the 
location of an auditory stimulus is perceived to originate from the same location as a 
simultaneously presented visual stimulus...The ventriloquism aftereffect is 
demonstrated when the same shift in the perception of an acoustic stimulus endures 
beyond the training period. (Recanzone, 1998, p. 869) 
The effect described is the principle underpinning ventriloquism: that perception can, in 
practice, be lastingly confused as to the origin of auditory data. In the experiment 
described by Recanzone, the subject is placed in a darkened sound and echo-attenuated 
booth, facing a l5-loudspeaker array. The loudspeakers span + to - 28 degrees in 4 
degree increments along the horizontal meridian. The subject is in complete darkness 
apart from dim red or green LED lights (one light for every loudspeaker), placed 1 degree 
above each loudspeaker, *The salience of the visual stimulus and the temporal correlation 
of the visual and auditory stimulus are critical for this ventriloquism effect to occur". A 
light flashes corresponding to the loudspeaker emitting a sound, and after a period of 
testing the subject's accuracy in spatially locating the sounds, the subject is trained to 
misplace auditory stimulus by 8 degrees to the right. This training is brought about by 
flashing the LED 8 degrees to the right of the loudspeaker emitting the sound, for periods 
during the 20-30 minute training. Ability to place the source of the sound is assessed by a 
headband, placed on the subject, measuring head orientation. The subjects are told they 
are listening to assess pitch and volume variation in the sounds emitted, and changes are 
indeed made in order that the subjects listen attentively. After this period of training, light 
and sound are once more paired spatially and temporally to an exact degree, and the 
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subject is once more tested in their ability to locate the source of the auditory stimulation. 
For tens of minutes after the light and sound stimulus have come together, the subject still 
places the sound source at 8 degrees to the right. 
There was a significant shift of almost 8 degrees following the +8 degree training 
condition for all subjects...These data indicate that there is a shift in the 
representation of acoustic space after a relatively brief exposure to a mismatch in 
location between the auditory and visual modalities and no apparent shift in the 
absence of such mismatches...The ventriloquism aftereffect demonstrates a visually 
driven change in the perception of acoustic space.,.These data taken together, suggest 
that normal adult human subjects are able to alter their cortical representations over a 
relatively brief time course and effectively alter their perception of at least acoustic 
space. (Recanzone, 1998, pp.871, 874 and 875) 
This is not so much the 'ventriloquism effect' but rather Ventriloquism', as the process 
of fooling the attending subject is the same in clinical surroundings as in the music hall. 
The report quoted in this account concluded in confusion as to how or in what way the 
cerebral cortex was deluded in its response to the training, but certain that the 
ventriloquism aftereffect demonstrated a "visually driven change in the perception of 
acoustic space" (Recanzone, 1998, p.874). The report concluded unclear as to 
physiological change corresponding to this change in perception. 
Given that the cerebral cortex is necessary for the perception of acoustic space, it is 
likely that the ventriloquism aftereffect reflects a change in the cortical representation 
of acoustic space...Although the phenomenon is robust, the underiying physiological 
mechanisms and the potential neuronal structures that change their representation of 
acoustic space remain unclear. (Recanzone, 1998, p. 869) 
There is an interesting correlate in the way that ventriloquism works to exploit the 
flaws in human perception, and the flawed *source monitoring' blamed for experiences of 
verbal hallucinations. Source monitoring is the name given to our process for 
distinguishing between possible sources of cognition. The ability to discriminate between 
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cognition and perception is often described as compromised in those who experience 
verbal hallucinations. Thus, conflating speech and thought, or apparently confusing 
thoughts with what one has heard or seen are attributed to flaws in source monitoring. 
Perception is to a large degree a cognitive process. Consider the cases of Anton's 
Syndrome that I describe in my chapter entitled Making Up Stones, where visual 
perception is shown to be most dependent or intertwined with cognition. 
It is often difficult to distinguish the exact source of a percept and no amount of 
perceptual discernment clarifies the matter. Nor is it a matter for introspection. Here is 
Coram again: 
The ventriloquist who use the 'distant voice* deceives the audience as much by his 
manner, gestures, acting generally, as he does by his actual voice. For example, if I 
produce the voice of 'the man on the roof,* I lead you to believe that a man on the roof 
is speaking. But, using exactly the same voice, by suggesting that the man is in the 
cellar 1 can lead you to believe that the voice comes from below. The voice is the 
same; it is the sense of hearing that is deceived. (Coram, 1900, p.5) 
The ventriloquist's acting skills are apt to mislead us by indicating the presence of a 
possibly invisible other to whom the mimicked voice belongs. This also tells us 
something about 'truth' and ontological relativity: truth is not a matter of belief any more 
than a hundred other conceits that one upholds with the tongue without ever witnessing, 
(the sun does not 'rise', but this does not stop us witnessing a 'sunrise*). 
If you give someone a piece of your mind it is senseless to ask for it back. If a weight 
is taken off someone's mind neither grammes nor grains will measure it. Someone who 
casts his mind back does not find that his mind is some way behind him. Although 
someone may have something at the back or front or in the comer of his mind, we can 
make no legitimate deduction about its shape. Statements of mental topography cannot 
be taken at face value. (Squires, 1971, p.347) 
These are examples regarding linguistically borne models of the self. Our relationship to 
the 'truth* about mental behaviour or self is very like our relationship to truth per se: one 
91 
has no concept of 'truth' other than a workaday, notional version of the truth that one 
pays lip-service to but that one never actually sees. 
What of 'emotional veracity'? The ideas in this thesis are often hard to uphold 
without resort to solipsistic 'truth telling*, without resort to the 'self. Is this a facet of 
language, or of my language, or of viewpoint? 'Truth shot through me like a whistle" (De 
Wys, 2001), says Margaret De Wys in the sleevenotes to her album / OH, What can she 
mean? The term 'ventriloquist' comes from a Latin word 'ventriloquium' meaning *a 
speaking in the belly', and there are umbilical connotations in this sense of the term. The 
true Latin word from which 'ventriloquism' is derived is 'ventriloquus' meaning *a 
person that speaks inwardly'. This Latin term is literally translated as meaning 'one who 
speaks from (or in) the belly' (Skeat, 1961, p.688). This thesis aims to connect this 
ontological relativity with the power of speech. 
When a ventriloquist works with a 'ventriloquial figure', or dummy, the acting skill is 
in persuading the audience that the voice spoken through the unmoving lips of the 
ventriloquist emanates rather from the dummy. The ventriloquist looks attentively at the 
dummy and responds to pauses or speech pattems in the conversation just as one would 
with any interlocutor. The acting skills of the ventriloquist, therefore, fool the audience 
even before any specifically ventriloquial skills fool their hearing. 
Instructional books such as Coram's stress the importance of maintaining a consistent 
ventriloquial voice for that of the dummy and stress the importance of consistent 
characterization for the persona of the dummy. The ventriloquist's basic skill of 
disguising the speaking voice by suppressing lip movement is secondary to this acting 
skill, as: 
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With regard to lip movement, you can console yourself with the assurance that a 
first-rate ventriloquist need never worry himself about these impossible words 
because his entertainment will be so good that the audience will be so engrossed in it 
that they will never notice what only the ventriloquist himself knows is a defect. 
(Coram, 1900, pp.6-7) 
Coram concedes that it is impossible to disguise mouth movements in the 
pronunciation of words beginning with the letters p, b, f, v, and m. This, however, is not 
of issue for the accomplished ventriloquist. The ventriloquist can bend his or her head at 
the vulnerable moment of pronouncing these words, or shuffle on their chair, or turn 
slightly towards the dummy. The very presence of the dummy is distraction enough to 
indicate another speaker. The American ventriloquist Jimmy Nelson made an LP record 
in 1964 titled Instant Ventriloquism and Ventriloquism for the Beginner (1964, 
sleevenote). It is an instructional album which guides the listener through lessons on 'the 
position of the mouth', 'the difficult letters' and so on: "YOU can learn to amaze and fool 
your friends; actually learn how to perform in front of an audience." Is this like 'letting 
daylight in upon magic'? If we know how ventriloquism works as skill of the performer, 
does that ruin it as an entertainment? I would say not, but why not? 
There are ventriloquist acts which create an illusion beyond the presence of a dummy: 
The illusion of making a voice 'distant' at first and then gradually less 'distant,' the 
imaginary person being supposed to be coming into the room, is not a difficult matter, 
but an audience usually receives this part of a performance very well. It is merely done 
by gradually allowing your mouth and jaw to take up the positions that are natural to 
them when you are speaking with your natural ventriloquial voice. A great part of this 
illusion is created entirely by the acting of the performer; by this acting he suggests to 
the audience that the imaginary person at a distance is coming nearer and nearer, and 
the performer so works upon the minds of his listeners in this way that their sense of 
hearing is deceived. When you have once persuaded your audience to believe, for the 
moment, that there really is a man on the roof, or in the cellar, or at the window, half 
the difficulty of producing the distant voice is over. The audience know just the sound 
they would hear i f such a man were speaking and the ventriloquist has to imitate the 
sound. (Coram, 1900, p. 15) 
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There really is no limit to what can be ventriloquised in these acts. Some ventriloquists 
can provide a voice for a brick, or chair, or lamp-stand. When one considers that the 
standard ventriloquist dummy is as inanimate as these, though having the appearance of a 
more likely speaking thing, the leap to providing voice for brick or chair is not so far. 
What of those acts who convince us of presence in the least tenable places, the 
ventriloquist who by impersonation of a voice can place the suggested speaker in a 
narrow chimney flue, or a box too tiny for anybody to speak from? 
Jon Wood's essay With Hidden Noise: Sculpture, Video and Ventriloquism (2004) 
describes distant ventriloquism thus: 
It does not entail the use of a ventriloquist dummy or figurative prop, but enclosed 
spaces such as crates, trunks, chests, cupboards and rooms (usually attics or cellars) 
that are, or are presented as being, far away from the ventriloquist. Distant 
ventriloquism can also be totally propless and come from nowhere, and it does not 
require the hands in the way that near ventriloquism does. Thus the ventriloquist 
pretends to be in two places, as well as in two 'bodies,' at the same time and the 
ventriloquist asks that the audience imagine the inner life not just of figurative bodies, 
but also of boxes. It is thus a more abstract and invisible deployment of the 
ventriloquial voice and has a spatial, architectural, acoustic and telephonic 
dimension. (Wood, 2004, p. 19) 
Consider computer chess and the notional opponent: there is no-one actually *there* in 
opposition and any opponent we may suppose is only that, suppositional. In distant 
ventriloquism the suggested personage is often situated in a place where no one could be, 
yet we believe in it or are willing to entertain the conceit despite the obvious locational 
dilemma. Ventriloquism concerns a suppositional location and, for the sake of drama, we 
suppose a situation and a perspective that cannot possibly exist. I want to use the 
analogue of distant ventriloquism to indicate some plurality of the self, and to suggest a 
suppositional status for the self To suppose a location and perspective for the self and for 
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8. The ventriloquist asks that the audience imagine the inner life of a figurative body. 
(Image reproduced from Szilagyi, 1978. fly-leaf) 
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consciousness is no more than supposition and does not indicate an embodied presence. 
(Theory of mind* is no more than that: a theory. A theory is not a theory unless it can be 
proved wrong.) What is indicated by such a distinction, by such a postmarked and dated 
parcel of percepts, is not the origin of self in time or space but the illusion of it. What is 
indicated by a sense of self is no more than ventriloquial speaking for and speaking from. 
The neurophysiology of human visual consciousness illustrates my argument 
regarding the suppositional location for perception and thus for perceiver. SirCharies 
Sherrington, described as 'the father of modem neurophysiology* (Feinberg, 2001, p. 
109), posed the question: "How is it possible that there is a 'singleness' of normal 
binocular vision when either eye alone is able to generate a separate mental image?" 
(Sherrington quoted in Feinberg, 2001, p. 109). The so-called 'Red Glass Test' makes 
apparent the slight deviations in the axes of our two eyes. It can do this because these 
slight deviations mean that the axes of the two eyes do not 'line up' property. By placing 
a red glass over one eye the person experiences two independent visual images, the one 
image being coloured red. The person in the red glass test is 'seeing double'. Why then 
do we typically experience a unified visual perception? Sherrington wrote that: 
How habitually and unwittingly the self regards itself as one is instanced by binocular 
vision. Our binocular visual field is shown by analysis, to presuppose outlook from the 
body by a single eye centred at a point in the midvertical of the forehead at the level of 
the root of his nose. It, unconsciously, takes for granted that its seeing is done by a 
cyclopean eye having a centre of rotation at the point of intersection just mentioned. In 
this visual field it obtains visual depth by unknowingly combining besides the actually 
identical fixation points, the host of homonymously - and heteronymously - crossed 
images of not too great lateral disparation. The combining of these last rests on a 
cancelling out - an algebraical submental summation - of the two disparations of left 
and right eye respectively. Oneness is obtained by compromise between differences, i f 
not too great, offered to the perceiving 'self. (Sherrington, 1906/1947, p.xviii) 
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Everything about normal visual consciousness indicates that we are seeing from a 
Cyclopean vantage point located centrally between and behind the eyes, and yet this is not 
the case. We seem to have a central, cyclopean eye just as we seem to have a unified self, 
or any self at all. Our perspective seems to derive from this centrally situated cyclopean 
*mind's eye,' but in fact it does not. Our perspective draws from disparate sources of 
perceptual stimuli; it is just that more often than not it seems coherent or unified. We 
experience visual consciousness from this suppositional perspective such that we take 
there to be something wrong should our vision be normally fractured or riven. We know 
we are drunk or concussed if we are 'seeing double.' 
The well-known outline-figures, often called equivocal-figures, with which while we 
gaze at what depicts for instance an overhanging eave the interpretation suddenly 
changes to a set of ascending steps, have the character of giving always wholly either 
the one thing or wholly the other. The meaning is never at the same time partly this and 
partly that. Doubtless because to be so would be to have no meaning. Psychical 
integration is immensely influenced by meaning. (Sherrington, 1906/1947, p. xix) 
There is something about sensing anything, says Sherrington, that 'points back to' a 
unitary self; a unitary self that seeks sense and a confirmation of its unitary status. 
The receptors at the starting-points of the nerve-thread we find now to be, by 
conspiracy with a psyche in the central organ, sense-organs. The full panel of the 
Tive-senses' is in session, and by further collaboration with the psyche, a worid of 
subject and object for the individual is in being. The individual has attained a psychical 
existence. Phases and moods of mental life accrue. Each waking day is a stage 
dominated for good or i l l , in comedy, farce or tragedy, by a dramatis persona, the 
'self.. . Although multiple aspects characterize it has self-cohesion. It regards itself 
as one, others treat it as one. It is addressed as one, by a name to which it answers. The 
Law and the State schedule it as one. It and they identify it with a body which is 
considered by it and them to belong to it integrally. In short, unchallenged and 
unargued conviction assumes it to be one. The logic of grammar endorses this by a 
pronoun in the singular. Al l its diversity is merged into oneness. (Sherrington, 
1906/1947, pp. xvii-xviii) 
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There are a number of unfulfilled potentialities that reach their heaven in the unified self. 
The 'drive' to unity culls these lost futures and condemns us to another fulfilment, that of 
'oneness'. Most of these resolutions regarding self are predicated on the feeling of what 
is ' in ' and what is 'out'; how does the discriminatory self establish grounds for 
inclusivity or exclusivity? 
In my earlier chapter on hallucinations I described Marcia Johnson's research on 
'source monitoring'. Johnson (Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993) has shown that in 
source monitoring we depend on a number of 'cues' to deduce the source of a percept or 
a perceived event. Johnson stresses the importance of contextual information in our 
assessment of the probability of an occurrence or the likelihood of our having invented it. 
The Cyclopean nature of visual consciousness indicates not two eyes but one. The context 
of visual experience indicates a cyclopean eye that does not exist. Al l the visual cues 
point to a suppositional location for perception, and thus the suppositional location of the 
perceiver. Thus are cognition and perception confiated in ordinary visual experience. 
Context in a good ventriloquist act might indicate the dummy as speaker, or a speaker in 
an untenable location. The cyclopean nature of visual perception indicates not two eyes 
but one; such sensations as one might have indicating a unified self or the uniform nature 
of perception may be due to a similar quirk. 
Whilst it may be arguable that any subjective experience points to a unified self, 
philosophers seem predominantly to have felt that it does. Descartes felt the 'soul' to be 
indivisible and intangible: 
Because it is of a nature which has no relation to extension, nor dimensions, nor other 
properties of the matter of which the body is composed, but only to the whole 
conglomerate of its organs, as appears from the fact that we could not in any way 
conceive of the half or the third of the soul, nor of the space it occupies and because it 
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9. Pineal gland as centre of consciousness. 
(Image reproduced from Clarke and O'Malley, 1968, fig. 89) 
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does not become smaller owing to the cutting off of some portion of the body, but 
separates itself from it entirely when the union of its assembled organs is dissolved. 
(Descartes quoted in Beakley and Ludlow, 1992, p. I l l ) 
Descartes claimed the pineal gland as the site for liaison between brain and soul in 
humans. He gave his reasons as: 
The other parts of our brain are all double so that we have two eyes, two hands, two 
ears, and, finally all the organs of our external senses are double; and that inasmuch 
as we have only one solitary and simple thought of one single thing during the same 
moment, it must necessarily be that there is some place where the two images which 
come from the two eyes, or the two other impressions which come from a single object 
by way of the double organs of the other senses, may unite before they reach the soul, 
so that they do not present to it two objects instead of one. It can easily be conceived 
how these images or other impressions could unite in this gland through the mediation 
of the spirits that fill the cavities in the brain. There is no other place in the body 
where they could be united unless it be in the gland. (Descartes quoted in Clarke 
and O'Malley, 1968, pp. 471-472) 
Why am I quoting Descartes, a seventeenth century philosopher, in my discussion of the 
assumed tenets of the self? Because, as Daniel Dennett describes, Cartesian Dualism is 
"the view that nobody espouses but almost everybody tends to think in terms of " 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 144). And, as Roger Squires has put it: 
Though doctors have long discarded the theory of humours, this fortunately does not 
prevent us from being in a good humour from time to time. Similarly, 'mentalism' has 
left a rich deposit of current idioms. Thus language fossilizes the metaphysics of the 
Stone Age. (Squires, 1971, p. 356) 
Cartesian Dualism is not just a problem for philosophers. The way we habitually 
carry on in conversations, with ourselves or others, contains some startlingly wrong-
thinking conceits. If we take the folk psychological referencing of attributes and qualities 
of the human mind at face value we are entertaining some very dubious beliefs. We can 
hardly be who we take ourselves to be. If we give someone a piece of our mind it is 
senseless to ask for it back. 
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Although someone may have something at the back or front or comer of his mind, we 
can make no legitimate deductions about its shape. Statements of mental topography 
cannot be taken at face value. (Squires, 1971, p. 347) 
What selves do not have is consistency. Selves cannot be held to be dimensional because 
their characteristics are so often abstract (or potential). 
Coram's explanation of how a ventriloquist act works to convince an audience serves 
to illustrate how cues can be misread in our source monitoring, and how we can be fooled 
as to the origin of a percept, or the part that cognition plays in perception. The example of 
ventriloquism illustrates how much is guesswork or ' f i l l ing in, ' and how this cue reading 
is influenced by expectation and first impressions. How much harder, then, to be accurate 
regarding cues from intemal sources such as memory or desire. Here is where the radar of 
source monitoring is most 'deceptive'. 
Daniel C. Dennett's stature as a philosopher of mind, as a philosopher, and as an 
authority on self and consciousness are indicated by J. A. Ross's characterization of him 
as "one of the greatest living philosophers," and as "the Grand Oral Disseminator" (Ross, 
2003, p. 82). If we are using the Daniel Dennett model of self then the process of being a 
self goes like this: 
A self, according to my theory, is not any old mathematical point, but an abstraction 
defined by the myriads of attributions and interpretations (including self-attributions 
and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose 
Centre of Narrative Gravity it is. As such, it plays a singularly important role in the 
ongoing cognitive economy of that living body, because, of all the things in the 
environment an active body must make mental models of, none is more crucial than 
the model the agent has of itself. (Dennett, 1991, pp. 426-427) 
Dennett goes on to draw an analogue between self and radar 
Thus do we build up a defining story about ourselves, organized around a sort of 
basic blip of self-representation. The blip isn't a self, of course, it's a representation 
of a self (and the blip on the radar screen for Ellis Island isn't an island - it's a 
representation of an island). (Dennett, 1991, p. 428) 
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The map is not the territory: one comes to believe that because there is a map of it that 
the territory exists. To whom does the radar represent the self? Is it representing the self 
to the self (as I take Dennett to be indicating)? How does the self represent the self 
representing the self to itself? This is not the indivisible soul of Descartes's description, 
but it depends on a similarly homuncular inhabitation. 
Philosophy and the folk psychology that feeds into and out of its metaphysics can 
miss the point horribly. This is a problem also for physics. Here is Henry P. Stapp, 
physicist and author of Mind, Matter And Quantum Mechanics (1993/2004): 
The idea that nature has two parts, one containing feelings and thoughts, the other 
material objects in motion, was created in antiquity. Revived in modem times by 
Descartes, it became the foundation for classical physics. But man, having put nature 
asunder, was then unable to see her whole....The difficulty encountered by the 
authors quoted above in the task of reconciling the conceptions of mind and matter 
stems from their tacit acceptance of the conceptualisation of matter provided by 
classical physics, and from the absence of a natural place for thoughts in the physical 
worid as conceived in classical physics....Classical physics works well in many 
situations, but is inadequate for problems involving the atomic or subatomic structure 
of objects and materials. For problems of this kind one must use quantum theory, 
which supersedes classical theory in that it reproduces all the experimentally validated 
predictions of classical theory, and covers the atomic and subatomic domains as 
well. (Stapp, 1993/2004, pp. 83-85) 
Consider the importance of timing in Daniel Dennett's picture of brain events: 
[the brain] must gather information from that worid and use it swiftly to 'produce 
future' - to extract anticipations in order to stay one step ahead of disaster. So the 
brain must represent temporal properties of events in the worid, and it must do this 
efficiently. The processes that are responsible for executing this task are spatially 
distributed in a large brain with no central node, and communication between regions 
of this brain is relatively slow; electrochemical nerve impulses travel thousands of 
times slower than light (or electronic signals through wires). So the brain is under 
significant time pressure. It must often arrange to modulate its output in the light of 
its input within a time window that leaves no slack for delays. On the input side, there 
are perceptual analysis tasks, such as speech perception, which would be beyond the 
physical limits of the brain's machinery if it didn't utilize ingenious anticipatory 
strategies that feed on redundancies in the input. Normal speech occurs at the rate of 
four or five syllables per second, but so powerful are the analysis machines we have 
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evolved to *parse' it, that people can comprehend 'compressed speech' - in which the 
words are electronically sped up without raising the tone chipmunk-style - at rates of 
up to thirty syllables per second. On the output side, many acts must occur so fast, 
and with such accurate triggering, that the brain has no time to adjust its control 
signals in the light of its feedback; acts such as playing the piano or accurately 
pitching a rock must be ballistically initiated. (Ballistic acts are unguided missiles; 
once they are triggered, their trajectories are not adjustable.) (Dennett, 1991, pp. 144-
145) 
What if the chronology we think we experience were just our means of ordering events 
(Libet et al, 1979)? Quantum physics supports this view (Stapp, 1993/2004. pp. 25-26). 
Consider the atomic clock that is so 'accurate' that a second is added now and again to 
compensate for the irregularity of the earth, and which measures a second as 
9,192,631,770 cycles of a caesium atom rather than as one-86.400^ of a day (Loe. 
1996/2000, p. 21). What if lime were only a convenience of mental telemetry? What i f 
Julian Jaynes was correct in identifying chronology as mere 'side-by-sideness' (1976, p. 
60) in the mind's spatializing of events? We are left with Kant's: 
I can indeed say *my representations follow one another, or are successive;' but this 
means only that we are conscious of them as in a succession, that is, according to the 
form of the internal sense. Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any 
objective determination pertaining to, or inherent in things. (Kant, 1781/1934, p. 52) 
Consider the contingencies operating on perception and then wonder whether the 
conventional borders of the self ought to be re-drawn. Consider whether the self need be 
bordered or better experienced as an 'experiential anarchy'. That version of 'self that 
appears to us as in control, and in control of itself, is a multiplicity of factors that, as 
often as not, divides against itself. Temptation, self-defeating actions, phobias, and 
addiction illustrate how events are often assigned to will in retrospect. The actual course 
of events is most often separate from our wishes, and our achievements are different from 
our aims. As Edward Conze has put it: 
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A psychological and philosophical analysis of sense-perception shows that it obscures 
more than it discloses, and that sense-given distinctions and boundaries are as 
arbitrary as the localization of sense-qualities, the whole being a tissue of falsehood 
designed to serve the purposes of practical life, without any basis in reality or bearing 
on it. (Conze, 1961/1996, p. 66) 
George Ainslie is a psychiatrist at a Veterans Affairs Medical Centre in Pennsylvania. 
Ainslie's 1992 book Picoeconomics (\992) uses a marketplace analogy to define 
'hyperbolic discounting*. 'Hyperbolic discounting' describes Ainslie's experimental 
finding that, "People devalue a given future event at different rates, depending on how far 
away it is" (Ainslie, 2001, p. 47). This is a theory that supports the spatializing 
characteristic of 'inner sense* rather than any objective notion of a temporal order. 
Ainslie describes a self that is a population of bargaining agents, blighted by short-
sighted choices and disproportionately valuing rewards that are sooner rather than later. 
We can no longer regard people as having unitary preferences. Rather, people may 
have a variety of contradictory preferences that become dominant at different points 
because of their timing. The orderly internal marketplace pictured by conventional 
utility theory becomes a complicated free-for-all, where to prevail an option not only 
has to promise more than its competitors, but also act strategically to keep the 
competitors from tuming the tables later on. The behaviours that are shaped by the 
competing rewards must deal not only with obstacles to getting their reward i f chosen, 
but also with the danger of being unchosen in favour of imminent altematives. 
(Ainslie, 2001, p. 40) 
Ainslie disregards the neuroscientific query as to whether the 'reward process' is 
concentrated on specific locations in the brain; this line of inquiry is redundant so long as 
there is, for instance, only one set of limbs to co-ordinate. 
There may be a lot of people or part-people in your mind, but they're all constrained 
to coordinate what they do by the fact of being permanent roommates. If a given 
behaviour can be influenced by more than one centre, these centres must compete for 
the exercise of this influence, and whatever process governs this competition will act 
in effect like a single comprehensive reward centre. Insofar as one behaviour can be 
replaced with another, it has to compete with the other for expression, and this 
competition operates as a single reward clearinghouse for all suitable behaviours - all 
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behaviours among which a person can choose. This is the constraint that unifies a 
person's behaviour at any given moment. (Ainslie, 2001, pp. 41-42) 
This process of power bargaining, made necessary by finite means of expression, may 
be all that unites a person, but Ainslie goes on further to say: 
Philosophers and psychologists are used to speaking about an organ of uoification 
called the 'self that can variously 'be' autonomous, divided, individuated, fragile, 
well-bounded, and so on, but this organ doesn't have to exist as such. The factor that 
impels toward unity the various behavioural tendencies that grow from a person's 
rewards may be the realization that they are, in effect, locked up in a room together. 
(Ainslie, 2001, p. 43) 
In my chapter titled Other Selves I describe Roger Sperry's experiments (Sperry, 
Gazzaniga and Bogen 1969) with commissurotomised patients. Those examples also 
serve to illustrate what happens if Ainslie's 'room' is divided so that only some of the 
person's learned processes have access to particular means of expression. This is when 
divisions in intent or motive become most apparent in an 'individual'. Conversely, as 
Ainslie points out: 
When convention or necessity makes two people act in concert over long periods -
for example, in some identical twinships and some marriages - the site of the 
marketplace seems to shift somewhat from the individual to the pair. But where in the 
pair? Here the choice-maker is clearly not an organ but a process, something in the 
empathic engagement between the two twins; and if this is true for the pair, why not 
for the individual or the neurosurgeon's half-individual? The constraint of limited 
resources for expression may be all that impels a person toward selfhood; and the 
success of her currently dominant interests in bargaining with interests that will be 
dominant in the future may be what determines the kind of unity her self will have. 
(Ainslie, 2001, pp. 43-44) 
Sometimes an individual is a pair. In P^yc/i/a/ry joumal in 1985, John Hamilton 
published a report titled Auditory Hallucination in Non-Verbal Quadriplegics (1985): 
The study was conducted in a state institution for the developmentally disabled. Of 
the total resident population of 1,034, all were categorized as mentally retarded. 
Among those were 222 who were so physically handicapped that they required total 
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care; they were unable to walk, talk, feed, bathe, toilet or dress themselves. Within this 
group were some who gave signs of unusual alertness. With those residents suspected 
of having the most awareness, communication methods were developed that provided 
more understanding of their receptive language abilities. Eventually, seven were 
identified as having questionable retardation, meaning that although they could not 
talk and had very limited information about the world beyond their own physical 
environment, they were able to understand what was said to them and could learn and 
retain new information in what appeared to be a normal manner. (Hamilton, 1985, 
p. 383) 
The subjects of the study had very limited educational and experiential backgrounds. Al l 
had been institutionalised for ten years or more, and most from an early age. The subjects 
had gestural means of signalling yes or no, leamt either from family or from staff at the 
institution: typically the gestures were tongue, lip or hand movements. Of the seven 
subjects interviewed, five indicated that they *heard voices*. Four more subjects within 
the institution were able to respond in interview to indicate that they also *heard voices*. 
Their disability pattern was similar; all were cerebral palsied, spastic-athetoid, 
quadriplegic adults who had always been totally dependent on others for physical care 
and had never been able to speak, but who were relatively unimpaired in receptive 
language skills. None had received any formal education; only one was able to read. 
(Hamilton, 1985, p. 384) 
The quality and content in these hallucinated dialogues didn't differ from the most 
common forms reported by able-bodied, or any other, subjects of research on hallucinated 
speech. The voices could be said to respond to experienced stress in the lives of the 
subjects. Times of upheaval, or doubt, or guilt, or choice-making characterised the 
periods when the voices were heard. 
The content of the messages of the voices as reported by these nine residents are as 
individualized as their own personalities, but some characteristics of the voice 
phenomenon are similar for all residents. The most commonly reported experiences 
included the following: The voice is heard frequendy, usually on a daily basis. The 
experience is clearly an auditory one, not a thought, dream or vision but an actual 
sound heard as if spoken by another in understandable and complete sentences. The 
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direction of the voice has a specific localization from outside - from above and in most 
cases, from the left. The voice sounds as if it is a relative, living or dead, who has 
played an important part in the resident*s life, it serves as an authoritarian conscience 
by telling the resident what to do, how to think and what to feel, and what is right or 
wrong. During periods of change or stress, it comes more frequently and for longer 
periods of time, taking charge of new situations by offering instruction and guidance. 
There is a compelling need to follow the dictates of the voice, not only because it is 
usually seen as right but also because disobedience brings harsh criticism and 
incessant harassment. The voice is perceived as being the highest authority; with die 
exception of one case, it is thought to be the voice of God. (Hamilton, 1985, pp. 391-
392) 
A person can be a dyad, and can rely on dissociated or imagined others for behavioural or 
psychological influence. This might be an instance of psychoanalytic *splitting-off,' or 
Jaynes-ian bicameral mind, or something else entirely, but it indicates an individual who 
is not an individual. If a model of self could be extracted from the above cited research it 
would describe a self operating amidst a chorus. This thesis argues that the self has less to 
do with unilateral agency than with the phantoms of such. A picture of self is a picture we 
can't conform to. 
There are many statements in Coram's guide to ventriloquism (1900), and Hercat's 
(1916), and Robert Ganthony*s (1920), and Douglas Houlden's (1958/1967), to the effect 
that the dummy is the star. 
Tommy, as I said before, 'plays the lead' or takes the leading part and it is up to you to 
get your audience ready for him. This is called in theatrical talk 'building up his 
entrance'.,.,Tommy is always the more observant and draws your attention to things 
that are happening. Al l this helps the illusion that he is alive since he seems sharper 
than you. Many things may happen during your performance and some you can be 
ready for by having rehearsed some chatter that sounds impromptu. There may be a 
dog or cat or canary in the room and Tommy will notice these and point them out to 
you. You, of course, pretend you hadn't seen them before. (Houlden, 1958/1967, 
pp. 37-38) 
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10. The dummy performs the leading role. 
(Image of A. C. Astor and dummy reproduced from Vox. 1993, p. 87) 
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The ventriloquist is the silent stooge, lips uainoving. What these manuals also stress is 
consistency of character for the dummy: 
Having discovered your ventriloquial voice keep to it, and do not be persuaded by 
anyone to alter it. When you have developed it properly and have got it quite *set* you 
will then be able to choose a figure to suit the voice.! know that this is not the usual 
procedure with amateurs, their custom being to buy a figure before they start to 
practice, with the result that the figure and the voice do not match....] lay great stress 
on this point of keeping always to the same voice ventriloquially. (Coram, 1900, 
pp. 7-8) 
If one forgets to maintain one's usual self for a few minutes what happens? If one is 
diverted by something - thoughtlessness, involvement, derangement - does one always 
*come back to one's senses' unchanged? Maybe one day one could walk off amongst the 
bears in the wood and never find one's way back to camp (where the fire meanwhile has 
gone out). This is the venue for all those versions of oneself, or versions of a life that 
didn't exist, that those unused synapses existed in order to map. Maps remain, charting 
other events and other versions of a self, a life one didn't get to lead. One can make utter 
transitions and change utterly. All the things one cared about or worried about or tried 
hard to cling to may be lost. Worse still, those things may no longer occupy us, and slip 
from our attention without notification or trace or sense of loss - they just aren't there 
any more. What about doubts? Self-doubts may turn to disbelief. We may come to 
disbelieve in ourselves as persons, and are we then ourselves? What kind of persons are 
we then? 
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Chapter Five: Memories 
Can there be one locus for consciousness? There must be diverse centres often in 
opposition; there must be always separate centres with different aims, objectives, and 
agendas. Even the self that appears to be in control of events within itself (the Cartesian 
self, the English Empiricist selO must be a multiplicity of factors at work. Phobias, 
addictions, and temptations illustrate how multiple and often conflicting impulses and 
desires point to different centres of control, rather than to a unitary self. 
Elsewhere in this thesis I have described how the heterogeneity of the term 
*conscious(ness)* means it cannot provide the systematically fruitful explanandum or 
explanans that science could use. 'Memory' is not now considered as a likely candidate 
for 'natural kind' status. Kathleen Wilkes has pointed out that: 
The number of distinctions people have seen fit to draw (short-term, long-term, and 
'working' memory; procedural vs. declarative; semantic vs. episodic, iconic, 
non-cognitive, somatic, etc) illustrate the diversity of the phenomenon. Alternatively 
one could consider the bewildering variety of types of amnesia, to make the same 
point. Amnesia can be anterograde, retrograde, or both; some amnesiacs can remember 
skills (like the Tower of Hanoi puzzle) while being unable to remember any facts -
such as the fact that this puzzle has been seen before; some memory failures seem due 
to an inability to store information, others to a failure to retrieve it; some diseases (e.g. 
the Korsakoff syndrome) might spare some remote memories, whereas others 
(Huntington's, Alzheimer's) do not; the list could continue long. (Wilkes, 1988a, 
p. 33) 
Wilder Penfield. with Herbert Jasper, made one of the more dramatic contributions to 
knowledge of human brain function when their research was published in the book 
Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy of the Human Brain in 1954 (Penfield and Jasper, 
1954). Both Penfield and Jasper were neurosurgeons working mainly in Canada. Their 
speciality was the surgical treatment of epilepsy. 
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In order to arrest severe epileptic seizures in their patients Penfield and Jasper excised 
by surgery that part of the patient's brain that was thought to be the focal area of the 
epileptic seizures. This is still the treatment for severe epilepsy in, for instance, Britain. 
Because the anatomy of the brain is known only approximately, and any particular 
example may differ from a sUndard, patients are only locally anaesthetized whilst being 
operated on and are able to talk to the staff around them in the operating room. This 
enables the surgeons to assess what damage they are doing to faculties such as speech, 
understanding, and so on. The surgeons can often identify irregular tissue in a zone close 
to where the seizures are known to originate, and then excise this tissue with recourse to 
the vocal response of the patient. Penfield and Jasper were often operating on the area of 
the brain known as the temporal cortex (an inch inside the cranium, near the top of the 
ear). A large expanse of the cortex of the temporal lobe seems to be related to memory, 
and it is adjacent to visual and auditory cortices (those parts of the brain that give the 
cortical representations of visual and auditory sensations). This seems often to be the area 
where seizures begin. The surgeons can assess damage to localized functions by 
discussing effects with the patient: failing visual recognition, slurring speech, memory 
failure, and so on. 
With the patient conscious but in no pain, and a section of the cranium removed, and 
before any brain surgery was done, Penfield and Jasper stimulated discrete areas of the 
brain with an electrode. In a procedure known as 'kindling' they passed a small electric 
charge into that part of the brain. This procedure was conducted in the spirit of 
experiment and without proscribed or predicted outcome. They did not know what they 
would find. 
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The unlikely result was that this process of kindling often stimulated a memory in 
each of the patients. It was a specific memory for the patient involved and it unfolded in 
'real time' and as vividly as a contiguous, current moment. The patients still had some 
awareness of the room around them, however, and could respond to the questions of the 
medical team (and even ask questions themselves, regarding the verification of events). 
The memories were not purely auditory, or visual, or olfactory, but often all of those 
things. They were not a single sound or a frozen picture, and did not play out their 
narrative in an all-at-once moment. If there were music it would be heard from beginning 
to end. If it was a song then it wasn't a generalized version of a song (one that had been 
'committed to memory'); it was one specific instance of that song, with the thoughts and 
emotional gravity that had accompanied the song in the context in which it was heard. 
I shall quote an account from Penfield and Jasper's records of these operations and 
the results they had: 
The patient's attacks may be called temporal lobe seizures. They began with a cephalic 
aura followed at once by automatism. Marked abnormality was encountered in the 
posterior hippocampal gyrus at the time of excision. For the purpose of this section 
only the production of recollection by stimulation at operation will be described. 
Operation. Right osteoplastic craniotomy. 
During the operative procedure it seemed advisable to explore some of the buried 
temporal cortex. For this purpose a coated monopolar electrode was used, the metal of 
which was exposed only at the tip. This was inserted into the first temporal 
convolution to a depth of I cm so that the stimulating point was in the superior 
temporal cortex at the bottom of the fissure of Sylvius. The stimulating tip must have 
been somewhat anterior to the transverse gyrus of Heschl. When the current was 
switched on, the patient cried out in great surprise: 'Yes, Doctor, yes Doctor. Now I 
hear people laughing - my friends in South Africa,' He was asked i f he could 
recognize who these friends were and he replied, 'Yes, they are two cousins, Bessie 
and Ann Wheliaw.' 
When asked, he said he did not know what they were laughing at, but he thought 
they must have been joking. 
After operation he was asked again about this and he said that it seemed to him that 
he was with his cousins and that they were all laughing together at something. This 
was obviously a real experience to him and he was much surprised that he seemed to 
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be with them back in South Africa which he had left about a month previously. 
(Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 136) 
What do the results and records of these experiments tell us about the working of 
memory or the 'construction of the self? The research data does not seem to point to a 
differendy clear conception of how memory and self function. These records might be 
said to indicate that memory and self are bound, but that their functioning together is in 
nothing at all of the manner that models in folk psychology represent. What was 
characteristic, in these memories kindled in Penfield and Jasper's patients, was the way in 
which they seemed to 'happen' to the patient as an affliction. The patient is often shocked 
or surprised at the nature or content of the memories. The patient seems also confused by 
the vividness of the memory - it really seems to be 'happening' in the present. Even more 
confusingly, the memory 'happens' concurrently with 'present experience'; neither the 
remembered, nor the contemporary world takes precedence and (much as in the 
psychoanalytic experience of 'transference') the two times seem to be running 
simultaneously with equally convincing 'sense data'. The memory seems to include 
information that the patient may not have chosen for his or herself and consequently the 
patient is often shocked at the kind of person that they find themselves to be. Here is 
another example of Penfield and Jasper's reports: 
During the course of the operation upon this woman's right temporal lobe, stimulation 
of the superior temporal cortex as it lay upon the insula was carried out. It caused her 
to say, ' I just heard one of my children speaking.' She added that it was 'Frank' and 
that she could hear the 'neighbourhood noises' as well - by which she meant 
automobiles passing her house, and other children. When the same point was 
restimulated, she said she heard the neighbourhood noises but not Frank. 
When questioned about it 10 days later she recalled that she had heard 'Frankie 
and the neighbourhood noises.' She was asked whether it seemed to her to be a 
memory and she replied, 'Oh no, it seemed more real than that.' She thought she was 
looking into the yard and saw as well as heard the boy. She knew she was, in reality, 
still in the operating room, but she supposed that the surgeon had somehow brought it 
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about! *0f course,' she added, '1 have heard Frankie like that many, many times, 
thousands of limes.' 
She had never had a similar experience during any of her habitual seizures. 
(Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 137) 
The explanations of Penfield, who seems as confused as any about the indications or 
import of these experiments, run along these lines: 
Stimulation of temporal cortex may cause a patient to be conscious of what he may call 
a memory or a dream. In any case, the elements of the experience are derived from the 
storehouse of his memory. One of the functions of the temporal lobes is to provide a 
storehouse of potential recollections. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 140) 
This explanation seems to indicate that memories and dreams are indistinguishable from 
one another. What would distinguish memory from dream at the point of perception? An 
implication of Penfield's report is that we can never be clear at the moment of experience 
that what one experiences is distinctly memory or dream. What is the moment of 
experience where memory is concerned? There is a storehouse of memory, writes 
Penfield, and it seems he does not mean this metaphorically. It seems that Penfield is 
describing a localized, spatialized place somewhere in the brain. If we have a storehouse 
of memory, does everything we see, or hear, or do go into it? When, or how, or why do 
we retrieve from it? And what might Penfield mean by 'potential recollections'? 
'Potential recollections' might mean experienced events that we have stored for future 
use but that we have not actualized, or activated yet. Or 'potential recollections' might 
mean 'stock' experiences which are potential in that they have not happened yet, but are 
available for 'recall' should any future occurrence resemble what is in store. It is not clear 
what Penfield meant by this, and these quotes have the status of free asides amidst 
opinions more commonly assented to. 
The experience may seem to the patient to be a dream, rather than an accurate 
memory. But it is a dream in which familiar places are seen and well-known people 
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speak and act. Such hallucinations, or memories, or dreams continue to unfold slowly 
while the electrode is held in place. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 142) 
What is temporal in these memories, hallucinations, or dreams? It is not clear to the 
subject which moments they are placed in. They have the quality of the psychoanalytic 
process of transference, in that two distinct time periods seem to coincide and overlap: 
both are real and current but simultaneously. 
The conclusion may be drawn that there are in the temporal cortex innumerable 
pattems which constitute records of memory (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 142). 
By Penfield's description memories are in the same category as dreams and 
hallucinations. Are memories based on occurrences, or are they occurrences recalled? 
That is: are memories an unavoidably accurate recollection of experiences and events, or 
are they fabrications based on the truth? Is there anything 'truthful' about memory? Or 
only inasmuch as a memory can be verified and isn't that missing the point? 
In the 2 years after her operation her only complaint was dizziness and headache on 
stooping, which was obviously due to the free movement of the subtemporal 
decompression. At the end of this time she began to have seizures again but they were 
of a new and curious type as follows: 
Hallucinatory seizure, auditory. In these later attacks, she heard voices which 
seemed to be coming from her right. They were not the voices of her children. Indeed 
she said she could not hear her children speak to her during an attack. Once, on 
getting up at night to go to the bathroom, she heard music. She thought it came from 
the radio in the living room. It was a song she had frequendy heard on the radio. She 
could not hear the words. In a later attack she thought the room had filled with people, 
all talking at once, although she could not tell what they were saying. 
In these attacks she retained the ability to move about. She was able to see but she 
could hear nothing except the rather complicated auditory hallucination, the content of 
which was either a musical memory or voices. 
One of such attacks, which occurred in hospital, was described by Nurse Margaret 
Goldie as follows: After the attack was over, the patient said she had a peculiar 
sensation in the chest which 'felt as though it came from the stomach.' Then the voices 
started on the right side of her. Then she said, ' I felt as if there were a crowd of people 
around me all talking to me. It made me very excited and nervous. Now I feel very 
tired and have a headache.' In other attacks she heard music, and several times at night 
she went to see if someone had left the radio on. She sometimes heard people sing but 
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could not remember what the song was. The voices or music were completely realistic 
and convincing, and the duration about one minute; the direction of sound seemed to 
be sometimes to the opposite side (right), and sometimes she referred them toward the 
supposed source, e.g., the radio. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 459) 
1 am quoting at length from Penfield and Jasper's Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy 
of the Human Brain because it is a book more read about than read. The findings of 
Wilder Penfield and Herbert Jasper are often lightly referred to, or hinted at, in various 
works of neuroscience. But the book itself is a 'rare book' and almost impossible to find 
in a library. Although the Phineas Gage case history (see chapter titled Change in this 
thesis) has been widely referred to without recourse to primary sources, recently there 
have been written studies which finally disinter the few firsthand accounts of Gage's 
injury and character. These recompense somewhat for the misappropriation and 
disingenuousness which has characterized even scholariy reference to Gage's life, 
character and pathology; the primary sources are at least now broadly available to those 
who care about such things. The commissurotomy studies of Sperry, Gazzaniga and 
Bogen (1969) (see chapter titled Other Selves in this thesis) have been interestingly and 
honestly interpreted by Thomas Nagel in his essay Brain Bisection and the Unity of 
Consciousness (1971), and there is a widely available literature written by the scientists 
most involved in the commissurotomy studies, Penfield and Jasper's studies however are 
never fully quoted, despite their detailed reports of an area of human life it is very 
difficult to report on (and hence scarcely reported). 
In the instance of the Phineas Gage case history, the disingenuous use of his life story 
to support varied neuroscientific claims has benefited from a scarcity of historical detail 
concerning Gage. In the instance of the Penfield and Jasper reports, it may be their 
heterogeneous character and the heterodoxy of their import that prevents this evidence 
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being more commonly used. The evidence in the Penfield and Jasper reports is so rich it 
is difficult to know what conclusion they point to. There is a variety in the reports that 
indicates the plurality of the subjects' exp>eriences: they do not seem to add up to any one 
view of the neuroscientific study areas which the cases are purported to enlighten. 
Memory, self, consciousness, and any definition of human character are unrecognizable 
or without parameter in the evidence of these reports. The findings presented in the book 
are intransigent and problematically so for an understanding of the 'self. 
The Penfield and Jasper reports might be said to provide too much evidence, and as 
such the evidence makes it impossible to conclude with any decision. The voices reported 
indicate many and plural truths rather than a succinct and definitive truth. Similariy, this 
thesis is intent to deal with evidence that is similarly unwieldy or singular and 
intransigent. Feyerabend has put it that: 
The idea that things are well defined and that we do not live in a paradoxical worid 
leads to the standard that our knowledge must be self consistent. Theories that contain 
contradictions cannot be part of science. This apparently quite fundamental standard 
which many philosophers accept as unhesitatingly as Catholics once accepted the 
dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin loses its authority the moment we 
find that there are facts whose only adequate description is inconsistent and that 
inconsistent theories may be fruitful and easy to handle while the attempt to make 
them conform to the demands of consistency creates useless and unwieldy 
monsters. (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 36) 
This is an important point to make about any academic endeavour the things that can or 
cannot be said within any academic discipline are circumscribed by linguistic, theoretical, 
or institutional regimes. The nature of the discourse defines the subjects of the discourse 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. 17). Thus this thesis will often fall foul of those academic criteria 
which seek to constrain discursive or cross-disciplinary work. 
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There are those who think the safety of scientific language prevents any inquiries into 
the less visually verifiable areas of human subjectivity. Jaak Panksepp is a neuroscientist 
who researches 'affective neuroscience': that is, the neurological processes correlative to 
emotions, Panksepp has complained that the neutrality insisted on in scientific literature, 
and the insistence on excluding data which cannot presently be visually verified, has 
curtailed the scope of scientific inquiry. To Panksepp, these limitations are especially 
prevalent or damaging in matters of neuroscience: 
Although language is the only way we can scientifically bridge the chasm between 
brain and mind, we should always remember that we humans are creatures that can 
be deceived as easily by logical rigour as by blind faith. Despite our scientific pride in 
using words precisely, the most important metrics for measuring our scientific 
insights are the predictions we can confirm and the useful products of our research. It 
is possible that some of the fuzzier concepts of folk-psychology may lead us to a more 
fruitful understanding of the integrative functions of the brain than the rigorous, but 
constrained, languages of visually observable behavioural acts. The dilemma that the 
'prison house of language' presently imposes on our modem scientific and cultural 
pursuits should not be underestimated. (Panksepp, 1998, p. 335) 
It is not simply that scientific language is a Hawed medium for reporting research into 
affective neuroscience, or that medical discourse is an inherendy inappropriate means of 
describing emotions, memory, and agency. Consensus is never a valid reason for belief, 
despite the absolutism and apparent transparency of scientific discourse. 
As is clear from the history of science (especially medicine), neither does complete 
unanimity guarantee truth, nor does incomplete consensus necessarily imply an 
inherent inconclusiveness of the evidence or an impossibility of achieving subjective 
moral certitude. (Shewmon, 1997, p, 64) 
In Penfield and Jasper's reports, 'memory' represents a tentacular calamity in terms of 
a definition. What would these reports signify in terms of a classificatory definition of 
'memory' and its linguistic referents? That memory is a scientifically confused term does 
not make it useless in everyday use. Herein lies the imporunce of folk psychological 
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examples as evidence: it does not matter that 'memory' does not conform to the terms or 
definition of its referents even as we describe them to ourselves. The term can still have 
cultural currency in everyday exchange; the term 'memory' still makes sense as we mean 
it even if we are unable to provide a genuine definition. It does not matter in ordinary 
language that we do not know precisely what the term means as the term still does what 
we want it to in conversation. The term has functional value i f not ontological. 
W, V. Quine has pointed out that we learn language by 'ostension'; that is, by hearing 
a word applied to samples or examples (1969, p. 121). Ostension is an induction into 
taxonomic groups. This is presumably as true of 'anger' as it is of 'yellow'. Quine 
highlights a problem with this ostensive language-learning process, as follows: 
Not only is ostensive learning a case of induction; it is a curiously comfortable case of 
induction, a game of chance with loaded dice. At any rate this is so if, as seems 
plausible, each man's spacing of qualities are enough like his neighbour's. For the 
leamer is generalizing on his yellow samples by similarity considerations, and his 
neighbours have themselves acquired the use of the word 'yellow', in their day, by the 
same similarity considerations. The leamer of 'yellow' is thus making his inductions in 
a friendly world. Always, induction expresses our hope that similar causes will have 
similar effects; but when the induction is the ostensive leaming of a word, that pious 
hope blossoms into a foregone conclusion. The uniformity of people's quality spaces 
virtually assures that similar presentations will elicit similar verdicts. (Quine, 1969, 
p. 125) 
Although Quine uses the example 'yellow', the same principle presumably applies to 
'anger'. But i f I point to this effloresence of anger with the word 'anger' 1 am being 
inducted into a sense of self and not just the meaning of a word. 
Harry Jerison has written that. 
Individuals capable of constructing elaborate multisensory 'real' worids might 
construct a reality that seems more fundamental than the immediate information from 
the senses. The capacity for imagery, in which one manipulates a possible real worid in 
one's imagination, must eariy have led the hominids, by the time these capacities were 
well developed, to reach an appreciation of a past prior to one's lifetime and a sense of 
a future after one's death. (Jerison, 1973, p. 429) 
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Our image of ourselves might be said to be culturally founded rather than 
physiologically. The images we have of ourselves, as evinced by the metaphors of folk 
psychology, are convincing beyond the reach of science. Although folk psychological 
models of self might be said to be founded on the metaphorical constraints of language, 
they effectively become the self and not just our means of talking about it. Concepts 
invoked linguistically take on solid proportions. Turns of phrase such as 'my mind has 
gone blank,' or ' i t has slipped my mind' represent in language an imagined physiological 
reference point which we cannot find by removing someone's scalp; the brain has the 
consistency of cold porridge. 
If you read any recent work on neuroscience you'll read that the 'autobiographical 
self relies on episodic memory. Yet observe how fragile, or contingent on any event is 
the basis of memory. In the matter of everyday recollection, can memory be an indelible 
record of that which one experiences? Is there really a storehouse of recollection which 
houses our impressions and that which we witness for future recall? Is that which we 
attend to entering into a state of potential future recall from the moment we witness it: 
like a filing cabinet where we can find the things we have lost? Julian Jaynes provides a 
number of examples that ought to indicate the recording power of memory, but which 
indicate the opposite. 
Consider the following problems: Does the door of your room open from the right or 
the left? Which is your second longest finger? ...How many teeth do you see when 
brushing your teeth? . . . I f you are in a familiar room, without turning around, write 
down all the items on the wall just behind you, and then look. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 29) 
If these things were one day changed for impostors one would probably spot the 
difference: this is the distinction between recognition and recall. 
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I can add some examples of my own regarding the fallibility of memory, and its 
temporally indistinct quality. Some things I remember but cannot have attended to first-
hand. I remember a particular tree being cut down in the garden of the house where I 
grew up; and yet photographs of me in that garden show me as a very new baby with the 
tree already cut to a stump in the background. In that same garden I waved goodbye as an 
infant to my neighbour, my favourite person in the world: when twenty years later I 
remembered that event it came back to me with unfathomable vehemence and 
viciousness. Had it really happened like that? When I left my flat this morning I began to 
question whether I had locked the front door behind me: I remembered locking the door 
but I also remembered not locking the door. In Spain, the signs say ^Hunting Rights 
reside with the owner of the property': so, with whom do hunting rights reside in this 
instance? 
Antonio Damasio is a neurologist and leading expert on neurophysiology. He is 
author of The Feeling of What Happens (2000), which is subtitled Body, Emotion, and 
the Making of Consciousness. 1 shall quote from that book because it is emblematic of the 
contemporary consensus in neurology and related fields. In his report of a New York 
Academy of Sciences Conference in 2002, J. A. Ross characterizes Damasio as, 
"Professor at both the University of Iowa and the Salk Institute, and he has received 
countless distinctions and prizes, including the Golden Brain Award in 1995...Here was 
a master at work" (Ross, 2003, p. 78). Damasio is quoted as authoritative by Mark 
Solms, Jaak Panksepp and other representatives of what Francis Crick called ^cognitive 
science' (that is, the pool of knowledge agglomerated from research on brain physiology 
and anatomy in medicine, psychology, philosophy, quantum physics, etc.). Oliver Sacks 
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has written of, "the pioneer neuroscientific work of Antonio Damasio" (Sacks in preface 
to Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. xi). Here is Antonio Damasio writing on the afTinning 
role that memories play in the construction of the self: 
The autobiographical self hinges on the consistent reactivation and display of selected 
sets of autobiographical memories. In core consciousness, the sense of self arises in the 
subtle, fleeting feeling of knowing, constructed anew in each pulse. Instead, in 
extended consciousness, the sense of self arises in the consistent, reiterated display of 
some of our personal memories, the objects of our personal past, those that can easily 
substantiate our identity, moment by moment, and our personhood. (Damasio, 2000, 
p. 196) 
Except that there is something wrong with this, isn't there? 1 dare say that Damasio is 
right in his supposition as to how the self resorts to ^personal' memories to shore up and 
substantiate its conception of itself. But consider how memories are constructed. 
Consider how one's 'past' is constructed. Julian Jaynes, in his book The Origin of 
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind {1906) puts it thus: 
introspect on when you last went swimming: I suspect you have an image of a 
seashore, lake, or pool which is largely a retrospection, but when it comes to yourself 
swimming, lo!...you are seeing yourself swim, something that you have never 
observed at all! There is precious little of the actual sensations of swimming, the 
particular wateriine across your face, the feel of the water against your skin, or to what 
extent your eyes were underwater as you turned your head to breathe. (Jaynes, 1976, 
p. 29) 
With this in mind, how much do we remember of our 'formative' years? How many 
memories of that time do we have; do we have lots, or only a few? Is the function of 
consciousness to store up experience, having attended to it as a camera does and able to 
'retrospect' on it in the same way? Then tell me how many teeth do you see when you are 
brushing them? Or, without looking, tell me which is your second longest finger? As 
Julian Jaynes has put it: 
Did you not in each of these instances ask what must be there? Starting with ideas 
and reasoning, rather with any image? Conscious retrospection is not the retrieval of 
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images, but the retrieval of what you have been conscious of before, and the reworking 
of these elements into rational or plausible patterns...Looking back into memory, then, 
is a great deal invention, seeing yourself as others see you. Memory is the medium of 
the must-have-been. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 28 and p. 30) 
How much is fabrication or make-believe a part of selfhood? Consider how many 
^memories' start off as suppositions based on old family photographs, or one's mother 
saying *don't you remember that?' A black and white photo of a children's party; soon 
you can picture yourself there, and your relatives (whose memories also play tricks on 
them) verify that picture of events. Soon it becomes your memory and your past. How 
many of our self-defining memories are as-told-to? From 'must-have-been' to *might-
have-been' and 'wish-it-would-have-been'. If the 'autobiographical self is reliant on 
episodic memory and these memories are fallible to the point of untrustworthiness, or are 
not 'memories' at all, what does this say about the construction of the self? Does the self 
not have more of the qualities of a dream, or an hallucination, than it does the qualities 
we ascribe to memory? We should admit of the invention at work in the continued role-
playing of the self; it has more of the nature of a performance (albeit an unconscious 
one). 
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Chapter Six: Other Selves 
The current consensus in neuroscience is that human babies are bora with many 
millions more synapses than they are ever going to use. We use these nascent links 
between brain cells to map our world. And those principal maps we have as children we 
use as templates for other, future maps of our modified world; we change, the world 
changes, and our image of ourselves in that world changes. 
Those other, unused brain cells are subject to the process of 'apoptosis/ which is 
selective cell death. In this process those unused cells effectively represent the world we 
didn't encounter. Potential worids. Where are the worlds we didn't encounter? Did we 
ever imagine them as potential worlds? Here is Wilder Penfield, late neurosurgeon and 
author of the landmark work Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy of the Human Brain: 
"One of the functions of the temporal lobes is to provide a storehouse of potential 
recollections" (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 140). Are these memories 'potential' in that 
they have happened but we haven't yet recalled them? Or are they potential in that they 
haven't happened (as 'events'), but they might do (or something similar) so we keep them 
in store? 
The description given by Solms and Damasio, and in most contemporary 
neuroscience, propounds the malleability of the brain: 
Plasticity, or modifiability, is one of the fundamental capacities of nervous systems. In 
the construction of a complex 'real' worid, in which each sense modality contributes to 
the cognitive image, it would be difficult to imagine a prewired central nervous system 
that was prepared, readymade for all the capacities. Among the consequences of the 
elaboration of functionally modifiable nervous systems, one must include the capacity 
for acculturation, the development of adult-child relations that lead to social and 
emotional dependence, the use of artefacts, communication by languages, and so forth. 
Each of these (or other categories, such as play, duration of infancy, love) can be used 
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as a point of departure for speculations about the source of hominization. But in every 
instance, the question of the evolution of the brain has to be tied to the work of the 
brain. (Jerison, 1973, pp. 428-429) 
This malleability concerns not just human adaptation in evolutionary terms, or in terms of 
individual human development in the sense that psychological trauma can affect the size 
and shape of the brain; but even genetic expression is mutable. Activating and expressing 
a gene is described as genotype tuming into phenotype; that is, a virtual or potential 
structure encoded in one's DNA becoming tissue. This process is regulated by 
physiological mechanisms on which one's internal and external milieu can have an 
impact and can transform. The brain's structure and chemistry are open to the suggestions 
of experience or trial; in this way we change our minds. The way we see the worid can 
radically alter, the picture we have of the worid can alter, and one can conceive of oneself 
differendy than one is used to doing. All these fundamental operations of perception are 
corrigible. 
Mark Solms and Oliver Tumbull have written that: 
We are all bom with billions more synapses than we need. These synapses represent 
the potential connections between neurons that might be needed to create internal 
maps and models of the worid in which we find ourselves. In a sense, they represent 
all the possible worids we might find ourselves in. The actual environment we are 
bom into results in only a subset of these connections being activated. These 
particular connections are then strengthened, and the ones that are not used fall by 
the wayside. This process is commonly referred to as neuronal 'pruning'. (Solms and 
Tumbull, 2002, p. 147) 
One's experienced worid changes the actual structure of one's brain: to change one's 
mind is actually to change one's mind. This process is not simply destructive or depletive 
and is not only a matter of pruning. Eric Kandel (Kandel, 2006) won the 2000 Nobel 
Prize for physiology and medicine for showing that the temporary, reverberating neural 
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circuits that constitute short-term memory have a 'permanent' effect on the cells 
involved. The repeated firing of cells at particular junctions will activate genetic 
mechanisms in those cells that promote the growth of synapses at those junctions; an 
increased density of neural tissue results. This effect is activity-dependent and continues 
throughout life. 
Nor does the pruning cease in childhood: 
Although that is when the bulk of excess neural tissue is shed, the 'use it or lose it* 
principle continues to operate throughout life. As a result, connections that may have 
been activated frequently in childhood (and therefore preserved) can subsequently fall 
away at later stages of development, for the simple reason that they are no longer 
required. (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 147) 
It is, however, quite likely that: 
The networks that survived the great pruning processes of eariy childhood serve as 
templates around which all later memories are organized. These deeply consolidated 
'trunk' circuits would be activated on a very regular basis, even i f the events that 
forged them are not consciously brought to mind in the process - and even if the 
events that forged them cannot be brought to consciousness any longer. (Solms and 
Tumbull, 2002, p. 148) 
New and differendy configured neuronal circuits mean that new or different pattems 
of behaviour are possible. Psychological changes are accompanied by physical changes in 
the brain. These anatomical changes can be large enough for CT or MRI scanning to 
detect, Richard P. Bentall writes that: 
Several studies have shown that the volume of the hippocampus (an area of the brain 
that plays an important role in memory) is reduced in people who experience 
post-traumatic stress following warfare or sexual assault. Other studies have shown 
that the corpus callosum and other anatomical structures are reduced in volume in 
children who have been victims of sexual or emotional abuse. (Bentall, 2003, p. 160) 
Similariy, research by the Institute of Neurology in London studied taxi drivers learning 
'the knowledge' of London street routes (Bentall, 2003, p. 160). The research showed 
126 
that as the taxi drivers struggled to acquire the new, detailed information the posterior 
hippocampi of their brains became enlarged. Our use and experience of language has a 
measurable effect on brain architecture too. 
As with most other brain systems that have been studied, the vigorous use and disuse 
of the language-processing areas of the brain should yield measurable changes in the 
underiying neuronal architecture. A great deal of research on other brain systems has 
indicated that enriched environments facilitate the growth of cortical systems, 
especially in young animals. Such effects have been especially well documented in the 
visual system. For instance, closing one eye in a young animal leads to permanent 
lifelong deficiencies in that eye's ability to process information, due to accumulating 
weaknesses in the underiying neural circuits. Thus it has been of some interest to see 
how sign language is processed in deaf children, and preliminary brain mapping 
suggests that they process language in very different ways than depicted in the classic 
view. For them, language is much more a function of information processing in 
somatosensory and somamotor representations of the hand. This remarkable finding 
suggests that in the young brain, many other areas than Broca's and Wernicke's 
[areas of the brain ordinarily considered central to language processing] are 
capable of elaborating the processing of linguistic material. (Panksepp, 1998, p. 335) 
In an organism so mutable isn't it impossible to seek the stasis and stability which 
words such as *mind,' 'consciousness' and 'self point to? It might be the fault of our 
language that we arrive at these static concepts. In The Unconscious Before Freud, L. L. 
Whyte (1962) writes that: 
Certain African and American Indian communities, the Hopi and others, appear to 
put the cognitive emphasis, not on separable traces representing isolable entities, but 
on the actual process of personal experiencing. Whorf has suggested that their 
languages are moulded to represent the transformation of the subject in the course of 
his experienced activities and of his participation in the processes of his worid. The 
Hopi, for example, view reality as 'events,' rather than as 'matter'. These languages, 
far from being vague or undifferentiated, make finer discriminations in regard to the 
action of thinking than do the European. They are highly developed systems of 
communication, stressing a different aspect of experience. (Whyte, 1962, p. 33) 
It is a misconception that genetic influences are fixed and predetermined. Genetic 
influence on character is mutable and inextricably linked to environmental factors. Genes 
are sequences of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) strung together in a double helix to form 
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chromosomes. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes and the gene sequences on these 
chromosomes have two functions that are known as the 'template' and the 'transcription' 
functions. Genes replicate themselves. The genes of the male and the female mix at 
conception; it is the unfolding of the mixture of parental genes that results in a baby. The 
ability to replicate is known as the template function of genes. Al l of our genes are 
represented in every cell of our body but this template function is, in a sense, restricted to 
the genes in the cells of the sperm and the ovum. 
This leads to the important question of what all the genes in the rest of the body do, 
including the genes in the billions upon billions of cells that make up the nervous 
system...The transcription function of genes is closely bound up with what we call the 
'expression' function of genes. The genetic codes (sequences of acids) making up the 
strands of DNA are designed to produce different proteins. In the simplest case, a 
particular protein thus produced will make your eyes blue or brown, and your hair 
black or red. (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 219) 
Genes create and modify various brain structures. Particular genes do not work in 
isolation; genes work in complex interactions with each other. To produce even one 
neural circuit requires a very complicated sequence of genetic events. This sequence does 
not unfold in isolation either, but in interaction with the body's inner and outer 
environment. 
We have said that each of the cells of your body contains all of your genes. Al l of them 
can therefore potentially produce a huge range of proteins. But in reality there is a 
division of labour between the different cells of your body. They do not all involve 
themselves in the full diversity of things that the human genome can produce. The 
genes in different cells produce proteins that represent only a small sample of their 
potential range - which is the same as to say that only a small sample of the genes in 
any one cell is actually expressed. The difference between a liver cell and a brain cell 
arises from the fact that the genes that are expressed in them are different, resulting in 
the growth of different types of cell and ultimately (due to the clumping together of 
cells) different types of tissue. This is how the body comes to contain the great variety 
of organs and functions that it does. (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 220) 
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This process of activating and expressing a particular gene is described as its 
transformation from genotype to phenotype. The virtual, potential, structure encoded in 
the DNA transforms into actual tissue. The environment influences this mechanism in 
numerous ways (the environment, in this instance, represents everything outside the cell 
itselO- In the brain, when one neuron activates another "It stimulates genes in the second 
neuron to manufacture particular proteins, which in tum leads to the growth of new 
synapses in that cell" (Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 221). In this way memory, for 
instance, is a process that is inextricable from genetic transcription. It is by the 
multiplication of synaptic connections at repeatedly activated junctions that long-term 
memory translates into the physical matter of nerve cells. Transient memory is rendered 
into the physical structure of our body's cell mass with every change of mind. Propensity 
and possibility are conjoined in genetics. 
During our life 50,000 cells in our body die each second. Each day about 50 billion 
cells in our body are replaced, resulting in a new body each year. During each year about 
98 percent of the molecules and the atoms in our bodies are replaced. Where are 
continuity and stability in this process? There is no true pattern. We seem to characterize 
consciousness as a stream. Regrets, volitions, small talk to oneself, frustration, and the 
exterior sensations of which we are selectively aware all seem to fall into a tidal estuary 
that fills even through dreamless sleep. Julian Jaynes has asked: 
If we think of a minute as being sixty thousand milliseconds, are we conscious for 
every one of those milliseconds? If you still think so, go on dividing the time units, 
remembering that the firing of neurons is of a finite order-although we have no idea 
what that has to do with our sense of the continuity of consciousness. Few persons 
would wish to maintain that consciousness somehow floats like a mist above and about 
the nervous system completely ununited to any earthly necessities of neural refractory 
periods. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 24) 
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It is likely that the seeming continuity of consciousness is an illusion along the lines 
of the way one eludes the lacunae of the 'blind spot' in one's field of vision. The same 
principle seems to be at work in registering an integrated spatiotemporal representation in 
the visual field as in eluding the lacunae in 'consciousness'. There is a two-millimetre 
gap on the nasal side of our retinas where the optic nerve fibres are gathered together and 
leave the eye for the brain. This creates a blind spot in one's visual field. 
The blind spot is that region on the retina where the ganglion cells leave the retina 
and project to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus. The packing density of 
light-sensitive cones is greatest at the foeva, decreasing sharply in the peripheral field. 
Rod density is greatest in the region that immediately surrounds the foeva, and 
gradually decreases in the more peripheral regions. The region of the blind spot is in 
the peripheral field. (Churchland and Ramachandran, 1998, p. 178) 
The foeval area of the retina is the area in which one's vision has relatively high 
resolution and high acuity. It encompasses a very small area of one's perceptual space. 
The foeval area of relatively clear and fused visual perception is about thumbnail size at 
arm's length, and a few centimetres deep; closer to the eye the fused space of visual 
perception covers an even smaller area. The blind spot of the retina covers a larger area of 
visual space than the foeva; the foeval area encompasses only 2 degrees of visual angle 
whereas the blind spot is about 6 degrees in length and 4.5 degrees in width. Put simply: 
the area of one's eye that sees cleariy is smaller than the area of one's eye that does not 
see at all. In order to compensate for the minimal extent of the foeval area, or to extend 
the foeval reach as it were, the eyes continually make small scanning movements called 
'saccades*. 
The eyes make a small movement - a saccade - about every 200 to 300 milliseconds, 
sampling the scene by continually shifting the location of the foeva. Presumably, 
interpolation across intervals of time to yield an integrated spatiotemporal 
representation is a major component of what brains do. Interpolation in perception 
probably enables generation of an internal representation of the worid that is useful in 
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the animal's struggle for survival. (Churchland and Ramachandran, 1998, p. 177) 
Visual consciousness is always partly this 'imagined whole'. In failing to ordinarily 
notice a 'blind spot' it is not that we ignore this gap in visual aspect. There are limits to 
the eye's capabilities for response to light, and it is in the work of one's visual perceptual 
capacity to create a pictured seamlessness, a visual aspect which is represented as fused 
and coherent. One does not merely 'think' one has seen that which is occluded by this 
blind spot, it is rather that one has seen it as one sees anything in the visual field. That 
which one 'completes' in the visual aspect is a visual phenomenon rather than a non-
visual judgement. It makes no difference whether it is 'there' or not. 
Relying on two eyes, a perceiver- even a careful and discerning perceiver- will fail 
to notice the blind spot, mainly because the blind regions of the two eyes do not 
overiap. If light from a thimble, for example, falls in the blind spot of the left eye, it 
will nevertheless be detected normally by the right retina, and the viewer sees a 
thimble. Even in the monocular condition, however, one may fail to notice the blind 
spot because objects whose borders extend past the boundaries of the blind spot tend to 
be filled in, without gaps. (Churchland and Ramachandran, 1998, pp. 177-179) 
One visually registers the world thus, by these rules and owing to these means. The world 
is context specific dependent on perspective. 
If one closes one's left eye and stares at the left margin of this page, one is not 
conscious of the large gap in one's vision about four inches to the right of where one 
focuses. But i f you now, still with your left eye closed, observe your finger move along 
the line of print from left margin to right, you can see the top of your finger disappear 
during its passage through this 'blind spot' and reappear on the other side. Julian Jaynes 
has observed of the 'blind spot' in visual perception: 
The interesting thing about this gap is that it is not so much a blind spot as it is 
usually called; it is a non-spot. A blind man sees his darkness. But you cannot see any 
gap in your vision at all, let alone be conscious of it in any way. Just as the space 
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around the blind spots is joined without any gap at all, so consciousness knits itself 
over its time gaps and gives the illusion of continuity. (Jaynes, 1976, pp. 23-24) 
Julian Jaynes compares consciousness to a torch in a dark attic. To consider that 
which we are not conscious of is to ask the torch to search around the attic for something 
that does not have any light falling on it. Given that there is light wherever the torch 
directs itself, the torch would have to conclude that there is light everywhere. However 
bright our light we cannot see where we are not looking. Similariy, the conscious mind 
can seem all knowing, elucidating, and uneluded. 
To continue with this metaphor the torch, like consciousness, could be said to be 
conscious of being on only when it is 'on'. Huge gaps of time could pass in darkness and, 
assuming things were broadly as they were before the light went out (and even if they 
were not), the torch when tumed on again would 'overtook' that period of darkness and 
register instead an uninterrupted period of light falling everywhere it directs its attention. 
Ventriloquism is a trick, a spectacle, a magic show, a stage effect, a deception 
maintained way beyond any pretence of disbelief: What else is like this? A bold 
psychologist, or neurologist might suggest that the self is a construction or an illusion. 
Consciousness might be compared to a magician's act: it is an act of misdirection and it 
disguises process to present an illusory whole. In magic (a technical artform), cards can 
levitate and disappear. In a magic act the magician can misdirect us so that we see what is 
not there, and do not see what is there. In an article in The Guardian newspaper (Jha, 
2005), Richard Wiseman (a professor of psychology at the University of Hertfordshire) 
explicitly stakes a claim for correspondence between stage magic and consciousness: 
Over the last five years there's been a reawakening as we look at things like change 
blindness [a failure to notice large changes in a visual scene] and at the fact that 
consciousness is a construction and may even be an illusion. (Wiseman quoted in Jha, 
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2005, p. 4) 
In this analogy, who is the illusionist? The article describes the misdirection practised by 
stage magicians to hide the procedure of the illusion: i f we do not see the ball, for 
instance, pass from hand to hand then we can really believe it has disappeared. If 
consciousness "may even be an illusion," then who is the illusionist? 
Magicians are manipulating your consciousness. They are showing you something 
impossible. They're getting you to construct a narrative which simply isn't true. So 
that means they know how to make you aware of certain things and blind to other 
things,.. Our visual representation of the worid is much more impoverished than we 
would assume. People can look at something without being aware of i t . . . What it 
shows is just how much of the picture in our head, of our surroundings, is a massive 
construction, based on expectations, what we think is important, what we normally 
encounter, and so on. (Wiseman quoted in Jha, 2005, p. 4) 
Is it the self that constructs a self? The omnipotent self, the same one posited by Wiseman 
and Descartes, is given here as an illusion. But drawing the analogy with stage illusion is 
a deception, a crowd pleaser. The above analogy points back always to the self: a self that 
is both illusion and illusionist. If the self is an illusion, doesn't that mean it is not there? 
How can the illusory self create the illusion of self? 
It should come as no surprise to us that we are these multiple potential selves and that 
one lies to ourself (consciously or unconsciously, it matters not) to maintain a spurious 
sense of continuity. One is always principally two separate people in league (or not) to 
attain an apparent unity. The corpus callosum is a bridge of white matter that connects the 
two hemispheres of the brain. In the 1960s a dozen or so patients with otherwise 
intractable epilepsy were treated with a surgical procedure known as commissurotomy. 
They were patients of a surgeon called Dr. Philip Vogel. Commissurotomy is the cutting 
down the midline of all interconnections between the two hemispheres of the brain, 
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(though the two halves are still connected at the stem and limbic system at the 'deeper' 
parts of the brain). Each of these patients had undergone, in a single operation, complete 
transection of the corpus callosum, the anterior commissure, and the hippocampal 
commissure. The procedure was used as a treatment in cases of severe epilepsy that were 
otherwise untreatable. The surgery was developed in an attempt to localize the abnormal 
neural excitation that constitutes an epileptic seizure. Commissurotomy acts in the brain 
as a fire-wall does in a forest; the seizure stays in the hemisphere that is its focal point 
and can't spread across the divide to the other hemisphere. 
In the 1960s neuroscientist Roger Sperry realized that these dozen or so 
commissurotomized patients could be studied to leam about the normal lateralization of 
the brain's halves. Are the halves of the brain divided by the dominance of one half or 
another, or by speciality, or by discrete roles? Sperry elicited the ingenuity of neurologist 
Michael Gazzaniga in devising ways to test commissurotomised patients for divisions in 
the brain's labours. 
With regard to this experimental research with commissurotomized patients Roger 
Sperry has written that: 
Instead of the normally unified single stream of consciousness, these patients behave 
in many ways as if they have two independent streams of conscious awareness, one in 
each hemisphere, each of which is cut off from and out of contact with the mental 
experiences of the other. In other words, each hemisphere seems to have its own 
separate and private sensations; its own perceptions; its own concepts; and its own 
impulses to act, with related volitional, cognitive, and leaming experiences. Following 
the surgery, each hemisphere also has thereafter its own separate chain of memories 
that are rendered inaccessible to the recall process of the others. (Sperry, 1968, p. 724) 
In the immediate aftermath of the commissurotomy some patients lost their speech for up 
to two months, whilst other patients had no obvious problems. Some patients suffered 
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memory loss and others not; why is still a mystery. Aside from its physical linking of the 
two hemispheres it was unknown what role the corpus callosum fulfilled in the brain. It is 
now supposed that there might be a different relationship in each of us between the two 
halves of the brain. Thomas Nagel has commented on the commissurotomized patients 
that. 
Ai l this is combined with what appears to be complete normalcy in ordinary activities, 
when no segregation of input to the two hemispheres has been artificially created. Both 
[hemispheres of the brain] fall asleep and wake up at the same time. The patients can 
play the piano, button their shirts, swim, and perform well in other activities requiring 
bilateral coordination. Moreover they do not report any sensation of division or 
reduction of the visual field...By and large the hemispheres cooperate admirably, and 
it requires subtle experimental techniques to get them to operate separately. (Nagel, 
1971, p. 154) 
Despite the two halves of the brain being separated at their main means of conference, a 
sense of unity was maintained for the subject and for the observer. The two hemispheres 
continued communication mostly by means of peripheral clues: the right eye can see what 
the left hand is doing, the left ear can hear what the mouth is saying, and so on. 
Gazzaniga's tests were devised to isolate sensory input to one half of the brain or the 
other, so as to particularize each isolated hemisphere's understanding of events. 
Julian Jaynes has highlighted the division between the brain's hemispheres, thus: 
As you look at anything, say, the middle word of this line of print, all the words to 
the left are seen only by the right hemisphere, and all the words to the right only by 
left. With the connections between the hemispheres intact, there is no particular 
problem in co-ordinating the two, although it really is astonishing that we can read at 
all. But if you had your hemispheric connections cut, the matter would be very 
different. Starting at the middle of this line, all the print to your right would be seen 
as before and you would be able to read it off almost as usual. But all the print and all 
the page to your left would be a blank. Not a blank, really, but a nothing, an absolute 
nothing, far more nothing than anything you can imagine. So much nothing that you 
would not even be conscious that there was nothing there, strange as it seems. Just as 
in the phenomenon of the blind spot, the 'nothing' is somehow 'filled in,' 'stitched 
together,' as i f nothing were wrong with nothing. Actually, however, all that nothing 
would be in your other hemisphere which would be seeing all that 'you' were not, all 
135 
the print to the left, and seeing it perfecdy well. But since it does not have articulated 
speech, it cannot say that it sees anything. It is as i f 'you' - whatever that means -
were ' in ' your left hemisphere and now with the commissures cut could never know or 
be conscious of what a quite different person, once also 'you,' in the other hemisphere 
was seeing or thinking about. Two persons in one head. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 114) 
Although recovery from the operation is gradual, after a year or so the patients do not 
seem to feel very different than they felt before the operation. Nor would an observer 
notice any difference. There is no sense of anything obviously amiss. The tests that 
Michael Gazzaniga (Gazzaniga, 1970) devised were ways of controlling the sensory input 
of these patients in order to reveal any defects that the commissurotomy might have led 
to. The researchers needed to be able to control the sensory data that was available to the 
patient and to isolate the availability of sensory data to only the half of the brain that they 
were testing at a given point. 
The tests conducted on the commissurotomised patients were mainly variants of a test 
in which the patient was required to fixate on the centre of a translucent screen whilst 
photographic slides of objects or scenes were projected onto the screen from behind. Of 
the sense modalities, only olfactory fibres do not cross en route to the sense cortices of 
the brain. All other inputs to the sense modalities on the left register in the right 
hemisphere of the brain and vice versa. Projections on the left side of the screen are thus 
'seen' only by the right hemisphere of the brain. 
Visual material can be presented selectively to one or the other or both hemispheres 
as desired, by having the patient fix his gaze on a designated point on the viewing 
screen. Pictures of objects and other visual stimuli are flashed to the left and right 
halves of the subject's visual field using tachistoscopic exposure times of 1/10 sec or 
less. The brief exposure insures that stimuli intended for a given half-field will not be 
projected into the wrong hemisphere through scanning movement of the eyes. Visual 
material seen to the right side of the vertical midline is projected to the left hemisphere 
and vice versa. (Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen, 1969, p. 277) 
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In most people language and speech are a speciality of the left side of the brain. 
Ordinarily only the left hemisphere of the brain has access to language and, in the way 
Jaynes suggests, information or processes from the right side of the brain are inaccessible 
to those persons who have had commissurotomies, (or are available to them but 
'inexplicably'). In these tests the right side of the brain also has the stimulation of visual 
data and 'sees' as well as the left hemisphere, but can't convey it to the other sphere 
(where articulated language typically resides). 
When stimuli fall in the left-field, however, in a random right-left presentation 
schedule, the subject's comments indicate he did not see the stimulus. If further 
questioned, he usually insists he saw *nothing' or at most, a *flash of light'. In literally 
hundreds of such test trials, conducted over the past three years, the 
commissurotomized patients have remained consistently unable to describe in speech 
or writing pictures or objects presented visually to the left side of the vertical 
meridian. (Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen, 1969, p. 277) 
The patient is not 'aware' of any visual sense data available only to the right 
hemisphere (by means of the left eye), but can often respond, to their own confusion, as if 
cognizant of that visual information. When the patient is asked to point with their left 
hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) to a picture they have just seen only with the 
right hemisphere, they will do so correctly more often than chance could dictate and 
whilst maintaining that they saw nothing at all. 
If two different figures are flashed simultaneously to the right and left visual fields, 
as, for example, a *dollar sign' on the left and a 'question mark' on the right, and the 
subject is asked to draw what he saw, using the left hand out of sight under a screen, 
he draws the dollar sign. But asked what he has just drawn out of sight, he insists it 
was the question mark. In other words, the one hemisphere does not know what the 
other hemisphere has been doing. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 115) 
The right hemisphere of the patient's brain can also respond emotionally without the 
left hemisphere knowing or understanding what the emotion concerns, or by what it was 
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prompted, or even that it is feeling anything. Enough of the emotion reaches both 
hemispheres through the limbic system of the mid-brain where the hemispheres are still 
linked for the emotion to be *felt/ but not enough of the exclusively visual data that 
would make the feeling understandable in terms of its prompts, in an experiment 
unpleasant odours were presented to the right nostril (olfactory fibres do not cross); the 
'talking' left hemisphere could not name the smell, but could respond to the smell's 
nastiness by pulling faces and exclaiming *ugh!' 
There appears to be an improbable division of roles between the two hemispheres of 
any one brain. Assessing and updating knowledge of what the brain has been doing, and 
interpreting it for the brain as a whole, seem to be roles played somewhere in the left 
hemisphere. The specific emotional response of displeasure, though, seems commonly 
triggered by some agency of the right hemisphere. Thus: 
In test situations, where the speechless right hemisphere is made to know the correct 
answer, and then hears the left dominant hemisphere making obvious verbal mistakes, 
the patient may frown, wince, or shake his head. It is not simply a way of speaking to 
say that the right hemisphere is annoyed at the erroneous vocal responses of the 
other. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 117) 
Daniel Dennett has described this process as the shifting of the 'centre of narrative 
gravity' (Dennett quoted in Kinsboume, 1988, p. 250); moment by moment attention 
focuses in one hemisphere and then the other as if there were *two fields of awareness'. 
After commissurotomy these two fields of awareness have not the connection to 'co-
ordinate' and yet they overiap in what they attend to. Each side of the brain could *tell a 
story' to which the other side of the brain is not reconciled. Marcel Kinsboume describes 
a test of commissurotomised patients in which: 
Patients were simultaneously presented with one incomplete form just right of the 
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fixation point and another one just left; for instance, three sides of a square open 
centrally to the right and two sides of a triangle open centrally to the left. The patient 
reports a complete square (picking it out with the right hand) and a complete triangle 
(picking it out with left hand). The patient discems no contradiction in identifying two 
totally different objects in the same location in the visual field. (Kinsboume, 1988, 
p. 250) 
It is normal for the two hemispheres to receive different inputs even in people who 
haven't undergone a commissurotomy. In the normally integrated brain a more 
^complete' representation of events is constructed, incorporating the *evidence' of both 
spheres. But, in commissurotomised patients, any incongruity between the differing tales 
of experience from the two spheres is not branched and any discontinuity is not 
homogenized. All this experiment does is highlight a division that occurs normally, and 
the work that usually has to be done in homogenizing a ^picture' of events - both as the 
events take place and in retrospect. Two, even contradictory, pictures of events can 
paradoxically co-exist without conflict. Marcel Kinsboume has argued that: 
In so far as the cognitive strengths and emotional proclivities of each hemisphere are 
not the same, processing of, and response to, the onrush of events would to some 
extent differ, further amplifying discrepancies in the experiences of the two 
hemispheres. (Kinsboume, 1988, p. 252) 
That is: given the different proclivities of the two halves of the brain, more than one 
'mind' could be said to be in existence. And this is not purely a feature of 
commissurotomy. 
Awareness is a property of neural networks, not of any particular locus in the brain. 
Were it possible further to subdivide the human brain, there is no reason in principle 
why several or many independently aware neural systems might result. They would 
not be as perfectly equipped with a full range of input and output facilities as each 
hemisphere is, but that is matter of detail, not principle. The only theoretical limit on 
the size of the set of consciousnesses would be the (as yet unknown) level of system 
complexity below which neurons are not able to actualise their potential for generating 
representations of which the individual is aware. (Kinsboume, 1988, p. 252) 
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Even in the normally integrated brain, it really is as if two separate brains were 
viewing the left or right halves of the visual field. The right half sees (with left eye) but 
cannot convey, not having the language to do so. The only difference in 
commissurotomised patients is the lack of direct contact between the gnostic experiences 
of the one half of the brain with those of the other half. But if direct access to the visual 
sensations, percepts, memories, etc. between one half of the brain and the other is not 
available there are still indirect means of access. In tests: 
Objects to be verbally identified must be kept away from the right hand and from the 
head and face. In many tests the major hemisphere must be prevented from talking and 
thus giving away the answer to the minor hemisphere through auditory channels. 
Similariy the minor hemisphere must be prevented so far as possible from giving 
nonverbal signals of various kinds to the major hemisphere. There are many ways in 
which an informed hemisphere can cue in the uninformed hemisphere and hence 
conceal the commissural defect in unrestricted behaviour. (Sperry, Gazzaniga and 
Bogen, 1969, p. 285) 
What happens in the normally integrated brain is a more direct conferring to 'get the 
story straight'. Some effort is made within the brain to present a unified front. 
Incongruities and discrepancies are smoothed over and any gaps are filled in by 
fabrication or rationalization. One ordinarily opts for the impoverished whole at the 
expense of the fertile diaspora. Why do we persist with a unitary model of self despite 
physiological evidence which contradicts this model? The evidence of the 
commissurotomy research points to a human brain which unifies only by distinct efforts 
to conspire. The default model of self would have to be something more plural, 
something more in line with Bakhtin's (1920s/1983, p. 119) dialogic principle. The vocal 
conspiracy of inner speech is conducted in voices we can only partially lay claim to, for 
they are 'overheard,' or 'borrowed,' or 'adopted'. The discrepancies, and efforts to unify, 
highlighted by commissurotomy research indicate something about the 'human mind' 
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which is seemingly unpalatable to the human mind; we are aghast at our finitude and yet 
abhorred by our plurality. With regard to the commissurotomy research, Thomas Nagel 
has put it that: 
The concept of a person might possibly survive an application to cases which require 
us to speak of two or more persons in one body, but it seems strongly committed to 
some form of whole number countability. Since even this seems open to doubt, it is 
possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint 
some day, when the complexities of the human control system become clearer and we 
become less certain that there is anything very important that we are one of. But it is 
also possible that we shall be unable to abandon the idea no matter what we discover. 
(Nagel, 1971, p. 164) 
We are bewitched by this unitary analogue we regard in the mirror of self-perception: 
bewitched by its unity and by its analogous quality. 
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Chapter Seven: Making up stories 
There is a neurological condition known as 'blindsight' (Weiskrantz, 1988, p. 188). A 
person with this condition has suffered damage to the visual cortex of the occipital lobes 
of their brain. This area of the brain is identified as the primary visual cortex because it is 
where most of the nerve fibres from the retinae terminate. It is the ^activation' of this part 
of the brain that generates the neural activity that is the physiological correlate of 'visual 
consciousness'. A person with damage to this area of their brain suffers from 'cortical 
blindness'; that is, their eyes are undamaged and functioning, but they are not conscious 
of seeing anything. 
If you were to hold up an object to a person with blindsight and ask them to identify 
it, they cannot. But if you were to offer them options to confirm what they had seen, 
perhaps asking them to identify from a choice of objects by pointing, their rate of correct 
identification is far above that of lucky guesswork. Of this phenomenon, Antonio 
Damasio comments: 
This indicates that some correct processing is taking place such that the structures in 
charge of movement can guide the arm and finger in the appropriate direction even i f 
part of the information underiying that process is not made available to the process of 
consciousness making. (Damasio, 2000, p. 268) 
Information from this kind of research is often used to illustrate that one can *by-pass' the 
main areas of 'consciousness' in the brain and still function adequately. This by-passing 
of consciousness is probably a common feature of our existence. Dreaming is an 
example. Patricia Smith Churchland has written that: 
Copies of the signals sent to the occulo-motor muscles from the brain-stem structures 
(what is called 'efference-copy') probably reach cortical areas [undamaged in persons 
with 'blindsight'], and may be a significant component in the information the cortical 
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networks try to incorporate into a coherent picture. (Churchland, 1988, p. 299) 
During 'dream sleep,' of course, there is no signal at the visual-perceptual periphery; the 
eyes are not seeing anything but the brain is. 
There is a further neurological condition known as Anton's syndrome (identified by 
G. Anton in 1899). Persons with Anton's syndrome are cortically blind but assert that 
they can see. Whereas people with blindsight insist they are blind but are able to make 
visual identifications during tests, people with Anton's syndrome are equally as cortically 
blind and yet insist that they can see. People with Anton's syndrome act and speak as i f 
they can see as well as ever and their conversation is often full of allusions to a visual 
reality that doesn't, in a sense, exist and that often conflicts with the physical reality those 
around them can actually see. They will persist in behaving as i f they could see even at 
the expense of bumping into things, and will vocally rationalize as to why they might 
seem blind but are really not so. This process of rationalizing is also known as 
'confabulation' (that is, 'telling tales'). 
Anton's syndrome is also described as 'visual form agnosia' and it relates to the 
wider neurological classification of 'anosognosia' (from Greek, and literally translating 
as 'not knowing of one's disease'). In a classic example of anosognosia, a patient who 
has suffered a stroke and is entirely paralysed in the left side of their body, and unable to 
stand or walk, will nonetheless claim that there is nothing wrong with them. Patients 
whose brain lesions affect only the right side of their body do not develop anosognosia. 
Anosognosia only occurs in patients who have suffered right hemisphere brain damage. I 
quote here an example from the work of Mark Solms and Oliver Tumbull: 
A patient who claims that she is able to run is asked why she is in a wheelchair; she 
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might respond: There was nowhere else to sit.' I f asked why she is not moving her left 
arm, she would say something like: *I exercised it a lot eariier today, so I'm resting it. ' 
And so on. These patients seem prepared to believe anything, so long as it excludes 
admitting they are ill...This is literally true. Not uncommonly these patients make 
bizarre claims about their paralysed limbs, such as denying that their paralysed arm 
belongs to them and saying that it belongs to someone else. (Solms and Tumbull, 
2002, p. 262) 
What is probably most extraordinary about this condition is the seeming anomaly of 
the patient's inability to sense the defect automatically, instantly and internally through 
the body's sensory system. It is within their body that so much change has occurred, and 
so rapidly, and it is about their person that they could find such evident change; why 
don't they feel such a change when we can assume they have special knowledge of it? 
Given that this change in the functioning of their body is obvious to all observing and 
requires no special knowledge, the patient's lack of insight (if that is what it is) is even 
more disturbing. What is disturbing is that a person can be oblivious to this most glaring 
alteration in their bodily condition. 
It seems to be not just obliviousness but denial (though of course it is consciously 
neither of these behavioural traits). It was discovered in 1991 that i f one pours cold water 
in the left ear of a patient with anosognosia, the effects of caloric stimulation (causing the 
area to warm itself up) means that the neglect disappears. This is interpreted by V. S. 
Ramachandran (1994) as a "temporary, artificial correction of the atientional imbalance 
between the spheres" (Ramachandran in Solms and Kaplan-Solms, 2000, p. 157). 
Ramachandran (1994) tried this experiment on a patient who had consistently denied 
the paralysis that affiicted the left side of her body. In the after effects of administering 
10 ml of ice-water into her left ear the patient not only acknowledged her paralysis, but 
also acknowledged that she had been paralysed consistently since she had suffered the 
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stroke which had so afflicted her. Eight hours later the caloric effects had wom off and 
the patient was again denying any paralysis, and denying that she had ever made a 
statement that might indicate she acknowledged the paralysis. 
Even arch 'physicalists' (Wilkes, 1978) have trouble explaining this feature of 
anosognosia and its related syndromes; Antonio Damasio writes: 
I have suggested that anosognosia results primarily from an inability to represent 
current body states automatically and through the appropriate signalling channels, 
which are those of the somatosensory system. In one form or another, this is the most 
frequent explanation of the problem. But although the traditional explanation may well 
clarify the main source of the disturbance, we also need to explain why, after patients 
are specifically told that they are paralysed, they fail to remember such an important 
verbal statement a few minutes later. And why, even after they see that they are 
paralysed and concur that they are unable to move the left limbs in the same way that 
they move the right, they also fail to remember such visually presented facts when 
questioned sometime later. To explain the aspect of anosognosia that allows someone 
to hold a persistent false belief in spite of having received information to the contrary 
we need to invoke something more complicated than mere lack of somatosensory 
updating. (Damasio, 2000, p. 211) 
It seems to be a feature of the brain to complete a picture even if that means 
fabrication, or substitution, or elision, even if it means falsifying known facts, or denying 
self-evident truths. The body longs for completion, or wholeness, and yet is aghast at its 
finitude. It is appallingly curtailed and yet open-ended. 
If we sometimes disclaim areas of our bodies (and we know of occasions when we 
would like to have done), what is odd about this? Or, our whole bodies: 'Something came 
over me,' ' I 'm not feeling myself today,' etc.? 
Michael Gazzaniga (Gazzaniga, 1970) was the man responsible for devising the tests 
used to examine the commisurotomised patients I describe in the chapter of this thesis 
titled Other Selves. Gazzaniga describes one of the tests: 
[An] example of the left brain interpreting actions produced by the disconnected right 
brain, involves lateralizing a written command, such as 'laugh,' to the right 
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hemisphere by tachistoscopically presenting it to the left visual field. After the 
stimulus is presented, the patient laughs and, when asked why, says: 'You guys come 
up and test us every month. What a way to make a living.' In still another example, i f 
the command 'walk' is flashed to the right hemisphere, the patients will typically stand 
up and begin to leave the testing van. When asked where he is going, the left brain 
says: ' I 'm going into the house to get a coke.' However you manipulate this type of 
test, it always yields the same kind of result. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 234) 
What if the stimulus in such a test had a more emotional relevance to the patient? In 
one of the more written-about tests used in the work of Gazzaniga, Sperry and Bogen, 
pornographic pictures were included amongst the images they projected to the isolated 
right hemisphere of a commissurotomised patient. Julian Jaynes reported the experiment: 
If among a series of neutral geometric figures being flashed to the right and left visual 
fields at random, which means respectively into the left and right hemispheres, and 
then a picture of a nude giri by surprise is flashed on the left side going into the right 
hemisphere, the patient (really the patient's left hemisphere) says that it saw nothing 
or just a flash of light. But the grinning, blushing, and giggling during the next 
minute contradicts what the speech hemisphere has just said. Asked what all the 
grinning is about, the left or speech hemisphere replies that it has no idea. These facial 
expressions and blushings, incidentally, are not confined to one side of the face, being 
mediated through the deep interconnections of the brainstem. The expression of affect 
is not a cortical matter. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 116) 
These test results tell us a particular story about the lateralizing of feelings, or affects, or 
emotional response. Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen (1969) make the following conclusion 
following their report of the experiments: 
The minor hemisphere also appears to possess distinctively human emotional 
sensitivity and expression. This is indicated in situations where information conducive 
to emotional response is restricted to the right hemisphere. Reactions of pleasure, 
annoyance, amusement, embarrassment, and the like, are evident in the facial 
expressions of the subject at times when the major hemisphere is ignorant of the cause 
and reason for these reactions. If the subject is asked at such a time why he is so 
pleased, annoyed, amused, or embarrassed he (the major hemisphere) is unable to 
explain and may resort to confabulation. It is interesting that an emotional tone 
generated in the minor hemisphere can spread into the opposite hemisphere. This we 
infer when the subjects verbalize the general emotional effect with words like 'nice,' 
'pretty,' 'funny,' or 'ugh!', but remain incapable at the time of describing the 
particular stimulus that caused the reaction. It remains uncertain whether this 
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inter-hemispheric transfer of emotion is effected through feedback from the periphery 
or via intact brainstem connections. (Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen, 1969, p. 287) 
In his studies of amnesia Daniel Schacter (Schacter, Harbluk and McLachlan, 1984) 
suggests that amnesia may frequently be more accurately described as 'source-amnesia'. 
That is: often persons suffering from amnesia remember the content of an event but not 
its source; they remember details of what has happened to them but not 'why' it 
happened, or the events that led up to it - its context. And what they do during tasks 
demanding identification of the source is to confabulate a source that they then quickly 
believe to be the source, Michael Gazzaniga has commented that his work and the work 
of Schacter point to: 
A brain model that is heavily committed to parallel processes that are co-active in our 
conscious lives. Their function proceeds as it must, and as do most other physiological 
processes, outside of our awareness. Coralling all of these activities and making sense 
of them appears to be the function of special processes present in the left brain of 
humans. This function, the interpretive function, works on the products of the 
modular activities to build a schema that can explain the logic behind all the ongoing 
activity that results in a behaviour. Behaving, alas, becomes a powerful determinant in 
what we come to believe as true. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 236) 
Do these test results really tell us anything about how a person with a normally 
integrated brain behaves in ordinary life? Is the rationalization and confabulation that 
appears in these tests a feature of life only after commissurotomy (or of the anosognosia 
in the previous examples in this chapter)? 
Social psychologists Nisbett and Ross (1980) experimented with everyday situations 
that might elicit this confabulatory behaviour in any of us. In an American shopping mall 
they made available a sale tray of pairs of tights, from which the mall's female customers 
were invited to choose a pair they liked best. The tights were identical. The tights chosen 
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by the shoppers came predominantly from the right-hand side of the table from which 
they were choosing. 
There was a pronounced position effect on evaluations, such that the right-most 
garments were heavily preferred to the left-most garments. When questioned about 
the effect of the garments' position on their choices, virtually all subjects denied such 
an influence (usually with a tone of annoyance or of concern for the experimenter's 
sanity). (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p.206) 
The explanations given by the shoppers referred to non-existent differences relating to the 
softness of the tights or differences in the care taken with their construction. None of the 
shoppers cited the right-hand positioning of their chosen tights, which in the analysed 
data was seen to be the dominant causal factor in their choice making. Of the results of 
this experiment Patricia Smith Churchland has concluded: 
The regular appearance of confabulation in ordinary, everyday explanations of one's 
behaviour suggests that we do not have anything like unmediated access to our 
desires, beliefs, decisions, or intentions. This confabulation seems to be normal, 
inveterate, and habitual, and does not involve anything like Freudian repression, nor 
is it done with deliberate or conscious awareness. There are many other studies 
showing similar results, and they strongly suggest that theorizing about one's 
motives, intentions, and other internal states is not anomalous, but commonplace. 
(Churchland, 1988, p. 289) 
An honest declaration of our intent might be given as: *I do not know who I am, but I 
shall lie that I do, and I shall make up stories to substantiate these lies. Al l of this shall 
pass unnoticed by my supposedly conscious self, as I believe my own lies. To my mind, 
all is continuity; why doubt, even when there is evidence to the contrary.' And who 
would dare see the vacuity of their own intent? There is nobody in occupation of 
ourselves except as we say there is, and what we say accords to something other than the 
facts. To what truths do our claims for ourselves accord? Who or what is the mystic judge 
of our veracity? Or by invoking veracity and truth am I missing the point? 
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In the preceding chapters of this thesis, selfhood and consciousness have been 
increasingly shown to be vague conceits. The terms with which we refer to them, and 
define them, may be practical in folk psychological use, but there are many concepts that 
survive folk psychological use whilst remaining deliberately heterogeneous or even 
fallacious (consider 'sakes' etc.). Just because we can commonly refer to a thing does not 
mean it exists: the sun, for instance, does not rise. Bestowing 'thinghood' is a property of 
language that can mislead. Medical science, though, needs to deal in terms that are clear 
and unambiguous. 
In her essay —-, yishi, duh, um, and consciousness Kathleen Wilkes (1988a) points 
out that the English term 'conscious' is, in its present range of senses, only three 
centuries old. Yet the term is fundamental to accounts of human life in contemporary 
psychology and neuroscience. Did Europeans have to wait until the seventeenth century 
to recognize their selves in the mirror? Who put their trousers on before they became 
'conscious* at that recent date? Wilkes puts it: 
The problem of whether 'conscious(ness)' - and, albeit to a lesser extent, 'mind' -
must be central to present and future theory deserves discussion; i.e. whether either 
picks out genuine or central explananda for the science. (Wilkes, 19^a, p. 16) 
English before the seventeenth century lacked the terms 'conscious(ness)' and 'mind'. 
When the referents seem so crucial to us, how could they have escaped the attention of 
our English-speaking forebears? Wilkes points out that those who countenance the 
obviousness of consciousness would give it as something easily recognizable; 
recognizable in the manner that tigers are rather than in the manner that electrons are. 
Most contemporary science has an attitude to consciousness which could be given as: we 
know we have it, now how to describe and explain it? Given the central and transparent 
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role consciousness and mind play in psychological models of self, how could the English 
language until recently so insouciantly lack terms for what they represent? 
To indicate the 'chaotic' definition of the term 'mind' Kathleen Wilkes describes the 
complexity of finding an equivalent for the term in other languages. Wilkes's confusion 
also indicates how a definition for the term varies between disciplines. Working with 
Croatian psychologists and philosophers, Wilkes asks how they would translate the 
English term 'mind' into their own language: 
'Um' was a popular candidate. One defender, a professional psychologist, was certain 
that this was really an exact translation, and hence that 'uman' translated as 'mental'. 
But two philosophers preferred 'duh', while conceding that 'duh' was not really all that 
close; and 'dusevni' as the adjective. Opposition to 'um' stemmed from the fact that it 
seemed too intellectual, focusing rather on rationality, wisdom, controlled emotions. It 
is not exclusively 'rational': 'razum' is the direct translation for analytical reason, and 
'um' is a bit more synthetic than that, with a suggestion of value judgment; but 'um' is 
still closer to the Greek sophia than to the English 'mind'. Thus, no more than sophia, 
it cannot readily serve to capture the irrational, uncontrolled, irresponsible thoughts 
and feelings that 'mind' allows for. 'Duh', however, smacked rather too much of 
'spiritual' to translate the term 'mind' smoothly. Interestingly, a (Slovenian) 
psychology textbook of 1924 (Veber 1924) freely employed derivatives of both terms: 
an alternative to 'psihologija' (psychology) was 'Jwseslovje', and *telo in dusa' was 
the phrase used to express the contrast of mind with body ('telo'); but it equally talked 
of the 'psihologija w/nskega dozivljanja'... ( 'Um', and 'duh' seemed to be the only 
serious contenders; but it illustrates well the chaos of the English term to note that in a 
medium-sized English-Croatian dictionary there were no fewer than ten terms offered 
alongside 'mind'.) (Wilkes, 1988a, pp. 30-31) 
The fine calibration of definitions is axiomatically impossible in translation, and there are 
arguably no direct correlates between languages. The point being that in this instance the 
translator's confusion equates to a confused definition for the term being translated. 
'Mind' is blurry in what it signifies, and the term carries with it such unwieldy baggage 
that perhaps no equivalent term is capacious enough to fit it. Translating from the 
Croatian terms into English would equally miss the meanings meant to carry. 
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If the term 'consciousness' goes missing from one's language is there anything less 
one can talk about? Not even a cardiologist can tell you precisely when their patient 
becomes conscious or unconscious (Van Lommel, 2004, p. 125) and the cardiologist's 
criteria for assessing consciousness is much cruder than you or I would use. Different 
kinds of medical practitioners are looking for different things when they are looking for 
'consciousness' and there is certainly not an easy or homogenous natural kind for them to 
search for. This thesis has quoted data from research into epilepsy. There, particulariy, 
consciousness is hard to define due to 'automatic' states and the role that 
autobiographical memories have at the onset of, and during, epileptic seizures. 
If one cannot define consciousness by these medical frames of reference, to what are 
we referring with our ordinary unscientific use of the word 'consciousness', or with the 
use of that word in philosophy or psychology? If the referent of our folk psychological 
use of the term 'consciousness' does not correspond to a neurological or physiological 
definition, how is it different to the 'life spark' (or any similar pre-scientific term) 
referred to by medieval or eariier writers? 
In her essay —-, yishi, duh, um, and consciousness Kathleen Wilkes considers 
whether consciousness can be considered a 'natural kind' (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 32). If the 
question were asked 'what does science describe and explain?' the answer could be given 
as 'natural kinds'. Natural Kinds are: 
Systematically fruitful explananda and explanantia, where members of the kind are 
held together and governed by law(s) (and sometimes by symmetry principles, or 
descriptions of structural isomorphism). (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 32) 
The terms 'explananda' and *explanantia' derive from Aristotle's explanation of the 
'Four Causes'. That which needs to be explained we call the 'explanandum' (pi. 
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explananda) and that which serves to explain it we call the 'explanans' (pi. explanantia). 
Aristotle took there to be four kinds of explanation, answering four different kinds of 
questions: 
A thing is called a cause in one way i f it is a constituent from which something comes 
to be (for example, bronze of the statue, silver of the goblet, and their genera); in 
another way if it is the form and pattern, that is, the formula of its essence, and the 
genera of this (for example 2:1, and in general number, of the octave), and the parts 
present in the account; again, if it is the source of the first principle of change or rest 
(for example, the man who deliberates is a cause, and the father of the child, and in 
general the maker of what is being made and the changer of what is changing); again, 
if it is a goal - that is, that for the sake of which (for example, health of walking - Why 
is he walking? - we say: 'In order to be healthy', and in so saying we think we have 
stated the cause); and also those things which, when something else has initiated a 
change, stand in between the changer and the goal - for example, slimming or purging 
or drugs or instruments of health; for all these are for the sake of the goal, and they 
differ from one another in being some instruments and some actions. (Aristotle quoted 
in Barnes, 1982/2000, pp. 83-84) 
There is a difference between scientific language and everyday language (as if this 
thesis had not already made that clear). Everyday language can be flexible and 
contextually nuance-ridden. Scientific language aims for inflexibly precise terms that are 
contextually neutral. When science appropriates terms from everyday language it aims 
for terms that refer to natural kinds and which will respond to systematic exploration. 
Thus, to use Wilkes's examples: 'gold' but not 'briefcases', and 'tigers' but not 'fences' 
(Wilkes, 1988a p. 32). Even if science discems natural kind status in a term from 
ordinary language, it is most often the case that science still needs to adapt the term for its 
use. For scientific use the term needs to be refined of its "context-dependency, vagueness, 
and imprecision" (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 33). Consider the contrast in definitions between the 
scientific and everyday uses of the terms 'mass' and 'charm'. 
Some natural kinds are cleariy governed by laws or principles that define all the 
members of the kind, for example: 'gold' or *tiger'. In other natural kinds some laws 
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apply to most, onJy, of the constituent members and other laws apply onJy to *sub 
classes' of the natural kind. Consider *metar or *acid' as examples of these ^cluster' 
natural kinds. The groups are still natural kinds rather than arbitrary sets and even in the 
case of cluster natural kinds the laws goveming the sub classes may have "significant 
structural analogy, or isomorphism" (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 32). 
(Structural) isomorphism is a useful term in understanding what is meant by 'natural 
kinds', but the two terms are not synonymous. In biology the term isomorphism refers to 
that similarity in organisms of different ancestry that has resulted from evolutionary 
convergence. It refers to a similarity of identity of form, or shape, or structure. Again we 
can refer to Aristotle's four causes: isomorphism describes similarities in form, matter, 
and *coming into being'. It also describes 'what it is tending towards'. If one considers a 
human baby as the explanandum, its 'efficient causes' are its parents and, though its 
'final cause' is potentially a human adult, it is not the same though similar to the human 
adults who were the baby's 'efficient cause'. 
Science borrows its natural kind terms from everyday language: consider 'mass', 
'acceleration' and 'charm'. These terms are necessarily context-ridden when adopted, and 
biased towards an experience that is human. Everyday language in its form as 'folk 
taxonomy' or 'folk psychology' gestures towards 'somethings' that may or may not exist 
as science views things. Science may use the terms with the same sense but constitute 
their meaning very differently from the everyday use: that gold has the atomic number 79 
does not indicate its value in a pawn shop. In the currency of everyday expression and 
communication it is useful and understandable to point to something we can call 
'memory', despite the problems we would have explaining what we mean by the term. 
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Even if a term from everyday language can be adopted by science to refer to a natural 
kind, the refming and adaptation of that term for its use in science indicates how terms 
thought unitary and exclusive in ordinary use are too impossibly heterogeneous for 
scientific laws to interestingly or fruitfully apply. This suggests the selective interest of 
science in human experience and also the imprecision of folk psychological terms despite 
their use value and applicability. An imprecision or effective meaninglessness does not 
discount the validity of folk psychological terms as regards everyday use. The efficacy of 
a scientific term does not ensure its use value for the humans whose experience it refers 
to, and as such these scientific terms do not have application to referents outside of their 
science. Discourse is bound to context, and discourse confers meaning. 
In everyday language we point to things that may or may not be there at all. Wilkes 
points out that, "We do something for some-one's sake:... we give someone a piece of our 
mind, have something weighing on our mind, or at the back of it" (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 32). 
Psychology, also, has very few clear and unambiguous terms. The term *conscious(ness)' 
is too heterogeneous to form even a cluster natural kind. As Wilkes puts it: 
There are thousand upon thousand of ordinary language psychological terms, of which 
'conscious' is but one - it is one that does not even exist in other languages with the 
same range and scope; before *adopting* it, there should be some reason to think that 
doing so will serve a genuine theoretical need. (Wilkes, 1988a, p. 38) 
Wilkes draws an analogy with *intelligence': 
^Consciousness' should be regarded as a second-order concept; intelligence', which 
certainly is so regarded, provides a useful analogy. Nothing is called intelligent if it can 
perform just one, or a very few, tasks well, even if it does them with extreme 
efficiency and sophistication; spiders building intricate webs, fish and birds travelling 
unerringly thousands of miles, chess playing computers, pocket calculators or the 
*idiots savants' who can juggle numbers with lightning speed - none of these is 
intelligent. Intelligence is ascribed as a function of the degrees of skill, flexibility and 
originality with which a number of tasks of diverse sorts can be performed. Put 
another way: I.Q. tests do not tests intelligence, but rather test performance at a set of 
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first-order tasks, and intelligence is ascribed to the extent that these are well done. It is 
thus a second-order predicate in the sense that its ascription rides pick-a-back upon 
the ascribability of a number of directly testable predicates. That it has a healthy 
adverbial form ('intelligently') bears out the claim that it is not a first-order ascription, 
since first-order ascriptions tend to lack the adverbial cognate. (Wilkes, 1984, p. 237) 
Conscious(ness) is a folk psychological term that is so generous in scope and reference 
that it is *damned by a thousand qualifications'. In some forms of philosophical logic that 
would be enough to prove that the term's referent does not exist at all. In folk psychology 
it does not matter whether the term has a referent as long as it has use value. That the 
term 'consciousness', in ordinary language use, has no precise definition does not make it 
unusual as very few such terms do. To an extent these are 'unthought knowns' in 
ordinary language and they have cultural currency even if they cannot be examined. As 
other languages and cultures indicate, however, one could do just as well without terms 
equivalent to 'consciousness' or 'self or 'mind'. 
Menzel and Juno (1985) have picked out the problems of natural kind definition, 
again with reference to 'intelligence'. Their studies of the social foraging of marmoset 
monkeys lead to larger questions regarding measurements of 'animal intelligence'. The 
imposition of an order of 'general intelligence' is shown, in Menzel and Juno's study, to 
be an arbitrary and misleading bracketing of abilities. 
Marmoset intelligence, as we see it, is whatever marmosets do, especially if it gives 
them an advantage over their competitors... Speaking more generally: although 'the 
ability to quickly solve new problems' or 'to apprehend the relationships between 
novel presented facts and organize one's actions accordingly' constitute the major 
ingredients of most definitions of intelligence, most 'standardized' tests of this 
hypothetical process, if not this definition as such, amount largely to definitions of 
human intelligence. Before animals are confronted with any given test situation, 
every species if not every individual has faced a different set of problems and 
developed a different set of strategies for solving them. These strategies might well all 
be optimal. Furthermore, depending largely upon how one's test situation and test 
criteria are loaded for or against it, almost any animal might in principle be made to 
rank either at the top or bottom of one's unidimensional quantitative scale of so-called 
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correct responses. (Menzel and Juno, 1985, p. 155) 
From throwing light on the species-biased criteria for discriminating 'animal 
intelligence,' Menzel and Juno are drawn by their study into questioning the essentialism 
of kind-based thinking, and thence to questioning the value of *intelligence' as a useful 
taxonomic concept. 
To most of humanity some animals quite simply look smarter and seem to act smarter 
than others. The fact that the smart-looking ones happen to be our own fairly close kin 
is no accident... This, however, is only to say that judgments regarding intelligence 
might best be viewed as folk taxonomy rather than scientific taxonomy, and that no 
taxonomist should trust any external Tield marker' implicitly, let alone treat it as a 
sufficient definition of his or her genotypic concepts. Species do not have any platooic 
*essence'; and neither does intelligence. (Menzel and Juno, 1985, p. 156) 
Aside from the scientific implausibility of some folk psychological terms of reference, 
this point also tells us something about the implausibility of searching human experience 
for the referents of scientific terms. There is a problem with 'kind'-based thinking: 
science makes use of kinds in a way that seems superficially similar to the intuitive 
taxonomy that we use all the time. These intuitive inductions into a taxonomy support the 
initial scientific enquiry, but often science departs in its classificatory references. 
[One] taxonomic example is the grouping of kangaroos, opossums, and marsupial mice 
in a single kind, marsupials, while excluding ordinary mice. By primitive standards 
the marsupial mouse is more similar to the ordinary mouse than to the kangaroo; by 
theoretical standards the reverse is true... A theoretical kind need not be a 
modification of an intuitive one. It may issue from theory full-blown, without 
antecedents; for instance the kind which comprises positively charged particles. 
(Quine, 1969, p. 128) 
W. V. Quine (1969) has argued that we use this taxonomic similarity notion, or 
'spacing of qualities', from our earliest development. Language leaming would seem to 
be very difficult without this facility, as would any prediction in the physical worid. 
These leamt groupings of characteristics inform the scientific classification of kinds: 
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Between an innate similarity notion or spacing of qualities and a scientifically 
sophisticated one, there are all gradations. Sciences, after all, differ from common 
sense only in degree of methodological sophistication. Our experiences from eariiest 
infancy are bound to have overiaid our innate spacing of qualities by modifying and 
supplementing our grouping habits little by little, inclining us more and more to an 
appreciation of theoretical kinds and similarities, long before we reach the point of 
studying science systematically as such. Moreover, the later phases do not wholly 
supersede the eariier; we retain different similarity standards, different systems of 
kinds, for use in different contexts. We all still say that a marsupial mouse is more like 
an ordinary mouse than a kangaroo, except when we are concerned with genetic 
matters. Something like our innate quality space continues to function alongside the 
more sophisticated regroupings that have been found by scientific experience to 
facilitate induction. (Quine, 1969, p. 129) 
Here is the problem of context. Presumably the standpoint of the subject constitutes part 
of the context. Standpoint must incorporate the particular functional capacities of the 
human being. These capacities are not so much Hawed as particular, and particular to the 
species. 
Nothing in experience, surely, is more vivid and conspicuous than colour and its 
contrasts. And the remarkable fact, which has impressed scientists and philosophers as 
far back at least as Galileo and Descartes, is that the distinctions that matter for basic 
physical theory are mostly independent of colour contrasts. Colour impresses man; 
raven black impresses Hempel; emerald green impresses Goodman. But colour is 
cosmically secondary. Even slight differences in sensory mechanisms from species to 
species. Smart remarks, can make overwhelming differences in the grouping of things 
by colour. Colour is king in our innate quality space, but undistinguished in cosmic 
circles. Cosmically, colours would not qualify as kinds. (Quine, 1969, p. 127) 
Quine indicates that we leam language by means of ostension. By 'ostension' it is 
meant that we learn by resort to samples: we know what to call yellow (for instance) by 
hearing what is referred to by that designation. 
Similarity being a matter of degree, one has to leam by trial and error how reddish or 
brownish or greenish a thing can be and still be counted yellow. When he finds he has 
applied the word too far out, he can use the false cases as samples to the contrary: and 
then he can proceed to guess whether further cases are yellow or not by considering 
whether they are more similar to the in-group or the out-group. What one thus uses, 
even at this primitive stage of learning, is a fully functioning sense of similarity, and 
relative similarity at that: a is more similar to b than to c. (Quine, 1969, p. 121-122) 
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Does this model of language learning apply to, for instance, emotional states? There is 
probably something more at stake in referring accurately to one's anger than to the colour 
of one's eyes. How can one know one has pointed accurately to one's emotional state, or 
even that emotional states have names? These states would seem to indicate who is being 
referred to, and what is at stake by referring at all, rather than just accurate naming and 
ease of designation. 
Ventriloquism is a kind of disowning of the body, and of the rights to designation. 
Any ventriloquist can speak through any dummy and nothing is amiss. Films and stories 
representing ventriloquism often represent a magical disjuncture with the body. Take, for 
instance, the most famous of all representations of ventriloquism on screen: Dead of 
Night (1945). Dead of Night is a portmanteau film which forms its plot around a 
gathering at a country house party. A character played by Mervyn Johns is (unbeknownst 
to the other guests) prey to some sort of psychosis. He has premonitions about a disaster 
to befall the party and the guests begin to tell each other stories about similarly 
paranormal events. A psychiatrist amongst the group tells a story of a ventriloquist 
(played by Michael Redgrave) whose strange relationship with his dummy leads to 
murder. This story is presented in such a way as to always confuse the agency and 
volition of the characters. Michael Redgrave's character *MaxweIl Frere' is tormented by 
that of the dummy *Hugo'. In one scene Hugo appears at the stage curtain to invite a rival 
ventriloquist in the audience (^Sylvester Kee') backstage to his dressing room. When 
Sylvester gets there he finds only Hugo, and chats to him alone until Maxwell appears 
from the bathroom. Maxwell Frere is angry and jealous to find his dummy Hugo chatting 
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to another ventriloquist about a possible new partnership. How far can a voice be thrown? 
How far can it be said that Maxwell's character inhabits the dummy, or vice versa? 
These stories and images represent a state that is not unique to the ventriloquist act. It 
can sometimes feel one's body is not one's own because: what does one know of it? 
One's visual knowledge of one's body is limited to what is externally apparent to all. One 
has no visual special knowledge of one's body. Fundamentally anything can be going on 
in there. One can be wrong about the state of one's body. One can, in a sense, be 
deceived about the state of one's body: phantom pregnancy, or a pregnancy one is not 
aware of; cancer that develops unknown; there are many *undiagnosed' diabetics; 
congenital defects such as aneurisms or hole-in-the-heart. There are many examples to 
suggest that we have no especial or privileged knowledge of the well-being or otherwise 
of even one's own body. Are there levels of consciousness that this kind of registerable 
knowledge passes under like a jet fiying under radar? Nor do we 'operate' our bodies 
with any physiological understanding of its operation. There is no working manual, 
(though one could perhaps be written: maintain a temperature of between a and b 
degrees; maintain a pulse rate of between a and b beats per minute, etc.). If one can be 
wrong or clueless as to the working state of one's body, how much easier to be wrong 
about the state of one's mind, or one's 'feeling state'. 
One would think that it would be easy and obvious to decide whether a person is 
conscious or unconscious. But apparently it is not. We all have different criteria that we 
use for making such a decision. It would appear to be a broad spectrum 'between the 
darkness and the light'. Wilder Penfield was a neurosurgeon whose work on epilepsy and 
the memories provoked by discrete kindling of the temporal lobes during surgery are 
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discussed in the chapter of this thesis titled Memories. Penfield was intrigued by the 
'automatic' states that often occurred in his post-ictal patients. ('Iclal' refers to the period 
during the epileptic seizure and 'post-ictal' refers to the period immediately after it.) 
Penfield's confusion as to when his patients in an automatic state became 'conscious' 
highlights the problems that a scientist has with such a loosely defined term as 
'consciousness', and why these problems effectively disqualify consciousness as a 
candidate for natural kind status in science, Penfield's problems defining a moment when 
unconsciousness becomes consciousness are also problems we might encounter even 
within the loosely defined terms of ordinary definitions of consciousness. Penfield's 
confusion or imprecision in this realm highlights the conflict and inaccuracy that arise in 
any epistemological decision-making concerning states of consciousness. In many cases 
what looks like a state of wakefulness to a third party may be the utter blackness of 
amnesia, or dreamless sleep to the person most concemed. 
Wilder Penfield devotes part of his epochal work with Herbert Jasper, Epilepsy and 
the Functional Anatomy of the Human Brain (1954), to a discussion of their enquiries 
into, and observations of, these automatic states. Penfield defines these automatic states: 
When a patient develops a state of confusion and amnesia during, or immediately 
following, an epileptic seizure, but retains his motor control, his behaviour is said to be 
automatic and the state may be conveniently described as automatism. (Penfield and 
Jasper, 1954, p. 497) 
What is interesting about these states is that it is hard even to know where to place them 
on a 'spectrum of consciousness'. An automatic state might include some degree of 
confusion on the part of the patient, or total confusion, or no apparent confusion at all. 
None of these qualities observed in the patient helps to indicate whether or not they will 
remember the period observed. The temporary- ictal, or post-ictal patient has not lost 
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motor control but appears to have lost 'understanding' and the capacity to make durable 
memory records. There is no 'condition', as such, physiologically, only the appearance of 
one. It is not an event, as such, but a narrative of events. Penfield describes a typical 
scenario thus: 
In a major seizure a patient suddenly loses consciousness and has a generalized 
convulsion. There is no evidence of physical activity, only silence. There is gross, 
purposeless somatic and visceral activity. The retum to normal may be much more 
deliberate. The storm of the convulsion having passed, the patient lies motionless. 
Electrical potentials in the brain are damped or almost completely absent. The 
respiratory centres continue to function, although, perhaps imperfectly... If he does 
not go to sleep and if consciousness is slow to return, he may get up and go about in a 
confused manner. It is easy to see that his behaviour is automatic. There is for the time 
being freedom or release from conscious control. In this state, consciousness is apt to 
retum to him gradually. He may first be aware of himself, then of his environment, 
and finally, after a little confusion, he gains access to memory, to understanding and 
insight. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 498) 
If the variety of consciousness cannot be described as a spectrum, can it be described 
as like a cosmos? Consciousness, surmises Penfield, might be said to be a light made up 
of several points: 
It may bum brightly, or it may be dimmed or partially extinguished, as in a dream 
state. It may be completely and suddenly extinguished by deep coma. But this retum 
of the light seems to be gradual, beginning with only a glimmer at one point which is 
gradually joined by the others until the illumination again seems complete. 
(Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 498) 
Although this 'coming to light' may be observed by the doctor to be a gradual process, to 
the patient it can be black and white. It may seem to the patient (Penfield and Jasper, 
1954, p. 498) that there had been complete darkness as in dream-less sleep, and then the 
complete light of waking. For the patients this period may fall into two distinct 
categories: that period which the patient remembers and that period which the patient 
does not remember. It is worth pointing out that 'sleep laboratory' research into the 
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process of dreaming is often characterized by arguments between doctor and patient 
(despite the use of functional imaging techniques to monitor neural activity) as to when 
the patient was in fact dreaming (Solms, 2000a). 
Not all questions regarding our own state of consciousness can be answered by 
introspection. But when is it time for an outside observer to assess one's state of 
consciousness? It is true that one does not always discern accurately regarding one's own 
states of consciousness (consider dream states, or hallucinations, etc.), but it is also true 
that one's state of consciousness is not always apparent to even the most skilled third 
party observer (no matter how hard they look). 1 am not just referring to the matter of 
whether one's happiness or sadness is readily apparent to an observer; it is not necessarily 
clear even to an expert witness whether the actions of those they observe are actions 
conscious or unconscious. 
Biology has a phylogenetic scale. As William Lycan points out: 
Nature actually contains a fairly smooth continuum of organisms, ranked roughly by 
complexity and degree of intemal monitoring, integration, and efficient control. Where 
on this continuum would God tell us that consciousness exists? (Lycan, 1997, p. 767) 
Where would a neuro-surgeon tell us that consciousness exists? Extrapolating from 
automatic states to the ordinary mental states of human life, Wilder Penfield writes that: 
"We are from moment to moment differently conscious" (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, pp. 
498-499). Cannot one be said to be conscious of one's dreams? Isn't one often clear 
about events in one's dreams and able to report on them upon waking? In his accounts of 
automatic states Wilder Penfield uses the term 'normally conscious'. A man may be said 
to be normally conscious. 
When he gives evidence that he is aware of his personal environment, and 
understands his own purposes in a manner which the observer considers to be normal 
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for him. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 499) 
Does it take two people to recognize where consciousness is present, ventriloquist 
and dummy? Does one need one's manner verified by another as being in line with one's 
usual behaviour before one can be sure of oneself, or sure one is conscious? Between 
what is 'normally conscious' and an automatic state, Penfield observes a great variety of 
'degrees of consciousness'. There may be a 'dawning awareness of the meaning of 
things' in which case the patient may be said to be 'partially conscious' like anyone who 
is inebriated or half-asleep. Penfield makes the observations that: 
An individual who is amnesiac for a certain period may or may not have been 
unconscious during that period. Amnesia should not be taken as the final evidence of a 
lack of consciousness... A patient who is completely paralysed might be acutely 
conscious, but we can make no judgment of this fact unless he is capable of some 
distinctive activity. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 499) 
It is very interesting to read the neurosurgeons Penfield and Jasper equate 'release 
from conscious control' with 'freedom' (1954, p. 498), as if yearning for another, looser 
definition of consciousness, an experiential anarchy. (Is 'freedom' a natural kind? 
Consider 'free radicals'). It is interesting also to read Penfield's confusion regarding 
consciousness: 
No doubt consciousness is never twice exactly the same thing... This renders 
definition difficult. Nevertheless, as clinicians, we must not allow this embarrassment 
to be an insurmountable obstacle. We cannot remain on the 'side lines' for 
psychological debate. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 499) 
It is only out of shame for his profession's apparent ignorance that Penfield attempts a 
definition at all. To end this account of a neurosurgeon's confusion regarding automatic 
states I shall repeat a case history of ictal automatism: 
This young man complained of epileptic seizures which were ushered in by epigastric 
aura. An attack was described by our associate. Dr. Frank Echlin, who was watching 
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the patient as he lay asleep in bed in the hospital ward. The first evidence of a seizure 
was twitching of the right hand followed by convulsive movements of the right arm 
and generalized stiffening of the whole body. After the major part of the seizure 
seemed to be over, the patient stood up, but while maintaining an erect posture he 
became greatly cyanosed and froth came from his mouth. While in this state he moved 
about in an automatic manner, got down on the floor seeming to search for something, 
and finally tried to get into a bed that was not his own. When attendants attempted to 
put him into his own bed, he struggled against them. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, 
p. 501) 
This would seem to be the perfect example to demonstrate the personal pronoun 
which floats in the confused and confusing matter of creative agency. What was the 
'young man' looking for? I quote at length from this neurosurgeon's concern regarding 
consciousness and the mind to prove a point: this thesis does not invent difficulties in 
regard to definition of concepts regarding human mind, or agency, or consciousness. This 
thesis is not counting angels on the head of a pin and lack of distinction in these most 
salient points would seem to constitute a point zero of artistic, let alone philosophical or 
scientific endeavour. Why would a thesis written as part of an artistic practice consider 
any other nicer point before considering what is in process in the act of self? Art would 
seem to be mostly a crisis of agency. This thesis takes as its starting point the confusion 
of Edgar Bergen when struggling to justify his philosophical conversations with a 
dummy: who is at work here, and where would agency reside in such a dialogue? The 
binary between consciousness and unconsciousness would seem to be fundamental to an 
appreciation of the brain's abilities and of the limits of the brain's control over its 
attendant body; the professional confusion regarding these terms is most telling. This 
thesis suggests repeatedly that the consensus models of the self forwarded and upheld in 
the fields of discourse most concemed with its description, indicate a process of 
ventriloquism where agency slips between dual poles of body and mind and cannot be 
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tracked to a hiding place. Just as with ventriloquism it is unclear who is doing the talking, 
and the skill of performance would seem to make this distinction almost redundant. The 
self seems a complicity of often conflicting agents when analysed as its constituent parts. 
And not there at all when viewed as a whole. 
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Chapter Eight: Change 
The story of the head-injury suffered by Phineas Gage in 1848 is retold in 
neuroscientific literature from the inception of that science in the nineteenth century right 
through to recent works by the main figures in the field, (see also the attached illustration 
from a contemporary magazine, one unconnected to any field of science and closer to 
folk psychology). I here quote a passage from The Brain and the Inner World: An 
introduction to the neuroscience of subjective experience (2002) by Mark Solms and 
Oliver Tumbull: 
In the 1840s, an unfortunate man by the name of Phineas Gage was laying railway 
tracks in the Midwestern United States. He was pressing down a charge of dynamite 
into a rock formation, using a tamping rod, when the charge suddenly exploded. This 
caused the tamping rod to shoot through his head, from undemeath his cheekbone into 
the frontal lobe of his brain and out through the top of his skull. Partly because the rod 
passed through so rapidly, probably cauterising the tissue on its way, the damage to 
Gage's brain was not very widespread...[his physician] Dr. Hariow noted that, despite 
the good physical recovery and the relatively small extent of the brain injury, his 
patient was radically changed as a person; his personality was changed. Before the 
accident Gage had been the foreman of his team, a position of some responsibility; he 
was regarded as of reliable character and was highly valued by his employers. 
(Solms and Tumbull, 2002, p. 2) 
Solms and Tumbull begin to recount this story on page two of their book and this 
indicates the fundamental relevance Gage's story has to neuroscientific accounts of 
subjective experience. I might equally have quoted from other leading neuroscientists, 
such as Antonio Damasio (1994, p. 8), or J.-P. Changeux (1983, p. 159), to indicate the 
continued centrality of Gage's story in neuroscientific accounts of mind. The 'Gage is no 
longer Gage' claim for the aftermath of Gage's injury acts as founding principle in 
Damasio's book Descartes' Error (1994). As in Solms and Tumbull's book (2002), Gage 
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P H I N E A S G A G E 
THE RAILROAD E N G I N E E R WHOSE GORY A C C I D E N T 
H E L P E D OUR UNDERSTAND'NG OF T H E B R A I N . 
In autumr 1848 constructior forerr.an P^.neas Gage * a s 
packing gun pcwiSer into btdrcck to clear the way tcr a new< 
railroad A sparV igriteC ttie charge and launched h.s triret- toct 
iron tarnping rod like a mitsiie irtn his left cheek, up behind his 
eye and out through the top r1 his sku'!, taking a sizeabie chunk 
ef his brain with it. Despite the massive iniunes Gage was still 
conscious anc. tcken to the nearest ly^rr., expressed concern 
tf^t he might have to miss wr.rk for a couple o1 days. His CD-
workefs meanwh le were already prepanng tor his funeral 
Ten weeks later, after seeing off bram fungi, delinum and loss o< 
vision in his left eye. Gage's doctor declared him fit. attributing 
the remarkable recovery to the angle of the wound which 
provided natural drainage for the discharge Indeed Gage 
ar-peared quite unaffected by his irjunes cwrept in one surpnsinj 
regaro His personality and behaviour had changed 
Where before he was likeable, responsible and socially adept, 
Gage was now erode, vulgar, unreliable and insensitive. He hac 
tost all Idea of monetary value, showed no concern for his futun 
or co-workers and. despite bemg able to recall every detail ci 
the accrdent and his Me before't. became obsessed w-th te»»'n( 
fantastK; lies atiout his past experiences 
He soon tost his job but spent the next 12 years, trading off hr 
new found infamy and bizarre perscna'ity. travelling tt\t wc"( 
wrth his iron rod. entertaining high society parties wrrth his fou 
mcuttied antics and lack o< inhit)rtions He even appeared m F l 
Bamum's legendary crcus. Death finally caught up with him ir 
May 1861. when he was 38. but his legend has lived on ir 
academic crcies forever. The stories of his accident anc 
subsecuent behaviour reached doctors wf)o recovered his sku! 
ard exam nec hfs records The 'crowbar case" twcorne a subjec 
great debate bctv<eer scholars of phrenctogy and neurc-togy 
'initially Gage wc^ use<i to show there isn't any localisatiori c 
th« t r a i l s a y s Dr H Rxharc Tyier c* Harvard University 'But 
many years later, when they realised he had this personality 
AVANT G A R D E 4 0 S F l L M M A K E F S T U V B L E D UPON 
VODCU TO S E A L H E R L E G E N D . AND HER FATE . 
r.ave hac 
Orer wa 
fellow GP 
Wii'<an>s i 
»r 1947 n was ttte f'f»t t immaker to be awarded a 
Guggerhe m Foundaiticn to travel to Hait . When the stepped 
off lh« boat .n 1947, her intention had been to produce 
a stud/ of Hait«r dance. Four yea^ and three trrps later she had 
becc/ne utteity engfc«cd ii. the complex cererrxmies and r tes c^ 
Vodou. What IS remarkable about Deren s Haitian footage is how 
indifferent lt\e revellers and worshippers are to her camera She 
showed tripes dancing m tf^ eir Sunday best. tt>eir bodies toosening 
up as possessor took its hoW. their eyes hurd in a fire of frenry. 
Dercn amassed w-w 18.000ft cf film and her ensuing f.lm OiVrne 
Norsemen.- Living God cf Haiti still serves as a rough guide to 
Vodou's rituals. 
Maya Deren died at the age of 44 In 1961 after being crowned 
Grand Priestess tiy New YorK's Haitian community. Although the 
official line is tfiat she died from a brain haemorrhage, caused by 
her addiction to ampfietamines arvd sleeptr>g pills, rumours 
repeatedly linked her death to Vodou For more than a decade 
after her death she was forgotten but according to Ames Voge;. 
founder of legendary Mm dub Cinema 16. her influence cannot te 
underestimated "I felt irke I was m the presence of a new kind of 
talent, who had absorbed the 20th century revelatiorw." 
11. Popular culture magazine indicating contemporary representation of Phineas Gage's 
accident and 'transformation' and its meaning for science. 
(Page reproduced from Dazed and Confused magazine, 2004) 
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is discussed in detail in Damasio's first chapter; so, what is at stake here? In books 
written by neuroscientists and psychologists the story of Gage's head-injury and his 
recovery are the background to the character changes he is said to have undergone in 
their aftermath. It is the character changes that are important in the retelling of the story. 
On page three of their book Solms and Tumbull quote Dr. John Martyn Hariow, Gage's 
physician and author of the only reliable written account of contemporary witness to the 
events retold in these stories of Phineas Gage. 
His health is good and I am inclined to say that he has recovered...[but] the 
equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties and animal 
propensities, seems to have been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times 
in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom ), manifesting but little 
deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his 
desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising 
many plans of future operation, which are no sooner arranged than they are 
abandoned...In this regard his mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his 
friends and acquaintances said that he was 'no longer Gage'. (Solms and Tumbull, 
2002, p. 3) 
Gage changed so much after recovering from his head-injury that 'his friends and 
acquaintances said that he was no longer Gage': this is the point always made when 
Gage's story is told in works on neuroscience or psychology. In the 1840s the stories of 
Gage's injury and subsequent life were used to establish connections between injury to 
brain and injury to 'psyche'. Damage to the physical but mysterious matter of the human 
brain could be observed as direct cause and correlative of damage to the injured person's 
personality and character. 
Since those eariy accounts of Gage's injury, and Hariow's 1868 attempt to follow up 
his case history, the story is told of Gage's nefarious post-injury existence. In Damasio's 
account Gage becomes, post-injury and post-recovery, a braggart, a drunk, a liar and 
unemployable. Damasio writes of Gage exhibiting himself in Bamum's Circus, being 
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fired from jobs for ill-discipline, and as unstable and capricious where he ought to have 
been independent and trust-worthy (Damasio, 1994, pp. 8-19). For Damasio this change 
in Gage is a moral or ethical depletion, and the injury takes Gage's soul: 
The most striking aspect of this unpleasant story is the discrepancy between the normal 
personality structure that preceded the accident and the nefarious personality traits that 
surfaced thereafter and seemed to have remained for the rest of Gage's life. Gage had 
once known all he needed to know about making choices conducive to his betterment. 
He had a sense of personal and social responsibility, reflected in the way he had 
secured advancement in his job, cared for the quality of his work, and attracted the 
admiration of employers and colleagues. He was well adapted in terms of social 
convention and appears to have been ethical in his dealings. After the accident, he no 
longer showed respect for social convention; ethics in the broad sense of the term, 
were violated...Gage lost something uniquely human, the ability to plan his future as a 
social being. How aware was he of his loss? Might he be described as self-conscious in 
the same sense that you and I are? Is it fair to say that his soul was diminished, or that 
he had lost his soul? G^amasio, 1994, pp. 10-11 and 19) 
Damasio's is one of a number of claims to 'psychopathic' behaviour in Gage's post-
injury life, and the claims are often made in order to localise brain function. This, for 
instance, is quoted from Natalie Angier's Woman: An Intimate Geography (1999): 
Before, he had been intelligent, hardworking, abstemious, churchgoing. Afterward, he 
was intelligent, impulsive, and profane. He cursed at his superiors. He cursed people 
who tried to keep him from fulfilling his fieeting desires. He cursed himself for 
abandoning plans to live his fantasies. He couldn't keep a job or a promise. *He was no 
longer Gage,' John Harlow, his doctor, wrote. Using brain imaging technology and 
computerized renderings of Gage's skull, scientists have reconstructed his brain 
injury, pinpointing the left orbitomedial frontal lobe as the site of greatest damage. 
They have suggested that herein lies a locus of impulse control - the brain's temperate 
zone, as it were, or its moral centre, as the scientists have suggested. (Angier, 1999, 
p. 283) 
On what are these stories of Gage's altered existence based? Malcolm Macmillan's 
book An Odd Kind of Fame: Stones ofPhineas Gage (Macmillan, 2002) sets out to 
establish which if any of these posthumous accounts of Gage are based on primary 
sources, and which of the primary sources are more than tabloid sensationalism and 
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hearsay. Over 562 pages he concludes that it is only a few hundred lines, mostly by Dr. 
Hariow, that reliably bear witness to Gage's injury and its aftermath and that those few 
hundred lines substantiate oniy the details of Gage's injury and a sketchy few other 
particulars of the remaining 11 years of Gage's life. Anything else since written about 
Gage is surmise. 
So what are the sketchy few details of the changes in Gage's character following his 
head-injury? Here is Dr. Harlow's 1868 follow up report on the post-injury life of 
Phineas Gage, printed first in the Massachusetts Medical Journal in the same yean 
His mother, a most excellent lady, now seventy years of age, informs me that Phineas 
was accustomed to entertain his little nephews and nieces with the most fabulous 
recitals of his wonderful feats and hair-breadth escapes, without any foundation except 
in his fancy. He conceived a great fondness for pets and souvenirs, especially for 
children, horses and dogs - only succeeded by his attachment to his tamping iron, 
which was his constant companion during the remainder of his life. He took to 
travelling, and visited Boston, most of the larger New England towns, and New York, 
remaining awhile in the latter place at Bamum's, with his iron. In 1851 he engaged 
with Mr. Jonathan Currier, of Hanover New Hampshire, to work in his livery stable. 
He remained there, without any interruption from ill health, for nearly or quite a year 
and a half. 
In August, 1852, nearly four years after his injury, he tumed his back upon New 
England, never to return. He engaged with a man who was going to Chile, in South 
America, to establish a line of coaches at Valparaiso. He remained in Chile until July, 
1860, nearly eight years, in the vicinity of Valparaiso and Santiago, occupied in caring 
for horses, and often driving a coach heavily laden and drawn by six horses. In 1859 
and '60 his health began to fail, and in the beginning of the latter year he had a long 
illness, the precise nature of which, I have never been able to leam. Not recovering 
fully, he decided to try a change of climate, and in June, 1860, left Valparaiso for San 
Francisco, where his mother and sister resided. The former writes that *he arrived in 
San Francisco on or about July 1 ,^ in a feeble condition, having failed very much since 
he left New Hampshire. He suffered much from seasickness on his passage out from 
Boston to Chile. He had many il l turns while in Valparaiso, especially during the last 
year, and suffered much from hardship and exposure.' 
After leaving South America, I lost all trace of him, and had well nigh abandoned all 
expectation of ever hearing from him again. As good fortune would have it, however, 
in July, 1866,1 was able to leam the address of his mother, and very soon commenced 
a correspondence with her and her excellent son-in-law, D. D. Shattuck, Esq., a leading 
merchant in San Francisco. From them I leamed that Gage was dead - that after he 
arrived in San Francisco his health improved, and being anxious to work, he engaged 
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12. Gage's skull and the tamping iron that went through it. 
(Image reproduced from Macmillan, 2002, p. 424) 
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with a farmer at Santa Qara, but did not remain there long. In February. 1861, while 
sitting at dinner, he fell into a fit, and soon after had two or three fits in succession. He 
had no premonition of these attacks, or any subsequent ill feeling. *Had been 
ploughing the day before he had the first attack; got better in a few days, and continued 
to work in various places;' could not do much, changing often, *and always finding 
something which did not suit him in every place he tried,' On the 18^ May, 1861, three 
days before his death, he left Santa Clara and went home to his mother. At 5 o'clock, 
A.M. . on the 20"^ , he had a severe convulsion. The family physician was called in, and 
bled him. The convulsions were repeated frequently during the succeeding day and 
night, and he expired at 10, P.M., May 21"*, 1861 - twelve years, six months and eight 
days after the date of his injury. These convulsions were unquestionably epileptic. It is 
regretted that an autopsy could not have been had, so that the precise condition of the 
encephalon at the time of his death might have been known. In consideration of this 
important omission, the mother and friends, waiving the claims of personal and private 
affection, with a magnanimity more than praiseworthy, at my request have cheerfully 
placed this skull (which I now show you) in my hands, for the benefit of science. 
(Macmillan, 2002, p. 415) 
Apart from the absence of any of the contradictory or wilful behaviour such as that 
claimed for the post-injury Gage by Damasio, Changeux and Angier, I think the most 
interesting point to be drawn from Hariow's 1868 report is this: either Gage didn't notice 
the change that occurred in him as a result of the accident or it was a change to which he 
could adapt using the resources by which he had managed the rest of life up to that point. 
Phenomenological changes apparent in Gage's approach to life after his accident 
could be read as a response to circumstantial changes in his life after his accident. It is 
usually given that changes occurring in the manner of Gage had as their cause the 
injurious changes to the matter of Gage. The things we know about the changes in Gage's 
life after the accident do not tell us anything clear about whether he managed those 
changes with ease or with difficulty. What remains as reliable contemporary record of 
Gage are the words of his doctor. Twenty years after the injury Gage's doctor attempted 
to follow up his case history. Most apparent from this attempt are the paucity of detail 
and the absence of character study. We don't know how Gage felt. We may not know 
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whether Gage managed the changes in his life with ease or difficulty, but we know this: 
whatever apparent change which Gage underwent as a *result' of his injury he seems to 
have negotiated with fluidity, and taken to his new role with convincing belief; at least as 
much belief as he had brought to his former role, and recognisably resembling the belief 
any of us brings to any of our roles. 
Any difficulty in adapting to this new role for Gage was apparent in those observing 
his behaviour rather than in Gage who seems to have been led by beliefs, or motives, or 
desires that he seems to have registered or obeyed in much the manner that he had always 
done. Isn*t it easier to be led by strong feeling? The stronger one's motivating desires 
(which are not all anti-social or prohibited or destructive) the less courage one needs to 
be obedient to the pull of one's strong convictions. How much bolder and more honest 
one can be if one's feelings speak in a way that is inarguable and that one can't help but 
live according to (and, again, why assume these feelings are all negative or selfish in 
intent?). Gage's immediate response to injury was a promise to see his colleagues at work 
the following day. He refused an offer to bring his mother to his bedside by insisting that 
he would soon be well. After the six or eight-week period of physical recovery it took for 
Gage to leave his doctor's care, Gage applied for his former (sub-contracted) post with 
the railroad. The railroad company refused Gage his former post of employment as they 
doubted he would have his former capacities and abilities. The head injury liberated 
Gage in that he became less driven to advance himself independently of his individual 
aspirations. 
Here are the words of Wilder Penfield regarding automatic states in his epileptic 
patients: 
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But i f he does not go to sleep and if consciousness is slow to return, he may get up 
and go about in a confused manner. It is easy to see that his behaviour is automatic. 
There is for the time being freedom or release from conscious control. In this state, 
consciousness is apt to return to him gradually. He may first seem to be aware of 
himself, then of his environment, and finally, after a little confusion, he gains access 
to memory, to understanding and insight. (Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 498) 
In this account it is hard not to view consciousness as a burden or curse. The person in an 
automatic state is subject to 'freedom' and 'release from conscious control.' Is there any 
other way to read these terms in this context than as conferring qualitatively positive 
attributes or characteristics to the person concemed? Certainly Penfield seems envious; to 
be without 'conscious control' is to be released into a freedom otherwise unavailable. 
Consciousness retums as an inhibitory curse, and its attributes are self-awareness and 
self-consciousness; in this light 'memory,' 'understanding' and 'insight' fall to the patient 
as burdens. It is the first fall, after which there can be no escape from self-consciousness 
and no return to automatic desire. Consciousness is the key to the chambers of memory, 
understanding and insight and these are doors we might better keep closed. This brings to 
mind an image of Penfield at a border, wishing there were a way he could persuade the 
immigrants to leave their luggage at the crossing. 
Is it naive to suggest that Gage is liberated by his change in character? We don't 
know if the adjustments Gage had to make, in becoming a different character, were 
difficult or not, required much adjustment or not, hurt or confused or bereaved Gage or 
not. We only know that Gage made these adjustments and those around him did not. If 
you think that consciousness is a facet of every waking state, consider days spent at the 
beach: the bright and reflected light, the undifferentiated sea and sky, the very distant 
horizon, the boats sailing toward the open sea. On days like this doesn't one question 
what normally passes for thought? Isn't ordinary thought better described as the noise 
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13. Days spent at the beach: the bright and refiected light. 
(Image reproduced from Nutting and Bowles, 2000, p. 114) 
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made by anxiety? Aren't we safer the less we submit ourselves to a conscious control? 
On the occasions we felt safe as children, could we tell the reasons why? What concerns 
one is the background to whatever it is one consciously considers, and this is out of our 
control in the ordinary conscious way. Mastery is not always the sagacious route to 
wisdom. 
It doesn't seem to have been Gage, ever, who complained of a lack of continuity. 
Gage doesn't seem to have despaired that the co-ordinates of his personality had changed, 
or that he now felt so different he no longer knew the parameters of himself, or that he 
seemed to have slipped by degrees into another way of being that he could no longer 
claim to be himself. Gage seems to have carried on as before, without a very different 
temperamental response to circumstantial changes he either suffered or sought. The 
career he chose required dexterity and physical strength. He was bold enough to travel to 
Santiago in Chile in a business venture that required him to drive a six-horse carriage, 
caring for horses, luggage and human cargo. He was consistent enough to follow this 
profession for eight years. It was hard work and his health deteriorated and yet he 
persisted. 
Gage seems to have carried on as before, with a not very different temperamental 
response to the very different co-ordinates of his self. Gage adapted to these changes with 
or without equanimity. This might be said to be a common procedure. Don't we all 
negotiate changes with an adjustment to our temperamental view of things that those 
around us could not characterise as large or small, trying or facile? Is there any law of 
correspondence between cause and effect in this adjustment to changes in our intemal or 
external environment? Knowledge of certain things lead one to feel that the world is to us 
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like a distant star, that may have died long before we see it. It may be that Gage could no 
longer perform the role of Thineas Gage' that he had been wont to do and by which 
others would recognise him. Isn't it always the case that the co-ordinates of our world 
(inner and outer) may change so much that we can no longer be thought to be who we 
have habitually taken ourselves to be, or who we have habitually been taken to be? These 
changes might occur under any circumstances, even the most ostensibly mundane or 
habitual. We might become this 'other' by no other means than doing what we ordinarily 
do. The role we play out for ourselves and for an observing public may no longer suit our 
outlook or circumstance, and we may slip into another disguise and another way of being. 
Damasio has this to say in his neuroscientific study of emotion: 
When states of emotion tend to become fairly frequent or even continuous over long 
periods of time, it is preferable to refer to them as moods rather than emotions. I 
believe moods should be distinguished from background emotions; a particular 
background can be sustained over time to create a mood. If people think you are 
*moody' it is because you have been sounding a prevailing emotional note (perhaps 
related to sadness or anxiety) consistendy for a good part of the time or maybe you 
have changed your emotional tune unexpectedly and frequently. Fifty years ago you 
would have been called 'neurotic,' but nobody is neurotic anymore. 
Moods can be pathological, and we speak, then, of mood disorders. Depression and 
mania are the standard examples. You are depressed when the emotion sadness is 
dragged on for days, weeks, and months, when melancholic thoughts and crying and 
loss of appetite, sleep, and energy are not a single burst or a gentle wave but a 
continuous mode of being, physically and mentally. The same applies to mania. It is 
one thing to jump with joy at the right event or to be enthusiastic about your 
prospects in life, it is another to sustain the joy and exuberance on for days on end, 
justifiably or not. 
Because moods are dragged-out emotions along with the consequent feelings, moods 
carry over time the collections of responses that characterise emotions: endochrine 
changes, autonomic nervous system changes, musculoskeletal changes, and changes in 
the mode of processing images. When this whole package of reactions is deployed 
persistently and inappropriately over long periods of time, the cost to the individual so 
affected is prohibitive. (Damasio, 2000, p. 341) 
It was never Gage who complained of feeling so thoroughly different that he must be 
considered as another, stranger kind of person than he had been used to being. It was 
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third parties, work colleagues as reported by a physician, who commented that he *could 
no longer be considered to be Gage.' Gage just got on with things as he now took them to 
be, and lived the life dictated by his desires, thoughts, emotions and responsibilities as he 
felt them to be, just as we all do in any circumstance. If anything, post-injury Gage seems 
to have adopted the role of being *Gage' with more gusto and conviction than he had 
before the injury. Post-injury, Gage's engagement with life seems to have been more 
thorough than previously; and i f his approach seems to have been more selfish or more in 
accordance with his desires, isn't this an adjustment we could all make, much to our 
family's chagrin or panic? 
Madness doesn't have to be regarded as an illness. Why not as a sudden - more or less 
sudden - change of character? 
Everybody is (or most are) mistrustful, & perhaps more so towards their relations, 
than towards others. Is there any reason for mistrust? Yes & no. Reasons can be given 
for it, but they are not compelling. Why shouldn't someone suddenly become much 
more mistrustful of people? Why not much more withdrawn? or devoid of love? Don't 
people get like this even in the ordinary course of events? - Where is the line to be 
drawn here between will & ability? Is it that I will not open my heart to anyone any 
longer, or that I cannot ? If so much can lose its attraction, why not everything? If 
someone is wary even in ordinary life, why shouldn't he - & perhaps suddenly -
become much more wary? And much more inaccessible? (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 62e) 
Gage doesn't seem to have been hindered beyond the third party claims regarding the 
lack of continuity in his performance, as if this were a film set and he was failing to stay 
in character. Whatever changes Phineas Gage underwent he seemed more capable of 
adjusting, or accepting, or adapting than those around him who watched this apparent 
change in his behaviour. At what point does it require a third party to recognize whether 
or not one is being who one is? Or to remind one that not only is one not being oneself, 
but that one has never been who one truly is? Consider addiction: M feel myself again' 
(now that I have administered some foreign chemical agent into my bloodstream). *I feel 
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more myself when high'. How more so? And this is not self-deception is it? Consider 
anti-depressants: ' I feel myself again when medicated with prescription drugs'. More like 
myself, more my old self again, free of the burden of depression or psychosis that 
prevented me being myself. And yet unmedicated I don't feel this way. Surely I know 
how much myself I averagely feel myself to be, and how that quantity or quality changes 
when the drug is administered? ' I like being this person more than that'. 
I prefer myself when I exhibit the qualities of bravery, or generosity. This is only 
partly cultural. The cultural influence stops at the qualitative point that my joy begins, my 
preference: 'This feels better than that, now feels better than the average, there is a 
qualitative difference between this moment and another and I am now more pleased than 
then'; culturally it matters why, qualitatively it matters not (except in learning how to 
make it a habit). 
What do I think is wrong with the common neuroscientific readings of the Phineas 
Gage story (aside from their proven detachment from primary sources)? Why is my 
reading different? In Solms and Tumbull's account of Gage (2002), and in Damasio's 
(1994), the emphasis is on distinctions and an extraordinary transfer between opposites of 
character. Their accounts represent Gage's perceived change as an unbridgeable gap in 
character coherence. They seem to indicate a suspension of disbelief is necessary to 
having faith in a coherence of character (Gage's or anyone's), and that this suspension of 
disbelief was confounded or foiled by the about-turn apparent in Gage's character. A lack 
of continuity in Gage's behaviour foils our belief in his continued presence. Where is 
Gage for the last eleven years of his life i f this is 'no longer Gage'? In my account I 
wanted less of an emphasis on extraordinary change from one distinct entity to another. 
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and more a Huid and constant slippage between definitions which it is provably (in this 
case at least) erroneous to believe in. Distinctions are misleading in this instance because 
they indicate discrete entities, even self-contained states of being. In Gage's case it is this 
fallacious transfer from Jekyll to Hyde, from respected foreman to profane itinerant that 
misleads us with its description of a binary reversal of character. 
Let me give you a related example from the science of genetics. Many of us are quite 
attached to our distinction as one gender or another, being specifically male or female. 
We might regard our distinct genitalia as proof of our designated gender, as undeniable 
biological determinant of our gendered role. For this, we assume, is an outward 
correlative of chromosomatic or hormonal determinism. We are this or that. Hormones, 
even, are gendered. Here is Lesley Rogers from her book Sexing the Brain (1999): 
Just as we assign individuals to the categories of female and male, so we refer to the 
male and female sex hormones. Testosterone is referred to as a male sex hormone and 
oestrogen and progesterone are referred to as female sex hormones. As a result, we 
tend to think that only males have testosterone and only females have oestrogen and 
progesterone. This is not the case. Both females and males secrete all three sex 
hormones, although they do so from different organs. For example, whereas males 
secrete testosterone from the testes, females secrete it from the adrenal glands. On 
average, males have more testosterone than females, but there is a considerable 
overiap, with many women having higher levels of testosterone in their bloodstream 
than many males. Similariy, although oestrogen and progesterone are referred to as 
female sex hormones, there are times when men have higher levels of these hormones 
than women. In women the levels vary according to the menstrual cycle and, during 
one phase of the cycle, the levels of both these hormones in the bloodstream of a 
woman are lower than the levels of the same hormones in men. Also, after the age of 
about fifty years, men have on average higher levels of oestrogen and progesterone 
than do most women. All of these facts show that hormonal distinctions between the 
sexes are not as great as we usually think. Referring to the hormones as either male or 
female constructs an absolute division that misrepresents the biology of the sexes. 
Other hormones come into the picture, too. For example, androstenedione is another 
so-called male hormone, or androgen, but it tends to be present at higher levels in 
women than in men. Biology is never as simple as some would have us believe. There 
are more sex hormones than the four mentioned so far. They are all steroid hormones, 
meaning that they have different and interacting effects on the development of the 
genitals and other parts of the anatomy. They also have different effects on the brain. 
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One such hormone, 5-a-dihydrotestosterone, causes the genitals to develop into the 
male form (that is, it leads to growth of the penis and to the testes descending into the 
scrotum). (Rogers, 1999, p. 32) 
The human body produces 5-a-dihydrotestosterone from testosterone through the 
action of an enzyme called reductase. The human body produces no 5-a-
dihydrotestosterone without the reductase enzyme. There are two families, one in Texas 
in the United States and one in the Dominican Republic (Rogers, 1999, p. 33), who have 
a genetic condition that means the males in the families don't produce this reductase 
enzyme until they reach puberty. As a consequence the pre-pubescent males have a 
feminine physique and appear to the world as girls and are raised as such. They are only 
'genetically' and chromosomally male, and to the world they are girls with all the 
consequent cultural distinctions. At puberty their bodies begin production of the 
reductase enzyme, and to convert testosterone to 5-a-dihydrotestosterone, and their 
penises grow and their testes descend. They appear to physically change sex and from 
puberty they live as men. 
The question might be asked: how do these children adapt at puberty when their 
bodies change from an outwardly female form to having all the appearance of 
masculinity? And the answer is: they adapt. We all adapt at puberty when our bodies 
change in a way that seems hormonally and logically incomprehensible. For where are 
we provided with knowledge or tools to comprehend such an illusory formal shifting, 
deceptive and polymorphous? Nature/biology is indeterminate but culture is determinate; 
that is why so many concepts fall through the gaps in between, and we feel undescribed 
by our own language. 
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We can be oblivious of the largest changes taking place in our perception. Books by 
neuroscientists always include exemplary case studies of patients suffering from hemi-
spatial neglect. For example, in a 1988 essay, Edoardo Bisiach describes his patient 
T.R.': 
As a consequence of a right-hemisphere stroke, RR. had a severe left hemiplegia and 
hemineglect anosognosia and obstinately refused to admit that his left arm belonged to 
him, unshakenly maintaining that it was the examiner's arm. Because he was an 
educated man, he could maintain relatively fluent conversation on a variety of topics 
without disclosing any sign of intellectual impairment. Indeed, he had himself supplied 
a detailed and exact anamnesis, except for one probably revealing particular he had 
left out the report of a surgical operation he had undergone a few years before for 
removal of a left inguinal hemiation. On one occasion, the examiner placed P.R.'s left 
hand on the bedclothes, between his own hands and asked the patient whose hands 
they were: unhesitatingly, P.R. replied that they were the examiner's hands. 
Questioned as to whether he had ever met a three-handed man, P.R., pointing to the 
three arms in front of him, answered that because the examiner had three arms he also 
must have three hands. Although one day P.R. spontaneously commented on the 
apparent singularity of some of his statements, he never questioned their soundness. 
Notwithstanding his expressed conviction, he too manifested no desire to leave his bed 
or to do anything that presupposed use of his left limbs, (Bisiach and Geminiani, 
1991, p. 34) 
In the chapter of this thesis titled Making Up Stories, I describe Anton's Syndrome. 
Persons described as having Anton's Syndrome arc cortically blind but assert that they 
can see. This seems to me another example of major changes passing within us seemingly 
unnoticed by the person those changes must affect most directly and intimately. 
In his book Altered Egos Todd E. Feinberg (2001) describes his patient 'Seymour': 
Seymour came to my office with the complaint that he was *a little nervous.' He was 
an older man, well into his seventies. He was immaculate in appearance, spoke in a 
refined manner, and carried himself like a real gentleman. He was now retired, but had 
been an accountant his entire adult life. His only complaint was that he occasionally 
gets a little 'nervous' and he would like to try some medication that might calm him 
down. The only unusual thing occurred when he went over his past medical history. 
Initially, Seymour denied any surgical procedures, but he subsequently recalled that, 
indeed, he did have a 'bit of surgery' on his brain when he was much younger, perhaps 
when he was in his late teens or eariy twenties. He was not sure why the surgery was 
performed, but he thought it may have been for 'nerves.' In any event, that was a long 
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time ago. 
Now I was really curious. Before I treated Seymour with any medications, I 
suggested we get a CAT scan and see exactly what was done to his brain. When I saw 
the scan, once again I was amazed. Some time in his past, Seymour had had a frontal 
lobotomy, and substantial portions of his frontal lobes had been removed. I assume 
Seymour had the operation for a psychiatric condition, but to this day neither Seymour 
nor I know why the operation was performed. 
Patients like Seymour do not come along every day. Indeed, I have never since seen 
a patient who was unaware that they had had a lobotomy. (Feinberg, 2001, p. 104) 
Most concepts of 'self - from philosophy, from neuroscience, from psychology and 
folk psychology - pre-suppose that we have an access to our moods, thoughts and 
motives of a kind that seemingly we do not. These concepts of self also pre-suppose a 
process of 'self selection' we which we can't actually lay claim to. Change is the normal 
way of things. Even drastic change is miraculously steered through. That is why it seems 
preposterous to pronounce that Gage is 'no longer Gage'. If he is no longer Gage then 
what is the alternative? 
John Locke would have me, you or Gage as an assemblage: 
That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whose particles, 
whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are 
touched, and are affected by, and are conscious of good or harm that happens to them, 
are a part of ourselves; i.e. of our thinking conscious self. Thus the limbs of his body is 
to everyone a part of himself, he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an 
hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness we had of its heat, cold, and 
other affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than 
the remotest part of matter. (Locke, 1689/1997, p. 303) 
Any recourse to phantom-limb phenomena would dispute this Locke-ian picture of a 
human self. Any recourse to the asomatognosia (see P.R.'s story above) would also refute 
this Locke-ian claim to *one body one self,' as would examples of conjoined twins and 
Sperry's *split-brained' persons (see Chapter Five: Other Selves and Chapter Six: 
Making Up Stories in this thesis). The self in neuroscience (despite their evidence to the 
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contrary) most often resembles this Locke-ian model. Or it resembles the Cartesian 
dualism of mind plus body with brain as interface: if the brain is irreversibly' destroyed 
(as in 'brain death') then the mind is cut loose from the body and the person (as 
composite of mind/soul plus body) has died. As D.AJones has put it: 
If personal identity comprises the identity of conscious attributes (rather than 
anything *underiying') then it seems it can be lost by degrees. A phrase like *He is 
not the person he used to be,' could be taken literally. Over time persons would 
gradually cease to be themselves and become other persons. (Jones, 2000, p, 103) 
Is this not the common picture of the self in science and in folk psychology? I am 
reminded of an instruction from an Edwardian manual on ventriloquism: 
A performer, i f an artist, or say a man of imagination, after a time feels that the doll is 
an individual. He knows him and would never make him say anything out of keeping 
with the doll's character. The performer's hands move after practice with the speech of 
the doll, and instead of moving his own lips he just as mechanically moves the mouth 
of the figure. (Ganthony, 1920, p. 88) 
Would we rather hold ourselves to be a fabricated whole, than accept the ungathered 
attributes to which we are subject? 
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Chapter Nine: Death and Unconsciousness 
AH too often the problem of defining disease is debated as i f it were a question of 
science, medicine, or logic. By doing so, we ignore the fact that definitions are made 
by persons, that different persons have different interests, and hence that differing 
definitions of disease may simply reflect the divergent interests and needs of the 
definers. (Szasz, 1987/1997, p. 17) 
Substitute *death' for 'disease' in the above quotation and you have the point of this 
chapter. In the previous chapters of this thesis I have shown 'consciousness' to be a 
vague construct, ill-defined but accepted in medical, philosophical, and psychological 
discourse. Whereas the term may have utilitarian value in folk psychological discourse. 
'consciousness' does not bear analytical scrutiny. The constituent factors comprising 
'consciousness' are an arbitrary set rather than the systematically related set of 
constituents required of 'natural kinds'. This thesis has shown 'consciousness' to be a 
term so loosely defined that it leaves users unsure to what they are referring. Whereas this 
is common and unproblematic for terms in their everyday use, science and philosophy 
need a temiinology that is firmly defined. Nor are referents of the terms 'mind', 'self, 
'Intelligence' or 'memory' substantiated by recourse to the sciences, by physics, 
evolutionary psychology or behaviourism. Despite this, studies of 'consciousness' and 
'mind' proliferate in those disciplines: 
The concem with consciousness is now to be seen wherever you look, but typically in 
significant places: in the titles of collections, in Presidential Addresses summarizing 
the general state of discipline, or, when a textbook is consulted, usually either in the 
preface or in the concluding chapter. The notion crops up rather infrequently in the 
bread-and-butter reports of work in experimental psychology. Philosophers interested 
in the work of their laboratory colleagues share this ambivalent attitude to the problem; 
some, like Nagel suggest that it is in principle impossible for an objective science to do 
justice to subjective experience, while others, like Dennett, prod cognitive 
psychologists along by sketching an outline theory of consciousness within which 
research into the phenomenon might proceed. (Wilkes, 1984, p. 224) 
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Puppeteer Ilka Schbnbein ventriloquizes for her own corpse. 
(Image reproduced from Blumenthal, 2005, p. 211) 
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The preceding quote comes from a paper that Wilkes wrote twenty years ago, but i f 
anything neuroscience is more than ever interested in promoting its claims regarding 
'consciousness'. Philosophy of mind concerns itself with little else and produces books 
by the yard in an attempt to re-draw these second order concepts in its own image. This 
emphasis has the effect of forwarding 'consciousness' as a salient topic for enquiry, and 
worthy of research within scientific disciplines. If it is not 'consciousness' in the title of 
every book then it is 'mind' or 'self. Far from being the 'hard topic' of research in these 
'cognitive sciences', it seems to be the only topic (and an easy and obvious one at that). 
Given that topics thrown up by contemporary medicine (stem cell research, transplants, 
etc.) are requiring of voluminous bio-ethical consideration, second-order categories such 
as 'consciousness' might be regarded as shadow boxing. 
As this chapter will show, this vagueness of definition surrounding 'consciousness' is 
problematic not just when describing ictal or post-ictal automatic states, or hallucinations, 
but when pronouncing death. The pronouncement of death would seem to require 
'consciousness' to be defined in broad terms; but this definition is equally the subject of 
debate, indecision, and contest. It is here that the term's lack of clarity, or lack of a 
referent 'natural kind', is most distinct. The difference between 'alive' or 'dead' is most 
significant medically, legally, and in any number of personal ways; it is in this realm of 
discourse that the linguistically ill-defined terms cognate to 'consciousness' are 
constituted by agreement rather than by testing. The terms of its definition are, besides, 
determined by a consensus which is curiously previous to 'medical proof. 
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Another impulse toward writing this chapter came during an interview I once heard', 
between a journalist and a surgeon. The surgeon was being asked about statistics relating 
to the number of patients who died during surgical operations. The surgeon said that 
patients who could be considered Tit ' (in the athletic sense) were twice as likely to 
survive an operation than those who were considered *unfit'. When the surgeon was 
asked why this should be, he said: "Those who are unfit are that bit closer to death 
anyway." 
D. A. Shewmon and E. S. Shewmon (2004) have written of 'death' as a semiotic 
problem, describing the paucity of distinctions in medical terminology referring to death 
and dying. They compare the medical practitioner faced with 'the death event' to 
pioneers learning west Greenlandic terms referring to snow: 
Now imagine that pioneers from the tropics migrated to the arctic and suddenly had to 
leara how to survive there. Their very language, which allows them to see only 'snow' 
and 'ice' all around, is itself detrimental to survival. They would do well to learn the 
Eskimo vocabulary in order to focus attention on important aspects of their new 
reality, critical distinctions regarding that white stuff they so carelessly refer to as 
'snow'. 
This is precisely the situation we find ourselves in regarding 'death'. We have 
migrated through human history into the modem !CU, bringing with us the linguistic 
baggage of a relatively simple concept of death for which medically real and ethically 
critical distinctions lack words in the common vocabulary. The best we can do is to 
speak in awkward phrases, such as 'the point in time beyond which cardiac 
auto-resuscitation is impossible.' To ask which of these technological mumbo-jumbos 
is really 'death' may be perhaps as linguistically and epistemologically inappropriate 
as asking an Eskimo which of sullamiq, qaniit, nittaalaq,...is really *snow*. 
(Shewmon and Shewmon, 2004, p. 96) 
The problematic key terms relating to self in human kind: consciousness, 
unconsciousness, mind, memory, intelligence, etc. might equally be considered as 
semantic ailments. Maybe the problems would go away if we stopped using the terms, or 
I 'm sorry I cannot trace this reference at all; perhaps I dreamt it? 
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got the terminology right? In Is Consciousness Important? Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984) 
puts her position: 
I shall question the existence of *a problem of consciousness', suggesting that in fact 
consciousness as such is not at all important, and that psychology, and the 
neurosciences would lose nothing, and gain much, by refusing to chase this 
will-o'-the-wisp. It should, though, become clear that this is not a particularly radical 
suggestion. It is much tamer than a more extreme argument to the effect that 
commonsense psychology and the philosophy of mind need not bother with the notion 
either; 1 shall conclude by defending briefly this further claim. (Wilkes, 1984, p. 224) 
The PhD thesis that you are reading broadly conforms to a Humboldtian view of 
language: "Distinctions in language derive from the awareness of distinctions in reality; 
but the reverse is also true: the perception of distinctions in the real worid is facilitated 
when a linguistic distinction already exists" (Shewmon and Shewmon, 2004, p. 102). 
When 'theory of mind' (described in the chapter titled Hallucinations in this thesis) is 
considered from this Humboldtian perspective, one can see that a picture of the self is the 
self. How one conceives of the self colours how one sees anything: one's moral attitude, 
one's perception of others, one's conception of one's own self. 
What a person values depends, basically, on what he believes himself to be. If he 
believes that he is an isolated hunk of protoplasm, struggling to survive in a hostile 
worid, or a physical organism constructed by genes to promote their own survival, 
then his values will tend to be very different from those of a person who regards 
himself as a being with a mind-like aspect that makes conscious choices that control in 
part his own future, and are also integral parts of the global process that generates the 
unfolding of the universe. (Stapp, 1993/2004, p. 270) 
When 'theory of mind' is mistaken for a theory rather than a practice, there is an implicit 
conception of the self that is accepted with it. Neuroscience and philosophy of mind 
perpetuate this error. To pre-suppose internal co-ordinates to outward behaviours and 
emotions is to posit a physiological 'control centre' correspondent to the behaviours of a 
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self. It is to conceive of the self as glyphic remainder of neurological ur-text. If this 
neurological sub-strata for the self exists, presumably one could put one's hands on it. 
The brain death debate is important because it forces neurologists to state their case: 
that they believe consciousness is neuroanatomically 'placed' in the cerebral cortex, and 
that this is the sole residence of 'consciousness'. In 1988 Dr. R. E. Cranford, neurologist 
and former chairman of the Ethics and Humanities Subcommittee of the American 
Academy of Neurology, wrote a paper entitled The Persistent Vegetative Slate: The 
Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight) (1988). As might be guessed from the 
subtitle of this paper, there is no equivocation regarding the neurological residence for 
consciousness: "The cerebral hemispheres...contain the function of consciousness or 
awareness (which is more precisely located in the outer layers of the cerebral cortex)..." 
(Cranford, 1988, p. 27). In a 1987 paper entitled Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral 
(Constitutional) Standard For Human Personhood, Cranford and Smith write: 
It is a fundamental fact of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology that consciousness and 
the capacity to feel pain and suffering are functions of the neocortex. When a physician 
can determine on physical examination that there are no neocortical functions present, 
the patient is completely unconscious and has no capacity to experience pain or 
suffering...These views on the medical reality of the PVS [Persistent Vegetative 
State] patient are scientific medical positions - statements of fact, not values. Whatever 
one's opinions on quality of life, euthanasia, autonomy, privacy, ensoulment, abortion, 
or other deeply held opinions on the meaning of life, whatever one's judicial or 
constitutional philosophy: judicial activism, judicial restraint, legal positivism, legal 
realism, or original intent, the medical reality remains the same. (Cranford and Smith, 
1987, p. 237 and p. 241) 
There is no doubt or hesitancy in the above quoted article in its use of the terms 
'consciousness' or 'completely unconscious', or of confiating consciousness with the 
capacity to feel pain, and the sense of these words is intended as entirely transparent. Nor 
is there any doubt as to the medical ability to determine neocortical function by physical 
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examination, or to determine the capacity for suffering in another. The certainty of these 
views translates to the practice of teaching medicine. 
Every medical student in introductory neuroscience learns a basic set of facts about 
the brain, among which the following two are key to the issue of 'brain death': 
1. The brain is central integrator of the body 
2. With respect to consciousness: 
(a) the cerebral hemispheres (particularly the neocortex) mediate the content of 
consciousness, and 
(b) the brain stem (specifically the ascending reticular activating system) mediates 
arousal. 
These principles are so fundamental and so universally accepted as established beyond 
doubt that their truth is simply taken for granted in professional circles. (Shewmon, 
1997, p, 35) 
The certainty of these terms pertains also in neuroscience, and in philosophy of mind. 
Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained (1991) is the most influential work in the 
'philosophy of mind'. Dennett may not be as 'good' a philosopher as W. V. Quine or 
Thomas Nagel, but to discuss matters relating to philosophy and mind is to contend with 
the influence of Dennett and Consciousness Explained. Throughout his writing Dennett 
uses terms taken from anatomy and physiology and from neuroscience; he will , for 
instance, refer to cerebral achromatopsia to support his theories regarding qualia 
(Dennett, 1988, p. 64). Why? What is it that recourse to medical terminology confers on a 
philosophical argument? It confers authority; it is to inarguably substantiate one's 
standpoint. It says: ' I f you want proof, here I have 'the body' itself to back me up'. The 
facts of the body are owned by medical consensus; medical statements regarding the 
body have a brute materialism and absolutism whatever the metaphysics inhabiting 
medical metaphor. 
There is little certainty in philosophy and plenty of certainty in medicine; medicine is 
the realm of haptic actuality. So what are the medical 'facts' of death and how is one to 
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interpret them? In 1968, The Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the 
Definition of Brain Death proposed whole brain death as the criterion for pronouncing a 
person dead. This newly proposed criterion for death was quickly accepted by physicians, 
philosophers and the general public. Historically the belief of Judeo-Christian peoples 
had most commonly been that breath constituted life and that permanent cessation of 
breath equals death. Or they accorded with the Ancient Greek belief that pemianent 
cessation of heartbeat equals death. It goes without saying that even with these traditional 
criteria for death people were often buried alive. Great pandemic disasters and the need 
for speedy burial increased the risk of premature burial. As a consequence Winslow, in 
1740, argued putrefaction as the only reliable confirmation of death. 
The mid-20^ century invention of mechanical ventilators and cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation meant that a person could survive massive brain damage with their other 
major organs still functioning. The 1968 ruling by the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee meant 
that a patient could be pronounced dead even whilst their blood still circulates their body 
and their respiratory system functions (with the assistance of a ventilator to expand their 
diaphragm and provide oxygenated air). The 1981 report of the President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Biomedical and Behavioural Research confirmed the 
ruling that death occurs when the entire brain, including the brain stem, permanently 
ceases to function. 
There are three approaches to the issue of which parts of the brain must be destroyed 
before the individual concerned is considered dead: 
(i) The whole-brain formulation requires the irreversible destruction of the whole 
encephalon: cerebral hemispheres, brain stem, cerebellum. 
(ii) The higher brain formulation defines death as 'the irreversible loss of what 
constitutes the human essence of a being' and considers the criterion that fulfils that 
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definition to be the irreversible loss of consciousness and all cognitive functions 
following the destruction of the neocortex. 
(iii) The brain-stem formulation comes from the United Kingdom. It considers that the 
total and irreversible destruction of the brain stem is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for death, irrespective of the possible persistence of activities in the brain 
hemispheres. In some way, the brain-stem formulation is the mirror image of the 
higher brain formulation. (Guerit, 2004, p. 16) 
Let us consider the criteria established in the United Kingdom. The Conference of 
Royal Medical Colleges and their Faculties, in 1976, formalized a process of decision-
making that had, in any case, been practised by doctors since the advance in intensive 
care techniques in the mid-1950s. Since those technical advances of the 1950s doctors 
had made decisions as to when treatment was burdensome for patients and families and 
bound to end in failure. Often in consultation with medical colleagues and the patient's 
family, doctors would decide to abandon treatment or not to embark on it in the first 
place. This withdrawal of treatment was not sanctioned by law but appears never to have 
been followed by legal action. The protocol established by the 1976 Conference provided 
a "uniformity of practice and a reassurance for those having to make such decisions" 
(Hill , 2000, p. 160). 
The recommendations of the 1976 Conference required pre-conditions of a known 
potentially fatal condition, and bedside tests of brain stem function: 
To establish diagnostic criteria of such rigor that on their fulfilment the mechanical 
ventilator can be switched off, in the secure knowledge that there is no possible chance 
of recovery. (Hill , 2001, p. 160) 
Although the Conference refers to these criteria as 'diagnostic' they are of course 
'prognostic,' as ventilation is discontinued with the intent of allowing the patient to die. 
Paul A. Byrne and Walt F. Weaver have written that: 
The brain's ceasing to function does not imply a priori its destruction but only 
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absence of physiological activity at the time of evaluation. If the persistence of absence 
of physiologic activity is accompanied by asystole, hypotension, and other detrimental 
responses, then this tends quickly, i f not instantaneously, to destruction of the brain 
and disintegration of the body that we call death. However, with immediate institution 
of life support measures, the brain tissue may end up being only stunned. Often at the 
time of the initial absence of physiological functioning, this will have caused the 
patient to be declared 'brain dead'. (Byrne and Weaver, 2004, p. 44) 
In 1978 pressure from the Transplant Advisory Panel led to a Memorandum that 
equated this same condition, established by means of exactly the same clinical tests, as 
"the stage at which a patient becomes truly dead, because by then all functions of the 
brain have permanendy and irreversibly ceased" (Hill, 2001, p. 160). 
There has always been confusion and mystery surrounding the establishing of a 'time 
of death'. The Catholic Church allows last rites (which are only given to the dying and 
not the dead) to be administered some minutes after the first signs of 'clinical death'. This 
is due to the historical uncertainty regarding exact time of death. Although the state of 
New Jersey in the United States has the same brain death criteria for pronouncing death 
as other American states, it permits Orthodox Jews to define and treat their 'brain dead' 
relatives as alive. Which paints the picture for me of a patient of, for instance, Protestant 
faith and a patient of Orthodox Jewish faith lying in adjacent hospital beds with identical 
head injuries, the one patient pronounced dead and the other not. These are not only 
anachronistic points of law or medicine; by what else do we discem the living from the 
dead? It is doctor and coroner, and church who pronounce death. 
Since 1968, irreversibility has been a prerequisite for brain death determination in all 
the different sets of brain death tests. The common medical definition of the term 
'irreversible' would be 'that which is incapable of being undone (by contemporary 
medical technology).' The physicians Joanne Lynn and R. D. Cranford applied this 
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concept of irreversibility to the determination of brain death and identified four different 
plausible times of death: 
T l is the time of onset of coma and apnea; T2 is the time at which the neurological 
physical examination shows that the relevant brain functions have ceased; T3 is the 
time at which the cessation of brain functions becomes irreversible; and T4 is the time 
at which the cessation of brain functions can be proved to be irreversible. Although 
any one of these times constitutes a plausible time of death, I advocate for using T4. 
...Most or all of the brain damage leading to death occurs at t imeTl . TimeT2 is when 
a physician first determines the loss of brain functions. Time T3 often may be 
unapparent at the time but can be determined in retrospect when the functions can be 
proved to be lost permanently at time T4. 
Despite the fact that the 'moment' of brain death arguably occurs at time T3, a brain 
death determination must employ the time T4. Brain death is determined in retrospect 
in the same manner as cardiopulmonary death: by showing the irreversible cessation of 
the relevant vital functions. In declaring death, physicians note the time of the 
examination at which they certified that all vital functions have ceased, and formally 
declare death to have occurred at that time, despite the obvious fact that the vital 
functions had ceased eariier. Only in forensic cases is much attention paid to 
identifying the exact earlier moment when those vital functions ceased irreversibly. 
(Bemat, 2004, p. 162) 
The first words of the 1968 Committee report are: "Our primary purpose is to define 
irreversible coma as a new criterion for death" (Byrne and Weaver, 2004, p. 43). What 
does irreversible mean? A prognosis considered irreversible in 1968 would not 
necessarily be considered irreversible in 2004. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, 
what the 1968 Committee report described as 'diagnostic' is actually 'prognostic': that is, 
it requires a forecast that the 'brain dead' patient will quickly die without intensive care. 
Advances in intensive care make it increasingly possible to keep alive the bodies of 
patients who currently would be classified as brain dead. Disregarding future technology: 
the potential for recovery from a vegetative state cannot at present be reliably predicted 
by clinical or neurodiagnostic tests. 
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Rather than a binary process (life/death), these detenminations of death describe it as a 
syndrome, "a cluster of related attributes, with a probabilistic diagnosis" (Hughes, 2004, 
p. 79). To determine brain death requires multiple criteria: 
However, the very diagnosis of 'brain death' militates against any further attempt to 
evaluate outcome of these different critical subsets of legally deceased patients, since 
their true physiologic death comes when they are utilized for vital organ donation, 
subjects for teaching or research, or when life-support efforts are discontinued. 
(Byme and Weaver, 2004, p. 44) 
To seek a unitary moment defined as 'death' is to be bound by etymology to require its 
irreversibility and singularity. This is culturally constructed; death can be configured 
differently in other languages than it is in English: 
In Nivkh (older name: Gilyak; spoken on mainland Sakhalin and opposite mainland by 
fewer than 1000 people).. .the verb corresponding most closely to 'die' is -mu. The 
interesting feature of this verb is that it also corresponds to the English 'become'. 
There is thus no word for 'die' in Nivkh which is really equivalent to the English. 
What might this imply for the worid-view of this culture, in contrast to ours, where, 
conversely, living is constant 'becoming' and dying is a ceasing to be? 
(Shewmon and Shewmon, 2004, p. 103) 
It is not uncommon in languages other than English to confiate the verb 'to die' with 
terms referring only to 'sickness'; or to indicate in referring to 'death' the passage to 
another life. 
Some languages have no equivalent for the English word 'death'. For example, in the 
Kovai language of Papua New Guinea, the verb um means 'to die', but the noun 
formed from it. umong. means not only 'death' but also mere 'sickness' (not 
necessarily fatal). There is no other obvious word for death or sickness. This may be 
quite common in Papua New Guinean languages. In Tok Pisin (English-based Creole of 
Papua New Guinea) 'he dies/is dead' is rendered em i dai. which can also mean that he 
is unconscious. To indicate what we call death they add an aspectual qualifier 
em i dai pinis (which can also mean something like 'he is already dead' and which is 
not available for the future tense) or dai olgeta ('die altogether'). These people's very 
language seems to reflect a world-view in which the demarcation between life and 
death lies more in the direction of life than we tend to think. (Shewmon and 
Shewmon, 2004, p. 102) 
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Here one has to conclude with the Wittgensteinian observation that even the broadest 
terms relating to human behaviour are culturally specific. Science is culturally specific. 
'Facts' regarding the self can only be said to be assumptions, and their foundations are in 
folk psychology not in neurons. 
There is a Heideggerian notion (Watts, 2001, p. 49) that we cannot know our own 
death; we can only ever know of the death of another. Just as Penfield's observations of 
automatic states required substantiation by a third party in distinguishing consciousness 
from unconsciousness, so death is something that can only be defined by the living. Just 
as Phineas Gage enacted his profound transformation of character only through third 
party descriptions and diagnosis, and through posthumous revision of primary sources, so 
the process of life turning to death is enacted within the semantic parameters of those left 
still breathing. Just as 'schizophrenia' is a diagnosis dependent on third party policing of 
the perimeter fence of good grammar, so death is declared conceptually and not by the 
visceral and irreversible progress of data, for others and not for the person most 
concerned. If death is semantically embodied, all the determinants and all the rights of 
recognition are with the living. 
Thus far, we have illustrated two attitudes towards death. The first, the oldest, the 
longest held, and the most common one, is the familiar resignation to the collective 
destiny of the species and can be summarized by the phrase, Et moriemur. and we 
shall all die. The second, which appeared in the twelfth century, reveals the importance 
given throughout the entire modem period to the self, to one's own existence, and can 
be expressed by another phrase, la mort de soi. one's own death. Beginning with the 
eighteenth century, man in western societies tended to give death a new meaning. He 
exalted it, dramatized it, and thought of it as disquieting and greedy. But he already 
was less concerned with his own death than with la mort de toi. the death of the other 
person. (Aries, 1974, p. 55) 
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16. What does death constitute in a figure which can be conceived of as vivified 
only by the performative act of a third party? - An Automata Autopsy. 
(Image reproduced from Blumenthal, 2005, p. 181) 
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In death, as in ventriloquism, the corpse is made to speak for someone else. Dummies are 
speaking things that seem to have a life away from the living. In a ventriloquist act the 
dummy seems to perform beyond the normal biological parameters, behaving in propria 
persona despite being physiologically inanimate. It is difTicult to conceive of death in a 
being never legitimately living; ventriloquist dummies live only by the ventriloquist act. 
A number of fictional representations of ventriloquism use this distinguishing feature to 
present a corpse that walks; what does death constitute in a figure which can be 
conceived of as vivified only by the performative act of a third party? 
In Devil Doll (1964) the crowd is never amazed by the act of ventriloquism per se: it 
is the puppet walking that draws the applause. The climax of the film, however, revolves 
around the voice-swapping of puppet Hugo and his ventriloquist 'The Great Vorelli'. 
Hugo is inhabited by the soul of a German dancer that 'The Great Vorclli ' murdered on 
stage, after having switched his soul to the wooden body of the puppet by means of some 
hypnotism. At the film's denoument Hugo the dummy speaks with the voice of The Great 
Vorelli, and The Great Vorelli speaks with the voice of Hugo. The voice is the only sign 
we have that another soul-swapping has taken place. 
This Great Vorelli's skill is that of any ventriloquist: that is, animating the puppet, 
though in this case by unorthodox means. The uncanny in the act is the animation of the 
puppet, and in providing the puppet's voice. These are Vorelli's skills and the skills of 
any ventriloquist. It is only Vorelli's uncannily great skill (apparent in the astonishment 
of his audience) that arouses suspicion in journalist Mark English. It is the puppet Hugo 
who cries for help and provides the crucial lead for English's investigation. Hugo tells the 
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journalist where and when his soul was stolen. It is the dummy who explains the enigma 
of ventriloquism. 
There are instances where patients remain sentient even under general anaesthetic 
(Channel Four, 2005). The patient is paralyzed by general anaesthetic but feels all the 
pain of the operation. The patient seems to *wake up' at some point, on the operating 
table, but, because paralyzed by anaesthesia, is unable to indicate to the surgeon or 
anaesthetist that they are in pain and can feel every scalpel-cut and suture. It seems to be 
a rare occurrence, but even so some people claim it has happened to them during more 
than one operation. It says something about the pragmatic stance of good doctors that 
they believe in the testimony of those patients who report experience of this 'anaesthetic 
sentience'. There is every reason to doubt the reports: it is such a rare occurrence, maybe 
they dreamt it? Does it indicate the *good faith' approach of doctor to patient, that doctors 
ordinarily trust the ability of the patient to know their own state of sentience? Or does it 
indicate the fallibility of anaesthesia, that it cannot be an exact science, that it is difficult 
to monitor (for what is one monitoring?)? 
Pain has long been a signifier of consciousness, or of the 'undeniable' qualia which 
guarantee the verisimilitude of epistemological experience. In 1963 Paul Feyerabend 
wrote in Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (an essay credited with first defining 
the concept of 'folk psychology' in philosophical terms), that: 
When 1 am in pain, there is no doubt, no possibility of a mistake. This certainly is not 
simply a psychological affair, it is not due to the fact that I am too strongly convinced 
to be persuaded of the opposite. It is much more related to a logical certainty: there is 
no possibility whatever of criticizing the statement. I might not show any physiological 
symptoms - but I never meant to include them into my assertion. I might not even 
show pain behaviour - but this is not part of the content of my statement either. Now if 
the difference between essence and appearance were applicable in the case of pains, 
then such certainty could not be obtained. It can be obtained as has just been 
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demonstrated. Hence, the difference does not apply and the postulation of a common 
object for mental processes and impressions of physiological processes cannot be 
carried out. (Feyerabend, 1963, p. 56) 
It is not so simple and straightforward a rule as ontological incorrigibility that bestows on 
pains the rights to epistemological presence. It is enlightening that the 'fail safe' to 
prevent against 'anaesthetic sentience' is to wake up the patient during surgery to ask 
them whether or not they are in pain despite the effects of the anaesthetic (Channel Four, 
2005). In his essay, Feyerabend goes on to say that, concerning the certainty of 
statements regarding mental processes, " it is their lack of content which is the source of 
their certainty" (1963, p. 56). Hence the potency of hypnotism as anaesthetic during 
surgery: it is only the patient who needs to be convinced regarding their lack of pain 
(Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975). 
During brain surgery, for instance surgery to deal with severe epilepsy (BBC One, 
2005) or Parkinson's disease, the patient is only locally anaesthetized (the matter of the 
brain seems to have no pain receptors). The reason for only locally anaesthetizing the 
patient is to enable the surgeon to speak to the patient during surgery. Brain function is 
only broadly localized, and the virtually indistinguishable matter of the brain proper 
requires the patient's assistance to monitor their faculty-impairment during surgery. 
There is a contrast of intent, however, when compared with the practice of waking up 
patients to guard against 'anaesthetic sentience'. In the locally anaesthetized brain 
surgery, patient vocal report is a marker of faculty, not of feeling. In contrast to the 
experiential qualities reported by those experiencing 'anaesthetic sentience' (pain, 
primarily), the vocal report of patients undergoing brain surgery is an indicator not of 
suffering but of underiying judgment. A brain surgery patient might begin to slur their 
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speech, or present as amnesiac in any number of distinct ways (forgetful as to the 
meaning of images, or words or context), but also may be unaware of qualitative change. 
The surgeon uses vocal report, in this instance, as marker of somatic change, of tissue 
damage, of cognitive fallibility: the symptoms are trusted because they contrast with the 
report of the patient and are considered as objective markers, with surgeon as primary 
assessor of their meaning. The patient's speech is indicative of something, though not 
necessarily what they are talking about. 
The laws regarding persons missing at sea, or missing in war, or just missing require 
those persons to be declared dead, for practical reasons. If there is some evidence that 
those missing persons are not certainly dead (they have, for instance, been shipwrecked, 
or taken hostage, or are in are hiding), then the declaration of their death follows a 
waiting period of years, or requires strong evidence that they have perished. But, as J. J. 
Hughes points out: 
The deadness of the missing person is also partly determined by our decision to 
mount a search mission or not, which is also true with the therapeutic situation of 
the 'do not resuscitate' order. The person in arrest with a DNR is much deader than 
the person in arrest subject to resuscitation. The non-heart-beating donor controversy 
has also made explicit what was implicit with DNRs; the intention to resuscitate a 
heart/breathing-arrested person partly determines when in the dying process a person 
is declared dead. (Hughes, 2(X)4, p. 83) 
Alan D. Shewmon (a neurologist) has pointed out a number of instances where people 
break the rule of semantic given, act beyond medical consensus and indicate the i l l -
defined terms which bestow life. Here there is animation where there should not be, and 
agency where there should not be power to act. 
I read with incredulity about this boy with hydranencephaly who was described as 
conscious, adaptively interactive with the environment and quite sociable. I knew for a 
'fact' that, due to the total absence of cerebral cortex (in the presence of an intact brain 
stem), hydranencephalic children are necessarily in a permanent vegetative state...As 
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the articles mentioned the adoptive mother's name and city, I was able to track her 
down through telephone information. After an introductory conversation, she verified 
all the claims and even more. For example, Andrew could scoot around the house on 
his back by pushing with his legs, without bumping into furniture; during the 
summer he would scoot through open doors onto the sun porch. He was obviously not 
only conscious but had at least rudimentary vision and voluntary motor functions...I 
was in a state of shock, amazed that a medical *fact' so certain as the necessity of the 
cortex for consciousness was evidently not true in all cases...Why did such outcomes 
not occur more often in cases of hydranencephaJy? Most likely, I suspected, because 
the prognosis of vegetative state universally told to parents tends to become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. fThis child was] given constant, loving nurturing, in contrast 
to most hydranencephalics, who are typically placed in a comer and only 
intermittently and perfunctorily attended to. Even neurologically normal infants, i f 
neglected and emotionally deprived, will fail to develop, especially in the areas of 
social relatedness. (Shewmon, 1997, p. 58) 
Shewmon has written of cases such as the above where accepted tenets regarding agency 
and volition are contested by the abilities of certain individuals to confound medical 
assumption. The cases of the children reported above not only provide evidence to 
contradict truisms of diagnosis but also the domain specificity of functional anatomy. 
Because these children almost entirely lack cerebral cortex, and ^consciousness* is 
axJomatically home to medically attributed *consciousness', the exhibited agency and 
motility of the children refutes and disproves consensually explicit medical dogma. By 
the considered pattern of orthodoxy regarding physiologically localized presence for 
'consciousness', the children described above should not be able to exhibit the skills that 
they do. 
Shewmon goes further, finding evidence to confound the principles by which death is 
considered manifest. Shewmon has provided evidence of a person whose continued 
existence beyond the parameters ascribed to death is organically holisitic and 
metabolically intact, but who confounds the assumptions by which death is ordinarily 
pronounced. 
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Examples of prolonged somatic survival with brain death have been well documented. 
In a paper presented at Cambridge, Shewmon described a child who had suffered 
massive bi^in damage due to meningitis. He showed a flat EEG, no spontaneous 
respiration, and fulfilled all clinical criteria for brain death. The child has survived in 
this state for 14 years. Further tests confirmed this extraordinary diagnosis: evoked 
potentials showed no cortical or brain stem responses; magnetic resonance showed no 
intercranial blood flow,..It was illuminating to see the reaction to this evidence by a 
physician responding for the official view. He stated quite calmly that this case must 
be one of misdiagnosis. This was even after a slide had been shown of the MRl scan 
showing *the entire brain, including the brain stem, had been replaced by ghost like 
tissues and disorganized proteinaceous fluids'. The child was evidently brain dead 
though his body survived 14 years (and still does at the time of writing). This case is 
the most extreme, but it is only one of many documented cases of prolonged somatic 
survival with brain death. (Jones, 2000, p. 98) 
I quote all these confusing documents concerning the determination of death not to 
enter an argument with 'Pro-life' regarding related topics of stem-cell research or 
abortion, or organ donation, or euthanasia. I quote these learned articles in my attempt to 
illustrate how nebulous or contentious definitions of death are to those whose duty it is to 
define it. To these anaesthetists, cardiologists and neurosurgeons death does not form a 
simple binary with life. Death is a cluster of factors that form a 'syndrome'. If enough of 
those factors are present in a patient then a doctor can pronounce the patient dead; but 
some of the factors conceming death are open to debate and subject to the discernment of 
those observing. As I have indicated in my discussion of automatic states, some events 
look one way to an observer but feel very differently to the person observed. 
This thesis has argued that consciousness does not constitute a natural kind of use to 
science. If one can't adequately define consciousness, what does one look for in a 
diagnosis of unconsciousness? If even the grand distinctions in consciousness such as 
between ' l i fe ' and 'death' are difficult to make and, even in medicine, riddled with 
indecision, what point a nicer definition of its aggregates? 
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Between life and death is a borderland rather than a borderline. It is still arguable 
when death occurs even if one is clear regarding the currently employed clinical 
definitions. l.C.U. (Intensive Care Unit) technology means that life is sustainable beyond 
cardio-respiratory failure. Is brain death what we would want to call death? Or do people 
revive from brain death? What is it that we want to have happened for a verdict of death 
to be given by those responsible for giving it? A loss of personhood legal or 
epistemological or spiritual or medical, or something else? 
Anaesthetists won't agree on what constitutes consciousness in a patient. They have 
acceptable levels of pain and arousal. Consciousness to an observing anaesthetist is an 
ascending scale. Every stimulus registers, but only some stimuli register above a level of 
awareness that one would be explicitly conscious of. Is it just that we want it not to hurt? 
We may look to death to give us clear definitions of the way we live. 
The lexical history of the terms referring to consciousness and unconsciousness 
begins relatively recendy. I have quoted Kathleen Wilkes to demonstrate that the terms 
may not refer to anything that it is useful to discuss, or that is inescapably important, and 
the late appearance of the terms in the history of the English language indicate the same. 
Julian Jaynes's work illustrates that consciousness refers to something vague; something 
that has been marginal in human behaviour now elevated to a central position (in 
philosophy, psychology and bio-ethics). 
If our death is indistinct this is no more than the ablative of our blurry definition of 
consciousness in life. I don't just mean this linguistically (though the lexical and 
performative histories of the terms tell this same story); I mean to indicate how barely 
there we may be said to be. If we can be said to be *there' at all it is in such a confusing 
206 
multiplicity that any attempt at definition is bound to fail. Our 'personalities' may be said 
to be 'ours' as much as is a ventriloquist dummy's, and accrete to us in much the same 
way. 
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